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I Dissent: The Federal Circuit’s “Great
Dissenter,” Her Influence on the
Patent Dialogue, and Why It Matters
Daryl Lim*

ABSTRACT
This Article is the first study to comprehensively explore the
centrality of the patent dialogue at the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, the nation’s principal patent court from empirical, doctrinal,
and policy perspectives. It offers several insights into how the Federal
Circuit reaches consensus and when it does not, serving as a window
into its inner workings, a reference to academics, judges, and attorneys
alike. More broadly, this Article provides a template to study the “legal
dialogue” of other judges at the Federal Circuit, those in other Circuits,
as well as those in other areas of the law.
The Article looks through the lens of one of the Federal Circuit’s
founders, Judge Pauline Newman, whose opinions have been
instrumental in developing patent law over the last thirty years. These
opinions reveal the consistency and coherence of her judicial
philosophy and a sincere commitment to the mission of the Federal
Circuit, a court she helped to create.
Moreover, her dissents,
particularly over the last twenty years, serve as an institutional record
for course correction even as the court continues to navigate new fault
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lines brought about by the America Invents Act, the globalization of
patent litigation, and disruptive technologies that challenge the
compact of patent law today.
The study involved a review of 1,789 cases and 4,981 law review
articles to give 10,461 datapoints. An in-person interview with Judge
Newman, conducted over two sessions, complements the quantitative
dimension of this Article. Her frank insights fill the gaps in the facts
and quantitative findings. They also provide a fresh and reflective
assessment of her dissents.
The data confirms that Judge Newman is the Federal Circuit’s
most prolific dissenter and that her dissents resonate with the Supreme
Court, her colleagues, and academic commentators more than those of
any other Federal Circuit judge. The data identifies her ideological
supporters and detractors on the court, but her influence with those
people and the industry is more nuanced than it might appear at first
blush. The Article also will paint the nuanced picture of her influence
on critical challenges in patent law that the Federal Circuit continues
to contend with today.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most dissents do not matter, which is how it should be. Society
benefits most from cases that are correctly decided, even if not all of
them are unanimous. Dissents, when they occur, are rarely heeded
because society is chiefly concerned with the law as it is declared, not
what the dissent thinks it might or ought to be.1 Thus the dissents
often fade into obscurity and the majority holding becomes the
conventional wisdom over time.
However, the fact remains that judging is an imperfect art.
Judges must decide cases whether or not they know the correct

1.
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 18–19 (1955) (“The technique of the dissenter often is to exaggerate the holding of
the Court beyond the meaning of the majority and then to blast away at the excess. So the poor
lawyer with a similar case does not know whether the majority opinion meant what it seemed to
say or what the minority said it meant.”).
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answer and usually under pressing time constraints.2 Dissents matter
because, though change is not always obvious, the judicial dialogue
sharpens and strengthens the law.3 Even when the issue is fully
canvassed and the dissenting judge’s battle for the majority vote is
lost, hers may be the clarion call that turns the tide of ideas.
Nearly every area of law is marked by the lasting effect of
dissents. Justice Holmes argued for a freedom of expression that
knows few bounds.4 Justice Black argued that in order to have a fair
trial, defendants in criminal trials needed the benefit of counsel.5
Justice Murphy argued that even wartime concerns did not exonerate
the Supreme Court’s complicity with the confinement of JapaneseAmericans in internment camps.6
Justice Harlan objected to
segregation flowing from slavery and argued that the Constitution is
color-blind, an ideal yet to be achieved.7
The same clash takes place at the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. Like the Supreme Court, it is seated in Washington,
D.C., but their similarities run deeper still. Constituted in 1982, the
Federal Circuit is the Nation’s “de facto supreme court of patents.”8 It
adjudicates more than two hundred patent cases and issues over one
hundred precedential patent opinions annually.9 The court has
exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, which means that, unlike
other circuit courts of appeals, there is no possibility of a circuit split

2.
RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY, at xi
(2016) (“[A] judge has to decide a case presented to him (provided that it’s within his jurisdiction)
even if he has no clear idea of what the decision should be. He can’t wait, as a law professor
contemplating writing a law review article can, for inspiration to strike.”).
3.
See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (“We therefore leave to the
lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”).
4.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (“[T]he best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”); see also THOMAS HEALY, THE
GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND–AND CHANGED THE
HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 5 (2013) (“As expected, it caused a sensation.
Conservatives denounced it as dangerous and extreme. Progressives hailed it as a monument to
liberty. And the future of free speech was forever changed.”).
5.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
6.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting); see
PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 335
(1983); Eugene Rostow, The Japanese American Cases: A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 509 (1945).
7.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
8.
Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 387, 387; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c)–(d), 1295 (2012) (referring to “exclusive” jurisdiction);
Federal Circuit Act 1982, 96 Stat. 25 (Apr. 2, 1982).
9.
Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 350,
353 (2014) (“[I]n 2011, the Federal Circuit stopped compiling this useful caseload data.”).
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to attract certiorari.10 It has the last word on patent law unless and
until the Supreme Court decides to intervene, which only happens for
1.2 out of every hundred patent cases.11 By comparison, the Court’s
general acceptance rate is 2.8 out of every hundred cases.12
Just as dissents at the Supreme Court contribute to the
constitutional dialogue, dissents at the Federal Circuit shape the
patent dialogue. This jurisprudential tool has enabled the United
States to meet the needs of a country that continues to lead the world
in technological progress.13 The dialogue within the Federal Circuit
reflects a broader dialogue taking place among stakeholders in patent
law.14 With no possibility of circuit splits and only a miniscule
number of cases reaching the Supreme Court, patent law dissents
within this cloistered arrangement take on a unique and crucial
significance.
Judicial decision making at the Federal Circuit has been a
topic of significant commentary and popular interest,15 and it has in
recent times even caught the attention of the mainstream media.16

10.
See, e.g., Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 322 (2014).
While the Federal Circuit’s portfolio covers a number of areas including federal
claims, veterans’ claims, international trade dispute claims, and federal employment
claims, it is perhaps best known for its role as the nation’s appellate patent court. It
was a new kind of court, an experimental court created especially for the adjudication
of patent rights, and the first of its kind anywhere in the world.
Id.
11.
Ryan Stephenson, Federal Circuit Case Selection at the Supreme Court: An
Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 281 (2013).
12.
Success Rate of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court, SUP. CT.
PRESS,
http://www.supremecourtpress.com/chance_of_success.html
[https://perma.cc/KYU5JDHV] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).
13.
Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 97 (2000) (“[T]he value that attaches to discourse
about law and governance that occurs between and among the different organs of the federal and
state
governments.”);
The
Innovation
Game,
ECONOMIST
(Sept.
17,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/09/global-innovation-rankings
[https://perma.cc/7GHE-U8KZ].
14.
See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A
CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 312 (1941) (“Conflicts which have divided the Justices
always mirror a conflict which pervades society.”).
15.
Jason Rantanen, Empirical Analyses of Judicial Opinions: Methodology, Metrics and
the Federal Circuit, 49 CONN. L. REV. 227, 227 (2016) (“Despite the popularity of empirical
studies of the Federal Circuit’s patent law decisions, a comprehensive picture of those decisions
has only recently begun to emerge.”).
16.
See, e.g., Scott Graham, Federal Circuit Splinters over Patent Board’s Picky Ways,
RECORDER (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202741648317/Federal-CircuitSplinters-Over-Patent-Boards-Picky-Ways?slreturn=20160611123941
[https://perma.cc/F52FLBWQ]; Andrew Pollack, Ruling Upholds Gene Patent in Cancer Test, N.Y. TIMES (July 29,
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However, the patent dialogue is not easily understood. Like tax law
and bankruptcy law, the ruminations of patent law judges seem
arcane even to the Supreme Court.17 Yet in a functioning democracy,
that dialogue should be made more accessible. This Article offers a
“Rosetta Stone” to help demystify that process. It provides an
unprecedented analysis of the patent dialogue through the eyes of one
judge who is well suited for this endeavor.
Judge Pauline Newman has earned a reputation as the Federal
Circuit’s “Great Dissenter” over her more than thirty years with the
court, longer than any judge at that court.18 By the time Judge
Newman was nominated to the Federal Circuit by President Ronald
Reagan in 1984, she had spent thirty years as a patent attorney and
played a role in shepherding the court’s formation.19 At ninety, she
remains an active judge and is the court’s institutional memory bank.
The combination of her judicial longevity and her reputation for
dissents offers a unique and invaluable perspective into the evolution
of the patent dialogue within the Federal Circuit.
“The Federal Circuit Court has six judges who have been on
the bench for less than five years, four of whom have been on the
bench for three years or less.”20 Practitioners note that “[t]he large
number of newly appointed judges made it difficult to predict how the
Federal Circuit would rule on intellectual property issues. Indeed,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/30/business/gene-patent-in-cancer-test-upheld-byappeals-panel.html [https://perma.cc/2RMM-HPVQ].
17.
See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Justice Scalia: Hardest Decision “Probably a Patent Case,” IP
WATCHDOG (July 25, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/07/25/justice-scalia-hardest
-decision-probably-a-patent-case/id=26743/.
18.
Vin Gurrieri, Newman Cements Status as Fed. Circ.’s Great Dissenter, LAW360 (Mar.
8, 2016, 10:19 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/767350/newman-cements-status-as-fed-circs-great-dissenter [https://perma.cc/F9TB-U6M5] (“Federal Circuit Judge Pauline Newman has
built a reputation as the appellate court’s most prolific contrarian . . . .”).
19.
Blake R. Hartz, Newman, J., Dissenting: Another Vision of the Federal Circuit, 3 IP
THEORY
47,
47
(2012),
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1019&context=ipt [https://perma.cc/T72G-EZB5] (noting that Judge Newman is “one of
the central figures in the creation of the Federal Circuit” and “the first judge appointed directly
to the Federal Circuit”); see also Pauline Newman, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. APP. FED. CIR.,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/pauline-newman-circuit-judge
[https://perma.cc/T244MDPF] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).
From 1982 to 1984, Judge Newman was Special Adviser to the United States
Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property. She served on the advisory committee to the
Domestic Policy Review of Industrial Innovation from 1978 to 1979 and on the State
Department Advisory Committee on International Intellectual Property from 1974 to
1984.
Id.
20.
Olivia T. Luk et al., 2014 Patent Law Decisions on Key Issues at the Federal Circuit,
64 AM. U. L. REV. 735, 805 (2015); see also infra Section II.C.1.
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many of the highlighted cases included vigorous dissents.”21 At a time
when members of the Federal Circuit are being replaced at an
unprecedented rate, it is even more important to remember the
reasoning behind countervailing currents against which the majority’s
decisions stood, and if necessary, to reconsider the reasoning of those
decisions.
This Article looks at the doctrinal, empirical, and policy
dimensions of the patent dialogue through the lens of Judge
Newman’s dissents. Part II introduces the dynamics of a judicial
dissent. It explains why judges dissent and looks specifically at the
Federal Circuit and its “Great Dissenter.” Part III presents a
quantitative study comprised of all Judge Newman’s 210 patent law
dissents over three decades. To provide context for the findings, the
dissents of her colleagues in appropriate instances are discussed.
Overall, the study involved a review of 1,789 cases and 4,981 law
review articles to give 10,461 datapoints. Like pieces of a mosaic, they
reveal the profound influence of one remarkable woman on the
nation’s patent dialogue.
The data confirms that Judge Newman is the Federal Circuit’s
most prolific dissenter22 and that her dissents resonate with the
Supreme Court, her colleagues, and academic commentators more
than those of any other Federal Circuit judge.23 She dissents most
often in chemical and biopharma industries cases.24
The data
identifies her ideological supporters and detractors on the court, but
her influence with them and with the industry is more nuanced than
it might appear at first blush.25
Judge Newman is consistent, doctrinally. Most of her dissents
concern validity issues, especially on issues of novelty and
nonobviousness.26 Other dissents of hers argue that district courts
should be given more discretion than the majority sometimes allows, a
view that the Supreme Court has vindicated.27 Judge Newman has
also been concerned about the manner in which the Federal Circuit

21.
Luk, supra note 20, at 805.
22.
See infra Section III.A.
23.
See infra Section III.B.
24.
See infra Section III.C.
25.
See infra Section III.D.
26.
See infra Section III.E.
27.
See, e.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 776 F.3d 837
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 189 (2015), abrogated by Halo
Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (committing determination as to whether
to award such damages to district court’s discretion and providing that appellate review should
be for abuse of discretion).
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has, at times, restricted the doctrine of equivalents and expanded the
defense of inequitable conduct to the detriment of patentees.28
Each of these views spelled out in Judge Newman’s dissents
has been upheld by the Supreme Court,29 as have many of her views in
other areas of patent law.30 In recent years, her dissents have also
reflected the evolving nature of the court’s docket, including the
relationship between the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), an
administrative tribunal within the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO), and the courts.31
As a whole, Judge Newman’s dissents reveal the consistency
and coherence of her judicial philosophy and a sincere commitment to
the mission of the Federal Circuit to promote innovation. The same
judicial philosophy that adheres strictly to statutory intent also
compels her dissents to alert stakeholders when her colleagues have
departed from it over the years. Moreover, an in-person interview
with Judge Newman complements the quantitative dimension of this
study. An interview with Judge Newman was clearly an honor not
always granted.32 Her frank insights fill the gaps in the facts and
quantitative findings. They also provide a fresh and reflective
assessment of her dissents. The most rewarding moments came when
she would remark, “I didn’t know that!”
Every dimension the Article forays into raises its own set of
limitations. The doctrinal study of her dissents may give rise to a
sense that Judge Newman’s majority opinions do not matter. They do,
but over the years, they become less frequent and her dissents more
28.
See infra Sections III.E.2–3.
29.
See, e.g., Intermatic Inc. v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 273 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1016, 123 S. Ct. 549 (2002), vacated, 60 F. App’x 805 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated,
535 U.S. 722, 742; Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated
by Festo Corp., 234 F.3d 558; see also infra Section III.E.2.
30.
See, e.g., Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
vacated in part by 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928, 1931 (2015) (good faith of invalidity belief not a defense
to inducement); Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171 (Fed.
Cir. 2012), vacated, 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (standard for willful infringement
includes an estimation of the reasonableness of the accused infringer’s view of patent validity
and infringement); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2115 (2014) (inducement rests on a finding of direct infringement);
Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010), overruled by
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 545 U.S. 193,
206 (2005) (affirming her view of the experimental use exception); see also infra Section III.E.
31.
See infra Section III.E.5.
32.
Scott Graham, In Era of Reform, a Patent Pioneer Slips out of Step, LAW.COM (Sept.
19, 2016), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/09/19/in-era-of-reform-a-patent-pioneer-slipsout-of-step/ [https://perma.cc/EN3T-RUE8] (“Newman declined an extended interview.”).
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frequent.33 This result is neither unintentional nor unfortunate. As
Judge Newman explained, “I may assign the opinion to another
member of the panel, in order to have time for those cases that I think
need a dissent.”34
Similarly, a thematic study of issues where she dissents
necessarily leads to some atomization of the discussion. However, her
vision for the arc of patent policy remains cogent throughout her more
than thirty years on the court.35 Finally, as with any empirical
endeavor, methodology and data impose their own limitations, which
are discussed in Part III.
In sum, this Article offers commentators, stakeholders, and the
courts an institutional record of the patent dialogue within the
Federal Circuit spanning thirty years through the eyes of one
extraordinary woman. Judge Newman’s wisdom in her dissents is
presented in a comprehensive yet accessible account for those seeking
guidance to “course correct” even as the court continues to navigate
new fault lines brought about by the America Invents Act, the
globalization of patent litigation, and disruptive technologies that
challenge the compact of patent law today.
More broadly, this Article provides a template to study the
opinions of other judges at the Federal Circuit, those in other Circuits,
as well as those in other areas of the law. It establishes that dissents
have an impact on the development of the law as well as the public
understanding of it and its development. It offers a number of
insights about how the Federal Circuit actually reaches consensus and
when it does not, serving as an insight into the workings of the court,
which is valuable both to attorneys and academics alike.
II. THE DYNAMICS OF DISSENT
Placing Judge Newman’s dissents in the context of history and
judicial strategy helps one appreciate more fully why her dissents are
so significant. Dissents in the law have an ancient vintage. The
Talmud tell us that “[a]n individual opinion is cited along with the
majority opinion as it may be needed at some time in the future.”36

33.
Id. (“Over the past two years, her dissents have spiked—they outnumber majority
opinions more than 3 to 1.”).
34.
Id.
35.
See, e.g., id. (quoting Fish & Richardson appellate specialist John Dragseth: “She can
fit the latest craze into a longer history and point out where it’s not what everyone thinks it is,
because she’s seen it all before.”).
36.
Menachem Elon, Freedom of Expression and Protection of Minority Rights in Jewish
Law,
OWL
—
MINISTRY
EDUC.,

882

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. XIX:4:873

Dissents are also a critical part of what it means to be American.
Colonial settlers in the New World were religious or political
dissenters.37 The American Revolution was a violent, bloody dissent
from the policies of King George III.38 Soon after the Constitution was
ratified, the Founding Fathers swiftly enacted its First Amendment,
enshrining the belief that the voice of dissenters must always be part
of the Constitutional dialogue, even when waged against truth that
appears immutable and universal.39
In the post-Revolution years, the Supreme Court followed the
British practice of seriatim, where each judge wrote a separate
opinion.40 In many cases, however, the Justices varied so much in
their reasoning that it was hard to decipher who won or why they did
so.41 Chief Justice Marshall broke with tradition and adopted the
practice of announcing unanimous judgments of the Court.42 He
delivered the opinions even when he did not write them and even
when they were contrary to his own judgment and vote.43 Unanimity
was sought as an ideal to be safeguarded, for it consolidated the
authority of the Court and aided in the general recognition of the
Third Branch as a co-equal partner to the other branches of
government.44
http://cms.education.gov.il/EducationCMS/Units/Owl/English/Pedagogic/Jewish/
[https://perma.cc/85CV-ZK8X] (last updated Dec. 28, 2005).
37.
See Kenneth C. Davis, America’s True History of Religious Tolerance,
SMITHSONIAN.COM (Oct. 2010), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/americas-true-historyof-religious-tolerance-61312684/?no-ist [https://perma.cc/VXK5-2R83].
38.
See generally DAVID MCCULLOUGH, 1776, at 3 (2006).
39.
See generally STEPHEN D. SOLOMON, REVOLUTIONARY DISSENT: HOW THE FOUNDING
GENERATION CREATED THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2016).
40.
MELVIN L. UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE COURT’S
HISTORY AND THE NATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 43 (2015).
These early seriatim opinions indicate several things. One, of course, is the inability of
the justices to agree on and articulate clear legal rationales for their decisions.
Second, the justices did not explicitly acknowledge their disagreement with one
another and concluded their opinions with a procedural statement on whether the
injunction should issue. In this way, the justices could openly disagree with each other
without explicitly dissenting.
Id.
41.
Id. at 6.
42.
Zoe Bell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial
Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 192–93 (1959); see, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419
(1793) (demonstrating the Supreme Court’s practice of justices writing separate opinions).
43.
David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal
Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 648 n.24 (1982).
44.
William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 433 (1986); see
also Samuel R. Olken, Chief Justice John Marshall and the Course of American Constitutional
History, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 743, 778 (2000) (“Adoption of majority opinions in place of
seriatim ones enabled the justices to present their views in a more uniform fashion, which
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Yet, the practice of judicial unanimity that began with Chief
Justice Marshall did not last, and despite the aspirations of current
Chief Justice John Roberts, there remains an opportunity for
dissent.45 Today, four in five Supreme Court decisions contain one or
more dissents and, as a result, dissents have become enshrined as an
important feature of the judicial decision making process.46 This is
true for the Federal Circuit too, where dissents are fairly common:
between 2010 and 2011, “about 25% of precedential decisions included
a dissenting opinion.”47
A. Why Do Judges Dissent?
It is easy to assume that disagreement is part of social
discourse in America.48 Justice Brennan noted that it was the ability
to encourage debate even after a decision has been reached that
makes Americans a “free and vital” people.49 The legal system is a
quintessential forum for arbitrating disagreements, so it is also
natural for us to assume that a degree of dissent should exist between
judges as well.50 Yet it might properly be asked why, as a practical
matter, judges would express their dissent at all.

although it did not prevent the creation of concurring and dissenting opinions, nevertheless
increased the solemnity and precedential weight of Supreme Court decisions essential in a
constitutional democracy.”).
45.
See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative
Judicial Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 583, 623 (1994) (“With the exception of the very first period
of Supreme Court history (1789-1804), dissent has played a vital role in each successive period of
the Court’s history. Hence it is safe to conclude that judges in American courts should always
feel free whenever necessary to disagree openly and publicly—that is, in dissents—with one
another.”); UROFSKY, supra note 40, at ix (“When John G. Roberts Jr. testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee at his confirmation hearings in 2005, he indicated that he hoped the Court
would return to its older practice of speaking with one voice—unanimous opinions founded on
narrow grounds. Nearly everyone familiar with the Court and its history—scholars and
practitioners alike—surely smiled at Roberts’s seeming naïveté, and his dream evaporated
almost as soon as he took the oath as chief justice.”).
46.
UROFSKY, supra note 40, at 3 (2015); see also LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF RATIONAL CHOICE 266 fig.6.1 (2013).
47.
Dennis Crouch, Dissents: Judges Newman and Dyk, PATENTLYO (Sept. 23, 2011),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/dissents-judges-newman-and-dyk.html
[https://perma.cc/U2C7-Z4ER].
48.
Brennan, Jr., supra note 44, at 438 (“The right to dissent is one of the great and
cherished freedoms that we enjoy by reason of the excellent accident of our American births.”).
49.
Id. at 437 (“We are a free and vital people because we not only allow, we encourage
debate, and because we do not shut down communication as soon as a decision is reached.”).
50.
POSNER, supra note 2, at 5–7 (“The reason is the adversary nature of American law.
Disagreement and debate are fundamental to it, just as rivalry is fundamental to professional
sports.”).
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To a skeptic, dissents are an exercise in self-indulgence.51 The
majority, presumably as competent as the dissent, reviewed the same
material and decided the case differently. Future courts look to the
majority, not the dissent, for the law. Dissents risk undermining
public confidence in the judicial system,52 may weaken the force of the
decision, and detract from the Court’s institutional prestige.53 Even
Justice Holmes, known as “the Great Dissenter,” remarked that
dissents are generally “useless” and “undesirable.”54
Dissents could also incite some to continue holding on to their
belief about what the law should be and even act upon it.55 For
instance, Chief Justice Warren was concerned that a dissent
suggesting that school segregation was constitutional might provide
those in favor of continued segregation with ammunition to disrupt
the already dicey implementation of the law.56 Some continental legal
systems are very concerned that dissents might damage the law if the
51.
See Letter from William Howard Taft to Willis Van Devanter (Dec. 26, 1921) (on file
with the Library of Congress), quoted in ROBERT POST, THE SUPREME COURT OPINION AS
INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: DISSENT, LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, AND DECISIONMAKING IN THE TAFT
COURT 42 (2001), http://ssrn.com/abstract=265946 [https://perma.cc/578V-27KG] (describing
dissents as “a form of egotism [that] don’t do any good, and only weaken the prestige of the
Court. It is much more important what the Court thinks than what anyone thinks”).
52.
UROFSKY, supra note 40, at 45.
Marshall strongly believed, as have many others, that the ruling in a case should be
seen by the public as the decision of a collective court rather than of the author. The
unanimity of a court added to its prestige and influence. In this institutional
approach, dissents can be viewed as undermining the legitimacy of the Court’s voice.
Dissents are the products of one or more justices who openly disagree with the
majority and shatter the illusion of a unanimous tribunal speaking in one voice.
Id.
53.
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958) (arguing that dissent “cancels the
impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so largely depends”);
Brennan, Jr., supra note 44, at 429 (“Some contend that the dissent is an exercise in futility, or,
worse still, a ‘cloud’ on the majority decision that detracts from the legitimacy that the law
requires and from the prestige of the institution that issues the law.”).
54.
N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
55.
MARK TUSHNET, I DISSENT: GREAT OPPOSING OPINIONS IN LANDMARK SUPREME
COURT CASES, at XIV (2008) (giving the example that government officials may rely on a dissent
as a signal to lower courts that they need not be too stringent in applying a rule).
56.
Id.; see also “With an Even Hand”: Brown v. Board at Fifty, LIBR. CONGRESS,
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-aftermath.html [https://perma.cc/MBY7-ZDR5] (last
visited Mar. 2, 2017).
A number of school districts in the Southern and border states desegregated
peacefully. Elsewhere, white resistance to school desegregation resulted in open
defiance and violent confrontations, requiring the use of federal troops in Little Rock,
Arkansas, in 1957. Efforts to end segregation in Southern colleges were also marred
by obstinate refusals to welcome African Americans into previously all-white student
bodies.
Id.
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public perceived the majority’s decision as being driven by personal
preferences.57 Some jurisdictions even criminally sanction judges who
dare to publish a dissent or even to make it known that there was
disagreement in the court.58
Even where it is legal to dissent, dissents can damage the
amicability among those on the bench. Judges, like the rest of us, do
not like to be criticized. Dissents fray the collegiality central to smallgroup appellate decision making.59 The judge writing for the majority
will likely have to revise the opinion to parry punches thrown by the
dissent, or worse, risk losing the other judge or judges to the dissent.
Beyond disadvantaging the majority writer, dissents can cause
trouble for dissenters. Dissenting judges may find their views less
influential, or worse, lose the tipping vote in future cases. Justice
McReynolds’s petulant dissents failed to have much impact “in part
because of their strident tone.”60 Similarly Justice Frankfurter
“managed to alienate most of his colleagues by both his abrasive
personality and his endless and pedantic separate opinions.”61 Unless
the dissent can show convincingly that the majority is mistaken or
failed to consider a different point of view, it will rarely rise beyond an
angry tirade.62 Left to fester, the consequences can be grave indeed.
Dissenting creates bitter factions and may over time lead the
dissenting judge to prematurely leave the court itself.63
Unsurprisingly, new judges are warned “against dissenting at
the drop of a hat, and against bluster, exaggeration, anger, and
snideness directed toward their colleagues whether in person or in

57.
TUSHNET, supra note 55, at XIII.
58.
Id.
59.
Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and Effects
of Decision-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 659, 694–96, 696
tbl.5 (2007).
60.
UROFSKY, supra note 40, at 13.
61.
Id. at 20.
62.
See Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, When Justices (Subconsciously) Attack:
The Theory of Argumentative Threat and the Supreme Court, 91 OR. L. REV. 933, 958 (2013)
(“[A]lienated from the majority, a Supreme Court Justice subconsciously (and irrationally)
resorts to the universally censured intensifier in an attempt to bolster the losing argument. The
theory of argumentative threat is consistent with social psychology theories suggesting that
language use changes in response to a perceived threat.”).
63.
POSNER, supra note 2, at 235.
An unfounded belief in the rightness of one’s judicial ideas or methods (often,
paradoxically, a belief that is a consequence of insecurity) can be a source of bitter
disagreement with other judges. The result can be to multiply separate opinions, slow
down the work of the court, and even drive judges to resign, or to retire prematurely.
Id.
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opinions.”64 But even when refraining from such emotions in the
opinions, dissents take time and energy, and disrupt the court’s
schedule by holding up decisions. This may be so even with the help
of capable clerks and judicial interns. If dissenting is costly to the
judge in all these ways, one may be left asking why judges dissent at
all.
1. To Formally Express Disagreement
Judges may dissent because they see weaknesses in the
majority opinion and feel strongly enough to formally disagree. Those
weaknesses may be faulty reasoning or a failure to understand the
facts of the case. The dissent says to the majority, “I think you have
this wrong. You need to look at that case or provision again. You need
to ask other questions.”65
Judicial decision making is not an algorithmic relationship
between facts and law that produce a particular result.66 The result is
far more organic and less predictable. Judges are not simply human
calculators churning out opinions like times tables. Rather, like us,
they are people with biases and principles.67
And why not?
Clergymen differ on theology. Professors argue over philosophy. Hard
questions cause disagreement, and the hardest questions are the ones
that percolate up to the court system.68 So it is unsurprising that
judges disagree and do so publicly.69 Chief Justice Hughes wrote that:
64.
RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 35 (2013).
65.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 185–86 (2003) (arguing that the
potential of a colleague to dissent can “reduce the likelihood of . . . an incorrect or lawless
decision [and render a decision] more likely to be right, and less likely to be political in a
pejorative sense”).
66.
See HUGH HANSEN, SUSAN SCAFIDI & DARYL LIM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW,
POLICY AND NEW PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming 2017) (discussing this problem).
67.
DARYL LIM, RETOOLING ANTITRUST: UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS AT THE PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERFACE (forthcoming 2017).
68.
Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 826
(2005).
The cases that reach the court rarely are simple application of law to fact. Instead,
today’s appeals take us to the boundaries of the law, to the grey areas where
competing policies abut and there are sound legal arguments on both sides. With close
questions, diversity of judicial viewpoint is more frequent. Such diversity produces the
“percolation” that scholars feared would be lost to the Federal Circuit, and indeed can
lead to consensus strengthened by the deliberations in reaching it.
Id.
69.

POSNER, supra note 2, at 185.

It is highly unlikely, for example, that people opposed to abortion shrug their
shoulders and say to themselves: “I don’t like the decision in Roe v. Wade but I am
resigned to the fact that the law left the Justices with no choice.” I especially don’t see
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When unanimity can be obtained without sacrifice of conviction, it strongly
commends the decision to public confidence. But unanimity, which is merely
formal, which is recorded at the expense of strong, conflicting views, is not
desirable in a court of last resort, whatever may be the effect upon public opinion
at the time. That is so because what must ultimately sustain the court in public
confidence is the character and independence of the judges. They are not there
simply to decide cases, but to decide them as they think they should be decided,
and while it may be regrettable that they cannot always agree, it is better that
their independence should be maintained and recognized than that unanimity
should be secured through its sacrifice.70

As an exercise of independence, dissents also serve to highlight
the limits of judicial wisdom. By definition, an opinion, even if
unanimous, merely represents a perception of legal truth. Some
judges see dissenting as an obligation because Congress makes the
laws and judges interpret them.71 Since majority opinions may be
wrong, dissents inject accountability and thus integrity into the
judicial process.72
Justice Scalia observed that such dissents
“augment rather than diminish the prestige of the Court,”73 since
“[w]hen history demonstrates that one of the Court’s decisions has
been a truly horrendous mistake, it is comforting . . . to look back and
realize that at least some of the [J]ustices saw the danger clearly and
gave voice, often eloquent voice, to their concern.”74 In theory, the
same might be said for the Federal Circuit.
However, the
propositional challenge is the same whether the dissent occurs at the
Federal Circuit or at the Supreme Court. Until the last page of
history is written, all that might be said is that at a given point in
time, the dissent seemed to have found itself on the right side of the
course of events, and that may be sufficient reward.

how such an attitude could be maintained in a system, which is our system, in which
judicial dissents are public.
Id.
70.
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 67–68 (1928).
71.
Brennan, Jr., supra note 44, at 435 (“I elevate this responsibility to an obligation
because in our legal system judges have no power to declare law.”).
72.
Id. (“It restrains judges and keeps them accountable to the law and to the principles
that are the source of judicial authority. The integrity of the process through which a rule is
forged and fashioned is as important as the result itself; if it were not, the legitimacy of the rule
would be doubtful.”).
73.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010)
(quoting
Antonin
Scalia,
Dissents,
13
OAH
MAG.
HIST.
18,
22
(1998),
http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/judicial/scalia.html) [https://perma.cc/XA69-8TDZ]).
74.
Id.
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2. To Influence the Outcome
Judicial dialogue is often more nuanced than a note saying “I
am going to dissent.” Once the panel of deciding judges has voted, the
judge writing for the majority strains under multiple burdens. For
example, the author cannot stray too far from the tentative majority
view and yet must take into account the dissent in order to prevent
the other judges from changing their minds.75 Since this may lead to
the strategic assignment of a case to a judge whose views are closest to
the dissent, the majority opinion ends up taking a middle approach.76
The debate between judges deciding the case improves the final
product by forcing the majority to deal with the hardest questions
urged by the dissent. In compelling the majority to react to these
judicial speed bumps and warning signs, dissents sharpen the final
majority opinion.77 As a result of that conversation, the opposing
judge may not agree with the final holding but may successfully
restrict the jurisprudential rationale.78
In order for the majority to take their threat to dissent
seriously, dissenting judges must be prepared to publish their dissent
even if they fail.79 Justice Holmes was known to prepare his dissents
ahead of time so that he could send a draft to his colleagues as soon as

75.
UROFSKY, supra note 40, at 14 (“Nearly all justices have at one time or another said
that when writing a majority opinion, they have little leeway, because they have to present an
argument that will hold the other justices in the majority.”).
76.
Id. at 17; see also POSNER, supra note 2, at 235 (“The judge who banishes all doubt
from his opinions—who writes with an assurance that borders on cocksureness—not only gives a
misleading impression of the law’s certainty and the cogency of legal reasoning but also irritates
the judges who disagree with him.”).
77.
UROFSKY, supra note 40, at 18.
I write an opinion and you write a dissent. I read what you say and I think, ‘Did I
really say that? Oh dear. He has a good point. I better rewrite what I did. I better be
certain that my argument is as good as I thought it was the first time.’ The impact of
your dissent will be, at the least, to make me write a better opinion.
Id. (quoting Justice Stephen Breyer).
78.
See id. (“Nearly all judicial opinions will undergo at least minor revision as a result
of comments upon the initial draft.”).
79.
Vanessa Baird & Tonja Jacobi, How the Dissent Becomes the Majority: Using
Federalism to Transform Coalitions in the U.S. Supreme Court, 59 DUKE L.J. 183, 185–86 (2009)
(“A game theoretic twist on this view is that publication is necessary to make those drafts
credible threats.”). But see id.
But that argument necessarily assumes that dissenting is costly to the court,
presumably by harming judicial legitimacy and challenging the fiction of judges as
apolitical discoverers of law. Presumably, this harm applies as much to the dissenting
judge as to the majority judge, and so the theory cannot really explain why two-thirds
of all cases involve published dissents.
Id.
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the majority arrived.80 Occasionally, the dissent succeeds in turning
the tide and changing the majority vote.81 Justice Brennan said that
“it is a common experience that dissents change votes, even enough
votes to become the majority.”82
At the Federal Circuit, however, this rarely happens, according
to Judge Newman.83 The panel debates the various views and
concludes the majority position before any opinions are circulated.84
“By that time, there isn’t much room for swinging the majority via a
dissenting opinion. It’s very rare to see a switch in the decision.”85
Unlike Justice Holmes, Judge Newman does not prepare her dissents
ahead of time.86 “Until a case has been decided, whether unanimously
or by majority, I won’t know whether I will be a minority view, or the
grounds with which I don’t agree.”87
3. To Send a Signal
Dissents communicate to the losing party that its arguments
have been heard.88 It also promotes clarity in the law since readers
know what the judges actually decided. This “safeguards the integrity
of [the] judicial decision making process by keeping the majority
accountable for both the rationale and consequences of its decision.”89
80.
See HEALY, supra note 4, at 198.
81.
UROFSKY, supra note 40, at 14 (“Clearly, from the dissenter’s point of view, the best
result is that members of the majority will change their minds before the decision is handed
down, even if there is no written dissent. It is not a common occurrence, but it does happen.”); see
also HEALY, supra note 4, at 72 (“[S]omeone who knew that Holmes had written a dissent, joined
by Brandeis and the chief justice, and who suggested, improbably, that enough justices might
change their votes before the decision was announced to turn the dissent into a majority
opinion.”).
82.
FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE
SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 69 (2000); see, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319
U.S. 141 (1943) (Justice Stone’s draft dissent persuaded Justice Black, who had been assigned
the opinion, thus turning the dissent into the majority opinion); Ginsburg, supra note 73, at 4.
On occasion—not more than four times per term I would estimate—a dissent will be
so persuasive that it attracts the votes necessary to become the opinion of the Court. I
had the heady experience once of writing a dissent for myself and just one other
Justice; in time, it became the opinion of the Court from which only three of my
colleagues dissented.
Id.
83.
Interview with Judge Pauline Newman, Circuit Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in Washington, D.C. (July 29, 2016).
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
William A. Fletcher, Dissent, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 291, 298–99 (2009).
89.
Brennan, Jr., supra note 44, at 430.
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Dissents are also written with one eye on the present and the
other on the future. Chief Justice Hughes noted that:
A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to
the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the
error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have betrayed. Nor is
this appeal always in vain.90

Thus the dissent furnishes future litigants and courts with practical
guidance on distinguishing subsequent cases and seeking relief in a
more amenable forum.91
Chief Justice Hughes’s intuition has recently been validated by
contemporary empirical scholarship. Reflecting on their study on
judicial dissents, Professors Vanessa Baird and Tonja Jacobi suggest
that “at least some dissents may be explained as signals from judges
to litigants about how to frame future similar cases to increase the
chance of success for the argument the dissenting judge supports.”92
They point out that in some cases, the dissent’s view may gain traction
with the appointment of new judges.93
This is particularly true for the Federal Circuit. There has
been a significant turnover in recent years: seven in twelve judges
have six years of experience or less.94 Data suggests that these judges
are less stubborn and may be more open to reconsidering the dissent.95
As a result, the dissent can also identify “a potential fissure in
the majority coalition that can be exploited by future litigants.”96 The
dissent thus has the ability to “summon litigation with new case facts
amenable to an alternative legal argument, enabling the court to
reach an alternative conclusion.”97 In an appellate court like the
Federal Circuit, the dissent can tell the Supreme Court or future
panels that the majority’s rule needs to be examined carefully and
should be revised or overturned.

90.
HUGHES, supra note 70, at 68.
91.
Brennan, Jr., supra note 44, at 430 (“[T]he dissent . . . is offered as a corrective—in
the hope that the Court will mend the error of its ways in a later case.”).
92.
Baird & Jacobi, supra note 79, at 185–86; see also David Fontana, The People’s
Justice?, 123 YALE L.J.F. 447, 454 (2014) (“If Justices persuade these lawyers, they might
present in their brief or oral argument the precise arguments that the Justices themselves
articulated in their extrajudicial communications.”).
93.
Baird & Jacobi, supra note 79, at 186.
94.
Hartz, supra note 19, at 57.
95.
See Hartz, supra note 19, at 57 (“If the statistics for Judges O’Malley and Reyna
indicate that these judges are willing to depart from their current colleagues, they may be more
willing to depart from precedent and consider dissents of the past."). See infra Section III.D.
96.
Baird & Jacobi, supra note 79, at 186.
97.
Id.
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B. Why Study Dissent at the Federal Circuit?
But more than influencing new judges or even the Supreme
Court, the voice of dissent has a unique role in the Federal Circuit
found there and nowhere else. The Federal Circuit is unique among
the circuit courts. It is the only one whose jurisdiction is defined by
subject matter rather than geography.98 Prior to the Federal Circuit,
the regional federal appellate courts handled patent appeals except
those from the USPTO, which were reserved for the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals.99 Patent cases were inconsistently adjudicated
by the regional circuit courts of appeals based on whether they were
“pro-” or “anti-patent”100 leading to a “mad and undignified race” to
choose the forum in patent cases.101
This forum shopping meant that “the fate of duly examined and
issued patents had become so uncertain in the courts as to place a
cloud on patent-based investment.”102 Further, “patent validity could
be attacked in court after court, even after having been litigated and
upheld. Patent property had lost the reliable protection of a stable
law, and was cynically described as no more than a license to sue.”103
The costs of such a system were enormous, as Judge Newman

98.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a) (2012) (giving the Federal Circuit jurisdiction
over patent infringement suits or suits seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement); id.
§ 1295(a)(4)(A) (giving the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the PTO’s
Patent Trial and Appeal Board—typically, rejections of patent applications); id. § 1295(a)(6)
(giving the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals from investigations by the International
Trade Commission into the importation of goods alleged to infringe a US patent); Charles W.
Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More than a National Patent Court, 49 MO.
L. REV. 43, 44 (1984) (“The CAFC is unique among the circuit courts because its jurisdiction is
defined by subject matter instead of geography.”). The Federal Circuit also has jurisdiction over
other areas, including “trademark, tariff and customs law, technology transfer regulations, and
government contract and labor disputes.” Amanda R. Lang, A New Approach to Tort Reform: An
Argument for the Establishment of Specialized Medical Courts, 39 GA. L. REV. 293, 308 n.104
(2004).
99.
George C. Beighley, Jr., The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Has It Fulfilled
Congressional Expectations?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 671, 675–76 (2011).
100.
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981).
101.
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979: Hearings on S.677 and S.678 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong. 194 (1979). Patents and the laws that govern them are often described as complex.
Indeed, one of the reasons cited for why Congress established the Federal Circuit was because it
“felt that most judges didn’t understand the patent system and how it worked.” Pauline
Newman, Origins of the Federal Circuit: The Role of Industry, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 541, 542 (2002).
102.
Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit—A Reminiscence, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV.
513, 516 (1992).
103.
Id.
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explained: “the cost of guessing wrong about the law and its
application is rarely recoverable.”104
This commercial uncertainty rattled business leaders, who
lobbied Congress to address the issue.105 President Jimmy Carter
referred the matter to a new committee, the Domestic Policy Review,
which found that “patents had lost significant value as support for the
creation and commercialization of new technologies, that no
reasonable alternative existed or could be readily implemented, and
that some form of economic incentive was needed in order to support
investment in new technologies and improved productivity.”106 The
Domestic Policy Review thus proposed to increase USPTO funding
through maintenance fees, to institute a system of reexamination of
issued patents, and for a national court for patent appeals.107 The
committee hoped that a court experienced in technology “would
understand the policies underlying the patent law, eliminate forum
differences, and contribute stability and thus provide incentive to
patent-based commerce.”108 As a result, the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were combined to create the
Federal Circuit.109 Since then, the Federal Circuit has been regarded
as the de facto final adjudicative body in patent law.110 It has
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of all cases in the district courts
that “arise under” the patent law, in whole or in part.111
The establishment of a single appellate court for patent law
allowed the same law to be “routinely applied in review of
104.
Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial Activism?, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 683, 686–88 (1993).
105.
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, A HISTORY:
1982-1990, at 11 (Marion T. Bennett ed., 1991) (Judge Marion Bennett, writing the court’s
official history, noted that the court was “pressed by patent-dependent industry and much of the
patent bar”). At that same event, Senator Bob Dole recognized the “strong interest of business
representatives in this legislation” in passing the FCIA. The Ninth Annual Judicial Conference
of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 94 F.R.D. 347, 355 (May 25, 1982).
106.
Newman, supra note 68, at 822–23; see also Newman, supra note 102, at 516.
107.
See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION:
FINAL REPORT 155 (1979).
108.
Newman, supra note 68, at 822–23; see also S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2–6 (1981)
(stating that the purpose of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 was to create
administrative efficiency through uniformity).
109.
Beighley, Jr., supra note 99, at 673; see also Newman, supra note 102, at 516 (noting
that the court would be “founded on its patent jurisdiction, built on the framework of the
combination of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, both already
national courts of specified jurisdictions”).
110.
J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
58 (1981). The Supreme Court decides only a small number of appeals, which leaves the courts of
appeals as “mini-Supreme Courts in the vast majority of their cases.” Id.
111.
Newman, supra note 102, at 522.
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patentability in the Patent and Trademark Office and review of patent
validity in litigation.”112 Judge Newman noted that “[t]he practical
importance of this step is manifest when one considers that over
150,000 patent applications are processed annually by the patent
examining system, yet each patented invention that is successful in
the marketplace is subject to second-guessing in the courts.”113 The
Federal Circuit also “advanced the jurisprudence at a rate that would
have been impossible were not all appeals concentrated in one
court.”114 The early years were spent returning patent law “to its
jurisprudential roots.”115 Crucially, “[p]atent law was placed in the
perspective of the marketplace: the destination contemplated in the
Constitution.”116
However, there were dangers to this monolithic structure.
First, it prevented the creation of “circuit splits” that form the basis of
many petitions for certiorari and trigger the involvement of the
Supreme Court.117 This lack of a jurisprudential “conversation”
between the Federal Circuit and both the Courts of Appeals and the
Supreme Court has been noted throughout the Federal Circuit’s
history.118 Second, “stare decisis [has] occasionally been overtaken.
This counsels caution, for the value of the court depends on the
success with which it provides a stable and consistent law on which
the technology community can rely.”119 However, despite the call for
commentators challenging the exclusive channeling of patent appeals
to the Federal Circuit, the status quo shows no sign of change,
imbuing dissenting opinions with special importance.120
Since the Federal Circuit has the last word, its views must be
subject to revision over time, or else patent law risks slowly ossifying
into anachronism. When a Federal Circuit judge perceives that an
112.
Newman, supra note 104, at 686–88.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
Id. The court eliminated special rules such as synergism, and clarified many of the
rules of patentability. Id. The court removed many of the artifices and doctrines that had puzzled
inventors and confounded jurists. Id.
116.
Id.
117.
Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1623–24 (2007).
118.
Janis, supra note 8, at 389. The American Bar association’s opposition to the
creation of the Federal Circuit originally was due, in part, to the lack or ‘percolation’ of issues
with the other circuits. Newman, supra note 102, at 516–17.
119.
Newman, supra note 104, at 686–88.
120.
Diane P. Wood, Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in
Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 10 (2013) (arguing for letting appellants in
patent cases choose the forum, allowing them to appeal either to the Federal Circuit or to the
regional circuit encompassing the district court).
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interpretation of the Patent Act or the Supreme Court’s opinion on an
equitable doctrine has departed from its essential scope, the dissent
acts as the first line of defense, sounding the alarm to the rest of the
court. Judge Newman maintains that “the Federal Circuit itself airs
divergent viewpoints in important cases,” so issues “that may warrant
further judicial or legislative consideration” receive sufficient
attention.121
Professor Paul R. Gugliuzza agrees, writing that
“percolating forces do exist in the patent system. For example, in the
Federal Circuit, dissents critiquing existing doctrine are frequent and
often lead to en banc proceedings reexamining and sometimes
correcting the doctrine at issue.”122
Judge Newman is ever mindful of the Federal Circuit’s “special
obligation to provide predictability and consistency in patent
adjudication” based on the “nationwide effect” of its decisions.123 For
example, she once exhorted the court to “rethink, en banc, the
optimum approach to accuracy, consistency, and predictability in the
resolution of patent disputes, with due attention to judicial structure,
litigants’ needs, and the national interest in invention and
innovation.”124 Nationwide jurisdiction, she argued, also warrants an
“obligation” to undertake en banc reviews to maintain that stability.125
They serve both to “eliminate intra-circuit conflicts” as well as to

121.
Newman, supra note 68, at 823, 826 (“With close questions, diversity of judicial
viewpoint is more frequent. Such diversity produces the ‘percolation’ that scholars feared would
be lost to the Federal Circuit, and indeed can lead to consensus strengthened by the
deliberations in reaching it.”).
122.
Gugliuzza, supra note 9, at 351; see also Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge,
Disuniformity, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2007, 2019–20 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2351993
[https://perma.cc/C99L-76BE] (noting dissents being filed in roughly 25 percent of precedential
patent decisions and only about 60 percent of precedential patent opinions achieving unanimity).
123.
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1041–43 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Newman, J., dissenting from denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
124.
Id. (“I do not share the view, expressed here by some colleagues, that this court
should not intrude upon panel decisions when major errors of claim construction are pointed out
on petition for rehearing en banc.”).
125.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F.3d 1377, 1379–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“This adds weight to our obligation to
undertake en banc review, both to reestablish consistency in the law and to correct errors in
panel decisions.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 879 F.2d 849, 851 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Newman,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
The Federal Circuit has a role in our judicial system that is unique among the
circuits, in that our decisions are of national effect. There rests upon us a special
responsibility, for there is no other forum in which litigants may seek a different
result. We must be vigilant to our own errors, and receptive to self-correction. Both
the principle, and the specific question here raised, are of exceptional importance, and
require rehearing by the full court.
Id.
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“correct and deter panel opinions that are pretty clearly wrong.”126
According to Judge Newman, en banc cases should be heard when the
issue “has percolated through various panels of this court, on a variety
of facts.”127 This is because “[t]he differences of opinion among the
judges of the Federal Circuit, are, in microcosm, the ‘percolation’ that
scholars feared would be lost by a national court at the circuit level.
Percolation is the great justifier of conflict among the regional
circuits.”128 Yet even when the court sits en banc, its decisions can
still go wrong.129
The data collected for this study reveals that Judge Newman
argued that the en banc court should hear the issue in thirty-four out
of her 210 dissents (16.19 percent).130 Despite her exhortations about
the importance of using en banc rehearings to resolve conflicting case
law, however, the data shows that the court has generally been
unresponsive, granting en banc hearings only once.131
This unresponsiveness may also have contributed to the
Supreme Court being more active in accepting cert petitions from
losing parties at the Federal Circuit. However, dissents like those
written by Judge Newman may also play a role in the increased
Supreme Court scrutiny. Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss wrote that

126.
Pfizer, 488 F.3d at 1380–81.
127.
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
128.
Id.
129.
Pfizer, 488 F.3d at 1379–81 (quoting Justice Scalia’s observation that when the
Court reverses a regional court of appeals’ judgments consistently and by “lop-sided margins,”
the “error-reduction function” of en banc hearings “is not being performed effectively”); Pennwalt
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 954 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“This court, sitting in banc,
has dealt a conspicuous change to a major jurisprudence in patent cases: the judicially created
‘doctrine of equivalents’. The court has adopted a view of the ‘doctrine’ that facially contradicts
the leading decisions of this court and of the Supreme Court.”), disapproved by Cardinal Chem.
Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993); see also Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 970.
The formula with which the majority now seeks to imprison the doctrine defies this
mass of precedent. The Supreme Court consistently and expressly rejected the
principle adopted by the majority, and declined to restrain the equitable authority of
the courts. The purpose of the doctrine to avoid a “fraud on the patent”, and our
public responsibility, are ill served by the majority’s cavalier restatement of the law.
Id.
130.
See Hartz, supra note 19, at 57 (“Even if there is significant conflict at the court, the
likelihood of invoking the en banc court is small.”); see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining
Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 801, 817 (2010) (discussing how collegiality allows judges to reach a “mutually acceptable
judgment based on their shared sense of the proper outcome”).
131.
See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (granting an
en banc hearing on an issue of jurisdiction).
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“[o]ne thing the Federal Circuit has learned to do is to write dissents
that attract Supreme Court review.”132
In the first twenty years since its establishment, the Supreme
Court allowed the Federal Circuit a fair amount of latitude in
establishing its corpus of jurisprudence. In the last decade, however,
the Court has “repeatedly rebuked the Federal Circuit on issues of
patent law.”133 The Supreme Court’s constant refrain is one against
the Federal Circuit penchant for applying rigid rules134 and for
expanding its jurisdiction.135 Judge Frank M. Coffin, who served for
forty years on the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, noted
that, when there are good arguments on both sides and the court is
divided, “all the judges will welcome dissent.”136 The dissent may
“stimulate the Supreme Court to accept the case for review. On such
occasions, it happens that even judges on the majority side do not
hesitate to make suggestions that help strengthen the dissent.”137
Like genetic studies, the insulated nature of the Federal Circuit
provides a useful laboratory-like setting with which to study the
patent dialogue between the majority and the dissent. However,
within the ranks of the Federal Circuit judges, one judge’s dissents
stand out more than any other.

132.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What Ought We to
Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827, 840 (2010) (collecting cases); Hartz, supra note 19, at 57 (“The
importance of dissents in changing the law at the Federal Circuit may be even greater than in
other circuits given the Federal Circuit’s tendency to rely on its own cases and develop a
specialized law that is ‘substantially out of the mainstream.’”).
133.
Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1441
(2012); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme
Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 792 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court “has
recently begun to intervene regularly” in matters of patent law and that “it has reversed,
vacated, or questioned nearly every” Federal Circuit decision reviewed).
134.
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes
of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 808–14 (2008).
135.
Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1061 (2003).
136.
UROFSKY, supra note 40, at 18.
137.
Id.
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C. Patent Law’s “Great Dissenter”138
Patent law’s “Great Dissenter,” Judge Pauline Newman, sits at
the Federal Circuit. Born in New York to Maxwell and Rosella
Newman,139 she enrolled in Vassar College and remembers that “I was
in college in World War II and women moved into every traditional
male job . . . . It made clear to everyone, particularly to other women
as well, that there were no obstacles to doing the kind of work that
had been viewed as men’s work. . . . I was a child of that era . . . [and]
. . . I think it had a profound impact on the sort of person that I
was.”140
Graduating in 1947 as a double major in chemistry and
philosophy, she went on to obtain an M.A. in pure science from
Columbia University in 1948.141
Initially, she sought to be a
physician, but changed her mind and enrolled at Yale where she
obtained a Ph.D. in physical organic chemistry in 1952.142
Thereafter, Newman landed a job at American Cyanamid in
1951. She was the only female Ph.D. in “that very large chemical
research operation.”143 She worked there from 1951 to 1954, before
moving to FMC Corp., where, after finishing law school at New York

138.
The Supreme Court’s “Great Dissenter,” Justice John Marshall Harlan, is known for
his
frequent
and
influential
dissents.
John
Marshall
Harlan,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Marshall_Harlan [https://perma.cc/APP3-8A6G] (last visited
Aug. 1, 2016). Justice Harlan served on the Supreme Court for thirty-five years, from 1877 to
1911, in which time he wrote 703 opinions for the Court, 316 of which were dissents. UROFSKY,
supra note 40, at 105. Of his more influential dissents, most worthy of note is his dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson where no other justice joined him in his rejection of the constitutionality of
“separate but equal” facilities. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n view of the
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind. . . .”). Reflecting on the influence
of that dissent, Justice Brennan later wrote that “[Justice Harlan] spoke not only to his peers,
but to his society, and, more important, across time to later generations.” Brennan, Jr., supra
note 44, at 431–32.
139.
Pauline Newman, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Pauline_Newman
[https://perma.cc/MS3S-QF3T] (last visited Aug. 1, 2016); NYU Sch. of Law, Law Women Alumna
of
the
Year:
Judge
Pauline
Newman
‘58,
YOUTUBE
(Feb.
19,
2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aU7TdABOlD4 [https://perma.cc/EYZ6-6QNB] (“There was, of
course the Women’s Suffrage Movement. My mother was involved in that, but it wasn’t
something we talked about.”). Lynn Levine, Senior of Counsel in the Intellectual Property Group
at Morrison and Foerster, was the co-honoree.
140.
Pauline Newman, supra note 139; NYU Sch. of Law, supra note 139.
141.
Samantha Soper, AAVC Award for Distinguished Achievement, VASSAR (Winter
2001),
http://vq.vassar.edu/issues/2002/01/connecting/distinguished-achievement.html
[https://perma.cc/KQ32-9L2B] (presenting “Newman with the first annual Award for
Distinguished Achievement”).
142.
Id.
143.
Id.
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University, she spent fifteen years as a patent attorney and in-house
counsel, and another fifteen years as director of its Patent, Trademark
and Licensing Department. 144
While at FMC, she joined the patent committee of the Domestic
Policy Review.145 As a member of the committee President Carter put
to address the task of reviewing the issue of patent adjudication, she
said, “We decided that the problem wasn’t with the patent system.
The problem was with the judges. So the easy solution was that we
would get rid of all those judges. So they took patent appeals from the
regional circuit courts and gave it to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. And that the was impetus for the formation of that
court.”146
Judge Newman represented “102 companies and institutions”
at FMC, which together “represent a large—a very large—segment of
US technology-based industry” and “two of the major academic
research institutions of the country” before the Senate Subcommittee
on Courts.147 She spoke in support of a centralized court for appeals in
patent cases.148 She explained that patent law affects day-to-day
operations: “before the research is started, and during the steps of
creative development, as the technology evolves, as the millions of R &
D dollars are committed; and finally when the capital needs and
payout time and return on investment are calculated.”149

144.
Pauline Newman, supra note 139; Pauline Newman, Circuit Judge, supra note 19.
From 1982 to 1984, Judge Newman was Special Adviser to the United States Delegation to the
Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property. She served on the advisory committee to the Domestic Policy Review of Industrial
Innovation from 1978 to 1979 and on the State Department Advisory Committee on
International Intellectual Property from 1974 to 1984. From 1961 to 1962 she worked for the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization as a science policy specialist in
the Department of Natural Sciences. Id.
145.
Newman, supra note 102, at 514.
146.
NYU Sch. of Law, supra note 139.
147.
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1981 and State Justice Institute Act of 1981:
Hearings on S.21 and S.537 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 226 (1981).
148.
Id.; Newman, supra note 104, at 686–88.
In testifying on behalf of supporters of the court, I said: A centralized court that
understands the processes of invention and innovation, and the economic and
scientific purposes of a patent system, would be expected to apply a more consistent
interpretation of the standards of patentability and the other complex provisions of
the patent statute. With a consistent nationwide application of the law, I would hope
for and expect a greatly enhanced degree of predictability of the outcome of patent
litigation.
Id.
149.

Newman, supra note 102, at 517–18.
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A patent “particularly aids new businesses, for it supports
entry of new products against established competitors, and facilitates
entrepreneurial investment—but only to the extent that the patent
grant is legally reliable.”150 Unreliability prior to the Federal Circuit
was driving inventors to choose trade secret protection, which was
problematic because “secrecy negates the public disclosure that
accompanies patent issuance, and does not enlarge the nation’s
technological base.”151 Patents are preferable because “any enhanced
economic prospect that is available from a patent will favorably affect
the risk/return calculation, and thus will weigh on the side of
allocating resources toward innovation.”152
While in practice, Newman was asked to appear before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary. She remembered that “out
marched the corporate patent counsel . . . . We brought the industrial
might of the nation. We brought our chief executives and our research
directors and our union leaders. The industries that were now
working to create this court represented three-quarters of the nation’s
industrial product.”153 She noted that “[t]echnology was grown from
17 percent of the Gross Domestic Product to somewhere between 60
and 78 percent depending on how much weight you put on the
intellectual property component of technology based industry . . . the
source of our great domestic strength has changed the nation.”154
Howard Markey, the Federal Circuit’s inaugural Chief Judge,
alluded to her contribution. In a speech, he recognized those who had
“contributed so much to what will be the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit on October 1, 1982,” a group that included
representatives from Monsanto, DuPont, FMC Corporation, and
Combustion Engineering Corporation.155 She would soon join him on
its bench.
In 1984, Judge Newman was appointed to the first vacancy on
the Federal Circuit after it replaced and subsumed the United States
Court of Claims and the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals.156 She was nominated by President Reagan, the first judge
to be appointed directly to the Federal Circuit.157 Yet, the resistance
she faced as a woman continued. She said, “When I was nominated to
150.
Id. at 515.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
Gugliuzza, supra note 133, at 1458.
154.
NYU Sch. of Law, supra note 139.
155.
The Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, 94 F.R.D. 347, 350 (1982).
156.
Pauline Newman, Circuit Judge, supra note 19.
157.
Hartz, supra note 19, at 48.
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be a judge, a number of people spoke out, including some who I
thought were my friends, saying that they didn’t think that I could
handle the job.”158 Yet, when she was appointed, there was another
female judge on the court. “I wasn’t the first woman on the court.
There was a trademark lawyer, Helen Nies, who had been on the
court . . . so I was the second woman on that court. I think we
showed . . . that we could handle whatever job was thrown at us.”159
Judge Newman’s early experiences would come to shape her
judicial outlook in at least three important ways.
First, her
experience as a trailblazer, obtaining professional employment in a
predominantly male environment, demonstrated that she would not
shrink from taking a contrarian viewpoint. That experience, however,
had no apparent effect on the substance of her opinions. Second, her
experience as a research scientist convinced her that the law must
foster an environment that facilitates innovation.160 Third, her
experience in creating the Federal Circuit made its mission central to
her decisions. She declared that “the [Federal Circuit] was formed for
one need, to recover the value of the patent system as an incentive to
industry . . . . This was our mission—our only mission.”161 Her
reverence for the mission of the Federal Circuit was made clear where,
in one of her dissents, she acknowledged that “[a]lthough I’ve
occasionally criticized our treatment of the law, I never forget why we
were formed, or the state of the patent law before we arrived.”162
In order to properly assess the influence of a dissenting judge,
one must consider not only a sizable number of dissents but also the
length of his or her term on the court. While in theory an earthshattering dissent by a judge who has warmed his seat for a day may
be possible, even brilliant judges need time to settle in and ideas need
time to percolate and gain traction. As Professor Mark Tushnet noted,
“[t]he more recent the dissent, the harder it is to know what social,
economic, and political developments will occur that will lead to the
dissent to fall to the wayside or become important.”163 Judge Newman
meets both criteria in spades with more than thirty years on the bench
and more dissents than any Federal Circuit judge, past or present.
158.
NYU Sch. of Law, supra note 139.
159.
Id.
160.
See infra Section II.C.2. For a discussion on the impact of personal expertise on
judging, see Walter Kendall, Reflections on Judicial Review and the Plight of the Poor in a World
Where Nothing Works, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 555 (2004).
161.
Beighley, Jr., supra note 99, at 702 (quoting Hon. Pauline Newman, Circuit Judge,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Address to Federal Circuit Law Clerks (Feb. 5,
2010)).
162.
Hartz, supra note 19, at 48–49.
163.
TUSHNET, supra note 55, at xx–xxi.
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1. The Federal Circuit’s “Most Prolific Contrarian”
Law360 published an article in 2016 reporting that Judge
Newman “built her reputation as the appellate court’s most prolific
contrarian.”164 It observed that Judge Newman had filed more
dissents in the preceding year than any of her colleagues—even
trebling the amount written by Judge Timothy Dyk, who ranked
second for number of dissents that same year (see Figure 1 below).165
In the same article, Professor Arti Rai noted that Judge Newman
traditionally had a rate of dissent higher than those of her
colleagues.166 A decade before, Jones Day patent litigator Gregory
Castanias reported that Judge Newman wrote half of all the dissents
in patent cases that year.167
According to Judge Newman, “the formalized expression of
contrary views is part of jurisprudential culture, and may advance and
clarify the law.”168 She explained that she dissents when she thinks
the majority is wrong without regard to the composition of the
panel.169 She sees her job as a judge as an obligation to reach the
right decision, and to speak out if that has not been achieved.170 She
does not distinguish between a case where “the impact is billions of
dollars, or a single vaccine-injured child.”171 She is uninterested in
leaving a legacy: “My concern is to get things right in the present.”172

164.
165.

Gurrieri, supra note 18.
Id.

Over the past year, Judge Newman, known as the “great dissenter,” sat on the panel
that issued opinions for 73 patent cases and she dissented at least in part to
the majority’s decisions in 13 of those cases. Her rate of filing dissents—17.8
percent—far eclipsed that of any other Federal Circuit judge, with Judge Timothy B.
Dyk coming in second with four dissents in 76 patent cases he heard in which opinions
were issued, or about 5 percent.
Id.
166.
Id.
167.
Gregory A. Castanias et al., Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Law Decisions in
2006: A New Chapter in the Ongoing Dialogue with the Supreme Court, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 793,
978 tbl.2 (2007).
168.
Interview with Judge Pauline Newman, supra note 83.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.

902

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. XIX:4:873

FIGURE 1: JUDGE NEWMAN’S DISSENTS IN 2015
SOURCE: VIN GURRIERI, NEWMAN CEMENTS STATUS AS FED. CIRC.’S GREAT
DISSENTER, LAW360 (MARCH 8, 2016)

Judge Newman’s great number of dissents are not confined to
the court’s patent docket. In an article titled “The Federal Circuit’s
Great Dissenter and Her ‘National Policy of Fairness to Contractors,’”
Crowell & Morning Senior Counsel Stanfield Johnson observed that
“Judge Pauline Newman has dissented in a remarkable series of
appeals implicating important rights of government contractors. Her
dissents represent such a significant percentage of contract-related
appeals in which she participated that the government contracting
legal community may appropriately view her as the Federal Circuit’s
‘great dissenter.’”173
2. Of Suppressed Dissents
The study of dissents can be problematic because they may be
173.
W. Stanfield Johnson, The Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter and Her “National
Policy of Fairness to Contractors”, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 275, 276 (2011).
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written but buried by their authors. Some judges may prefer to avoid
dissents except in cases of strong disagreement. A two-judge majority
on an appellate panel may compromise with a third judge to avoid a
dissent.174 Justice Ginsburg pointed to “[a]n entire volume” that had
been devoted to the unpublished separate opinions of Justice
Brandeis.175 She noted that “[h]e would suppress his dissent if the
majority made ameliorating alterations or, even when he gained no
accommodations, if he thought the Court’s opinion was of limited
application and unlikely to cause real harm in future cases.”176
Judge Posner observed that “[m]ost judges do not like to
dissent” for a variety of reasons, including the perception that it
amplifies the majority opinion.177 Perhaps it was this aversion to
dissent openly that led him to observe that there is “[a] certain
staleness in the current judicial culture—a tendency of judges to recite
propositions of doubtful veracity just because they had been repeated
before; a lack of curiosity and imagination; a lack of clarity and
candor; and a weak sense of fact.”178
Judge Newman, however, does not duck a fight. Fish &
Richardson Principal John Dragseth noted that judges “sometimes sit
on certain disagreements they may have with colleagues on particular
cases, but Judge Newman is one who ‘wants to make sure she explains
herself.’”179 Dragseth explained that “[s]he’s been a patent lawyer
forever—since the 1970s . . . . She really understands the patent
system and feels it in her bones. She has strong views and will say if
she feels something isn’t quite right.”180
174.
Sheldon Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals,
1968 WIS. L. REV. 461, 479–80 (discussing the “give-and-take” of judicial decision making on the
courts of appeals); Cass R. Sunstein, Sober Lemmings, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE (Apr. 13, 2003),
https://newrepublic.com/article/64811/sober-lemmings [https://perma.cc/GJV4-UNDR] (describing
the conformism of federal judges).
175.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE
BRANDEIS (1957); see also UROFSKY, supra note 40, at 18.
In some instances, he decided to quash his opinion for strategic purposes, in that the
issue did not rank as high in his priorities as did other matters. But in some, the draft
dissent led the Court to change its mind, not necessarily coming over fully to
Brandeis’s position, but modifying its ruling to meet some of his objections.
Id.
176.
Ginsburg, supra note 73, at 3–4; see also CLARE CUSHMAN, COURTWATCHERS:
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS IN SUPREME COURT HISTORY 161 (2011) (Louis Brandeis told Holmes, “‘I
think this case is wrongly decided . . . . But you have restricted the opinion so closely to the facts
of the case, that I am inclined to think it will do less harm to let it pass unnoticed by dissent.’”).
177.
POSNER, supra note 64, at 32.
178.
POSNER, supra note 2, at ix–x.
179.
Gurrieri, supra note 18.
180.
Id.
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In an interview, she said, “I have not hesitated to comment
when I think that a panel isn’t going in quite [the] appropriate
direction. Others have felt that perhaps I haven’t gone in quite the
appropriate direction . . . . [A]ll in all it seems to me that it’s quite
healthy to present a certain amount of turmoil to practitioners in the
short run. But in the long-run I think the law is better for it.”181
Elsewhere, she emphasized the importance of this patent dialogue:
In all areas of patent law, new challenges will arise as new facts take litigated
cases to the boundaries of precedent. It is these cases that generate differences of
judicial opinion, for they reside at the abutment of conflicting legal theories and
policies. As the court reaches decisions that will narrow the grey areas and tighten
the boundaries, added predictability will be achieved; but with added struggle.
This struggle is usually expressed in dissenting opinions, whereby judges publish
the differences that they have been unable to reconcile.
The differences of opinion among the judges of the Federal Circuit, are, in
microcosm, the “percolation” that scholars feared would be lost by a national court
at the circuit level. Percolation is the great justifier of conflict among the regional
circuits. An issue will move up and down the various circuit courts, refining the
arguments and the policies and the nuances, testing variations of law in diverse
factual situations, until ripe for the Supreme Court. An excellent idea—but slow
and highly selective. There’s been a good deal of percolation in the Federal Circuit,
and there has been relatively little Supreme Court review. Our differences of
opinion are, I believe, healthy, and necessary. They weigh against the risks of
complacency and disaffection envisioned by opponents of the formation of the
Federal Circuit.182

The Federal Circuit’s precedent maintains a balance between access
and incentives,183 and her dissents serve as a yardstick of the Federal
Circuit’s history and purpose.184 In one, she wrote:

181.
Beighley, Jr., supra note 99, at 731.
182.
Newman, supra note 102, at 527–28.
183.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F.3d 1377, 1379–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (influencing “the
conduct of R & D, the costs of drug development, and the balance between generic access to
established products and the incentive to development of new products”); see also id.
[T]he pharmaceutical research companies point out that diminished access to
patenting will affect the kind and direction of product development; the generic
producers point out that the sooner they can enter the market for established drugs,
the lower the consumer price. The placement of the balance in this ever-present
conflict between innovator and copier has long engaged the public and Congress, and
needs must continue to do so. Meanwhile, however, it is inappropriate for a panel of
this court to make a change in the precedent by which both sides of the debate have
heretofore been bound.
Id.
184.
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“I write
to balance the historical record on which the majority bases its decision.”), disapproved by
Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
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[T]he reasons for the judicial restructuring that established this
court . . . illuminate the court’s role in the judicial system, and indeed allow me to
presume to the personal role of critic, drawing on my participation during the
creation of the court, my knowledge of the problems that this new judicial
structure was intended to solve, and my active support for its purposes.185

It is with this mantle of guardianship that Judge Newman holds the
Federal Circuit to its founding purpose.
She wrote that “[a]
centralized court that understands the processes of invention and
innovation, and the economic and scientific purposes of a patent
system, would be expected to apply a more consistent interpretation of
the standards of patentability and the other complex provisions of the
patent statute.”186
She also corrects the majority on the science, because “I
believed, as a lawyer in the private sector observing decisions in
patent cases, that not all judges understood the ways of technologists,
or investors, or the workings of the patent system.”187 She noted that
“there appears to have been a failure of the ‘two cultures’ of law and
science to understand each other.” She stated that “[t]oday we cannot
afford this gap, for scientific and technologic issues underlie large
segments of modern jurisprudence, as well as of our economy.”188 In
one instance, the majority based its holding on the premise that
neutralization of an acid produced only a salt. She wrote that “the
panel majority has misunderstood the chemistry, in holding that
neutralization of 14.5% of the maleic acid groups means that the
totality is a salt and not an acid. This flawed science led to an
incorrect conclusion of law.”189

185.

Newman, supra note 104, at 683–84; see also Pfizer, 488 F.3d at 1380.

[S]tability of precedent and the uniform application of correct law to achieve the
correct result are the assignment of the Federal Circuit, for our rulings are of nationwide effect. A primary purpose for which our court was formed was to provide the
judicial stability that supports commercial investment-this was a unique judicial role,
and was adopted in recognition of the dependence of technology-based industry on an
effective patent system.
Id.; Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“Failure of this court to reach consistent decisions based on a
consistent application of precedent will be as destructive of the purposes of a patent system as
was the forum-shopping and inconsistent judgments of the past.”).
186.
Newman, supra note 102, at 523–24.
187.
Id.
188.
Newman, supra note 104, at 686.
189.
Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 441 F.3d 963, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“Of course a reaction between an acid and a base
produces a salt. But a reaction between 14.5% of the acid and matching amount of base produces
14.5% salt, leaving 85.5% unreacted acid. From my colleagues’ inaccurate science, and the
conclusion drawn therefrom, I must, respectfully, dissent.”); Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison
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Beyond scientific knowledge, Judge Newman seeks to ensure
that the commercialization of patented technology is not prejudiced by
the court’s errors. She noted that “[i]n today’s technology-based
commerce, rational economics requires that the patent provide a
reliable basis for investment. The patentee is in control of the
specification that describes the invention.”190 In another dissent, she
zeroed in on the costs of adjudication on parties. The majority had
held that the fact that there were opposing expert witnesses required
trial despite the “depositions, briefs, written opinion, final judgment,
and appeal.”191
Judge Newman regarded this as “expensive
redundancy,” and “not a trivial matter to require the parties, the trial
judge, and perhaps ultimately this court, to repeat in the trial context
much of what they have already done.”192
Sometimes, Judge Newman would write a dissent taking the
majority to task on the science, law, and practice. In a case involving
chemical compositions, the majority held that a claim to a chemical
formulation composition could not be infringed “if there is interaction
between any of the ingredients after they are added to the
composition, such that any ingredient changes in chemical form or
ratio from that listed in the claim.”193 She wrote that it was “gravely
incorrect as a matter of law, as a matter of chemistry, and as a matter

Co., 91 F.3d 169, 1996 WL 297601, at *6 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (Newman,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
[M]y colleagues on this panel have not correctly perceived the technological substance
of the [prior art] reference, on which they rely for anticipation. Demmitt reported a
scientific study of the Houghton process, whereby he measured the amount of residual
hydrazine by taking a sample of the aqueous stream, passing this sample through a
cation exchange resin to remove materials that interfere with the measurement of
hydrazine, and then measuring the hydrazine content of the sample. This is not the
same as the Ecolochem deoxygenation process, wherein carbon catalyst-sourced
impurities are removed, as a step in power plant and reactor water deoxygenation, by
use of a mixed- or cation-exchange resin.
Id.
190.
InterDigital Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 690 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Newman, J., dissenting).
191.
B-K Lighting, Inc. v. Fresno Valves & Castings, Inc., 375 F. App’x 28, 33 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (Newman, J., dissenting).
192.
Id. Judge Newman is sensitive to the efficacy of a rule. In Zenon Environmental, Inc.
v. U.S. Filter Corp., 506 F.3d 1370, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the majority required that “all subject
matter must be reproduced in all continuing applications.” She wrote that “adds nothing to the
knowledge disclosed to the public, adds nothing to the information provided to the patent
examiner, and adds nothing to compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 120; it simply adds costs and pitfalls
to inventors, as they attempt to walk new judicial tightropes.” Id. (Newman, J., dissenting)
193.
Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 77 F.3d 450, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
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of patent practice.”194 She warned that the majority’s “new rule” of
“‘claim construction’ will cast a cloud upon many thousands of existing
patents, and major classes of chemical invention will confront unclear,
unnecessary, confusing, expensive, and perhaps impossible scientific
requirements.”195
While all her dissents are temperate, on one exceptionally rare
instance, her disdain seeps through. In Bard Peripheral Vascular,
Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., the majority found against an
inventor who invented, developed, and commercialized the product
that it was now found to willfully infringe.196 This, according to Judge
Newman, amounted to an “insult to [the] judicial process.”197 She
twice quotes Shakespeare in her dissent, and calls the majority’s
opinion “a scarecrow of the law.”198 On appeal to the en banc court,
the majority’s decision was vacated. She expressed satisfaction that
“[t]he court now acts to correct its ruling on the subject of willful
infringement.”199
Judge Newman’s large number of dissents and her willingness
to dissent openly makes the count of her dissents and the variables
they offer more accurate than it may be for many other judges.
However, as valuable as both traits are to the scientific inquiry, they
would be incomplete without the third feature: her standing as a
judge. Just as not all majority opinions are created equal, neither are

194.

Id. at 453.

Most or all chemicals interact to some extent in solution, wherein ions and molecules
rearrange based on forces of various kinds. Under the court’s new law, table salt
dissolved in water will not be an adequate description of the composition for
infringement purposes, since the sodium chloride molecule no longer ‘exists’: in
dissolution the sodium and chloride ions will have broken their bonds to each other, in
interaction with molecules of water. . . . It is without precedent, and it is contrary to
the way that chemical formulation composition claims are understood within the
chemical and the legal communities.
Id.
195.
Id. at 451.
196.
See generally 670 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated in part, 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
197.
Id. at 1199 n.1. (Newman, J., dissenting).
198.
Id. (“I take note of the panel majority’s observation that this saga has overtones of a
Shakespearian tragedy, for these events indeed illustrate that ‘to be honest, as this world goes, is
to be one man picked out of ten thousand.’ W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, sc. ii.”); id. at 1199
n.2 (“‘We must not make a scarecrow of the law, / Setting it up to fear the birds of prey, / And let
it keep one shape, till custom make it / Their perch and not their terror.’ W. Shakespeare,
Measure for Measure, Act II, sc. ii.”).
199.
Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1009
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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all dissents.200 Who the dissenting judge is has a significant impact on
its influence.
3. “Not a Burger”
An account is told of how three Justices of the Supreme Court
visited the redbrick townhouse of Justice Holmes on the evening of
November 7, 1919, as federal agents launched a nationwide raid on
the homes and meeting halls of Russian immigrants.201 With the
United States gripped with fear of communism, Justice Holmes
circulated a draft dissent proposing a radically expansive
interpretation of the First Amendment that would protect all but the
most immediately dangerous speech. His colleagues were worried
that a dissent “from a figure as venerable as Holmes, might weaken
the country’s resolve and give comfort to the enemy.”202 That dissent
subsequently became immortalized in the case of Abrams v. United
States.203
Professor Melvin Urofsky noted that “[a] Ginsburg, a Kennedy,
or a Scalia presents the possibility of a strong and well-reasoned
separate opinion, a possibility that no writer of a majority opinion
would take lightly. Warren Burger, on the other hand, has never been
considered a jurisprudential heavyweight, and a threat [of dissent] by
him, as in this case, could be dismissed with a polite ‘Sorry, but no.’”204
Judge Newman is no Burger. She was elected by her peers to
the IP Hall of Fame, only one of five Federal Circuit judges accorded
that honor, three of whom were Chief Judges and the other was Judge

200.
Brennan, Jr., supra note 44, at 429 (“Not only are all dissents not created equal, but
they are not intended to be so.”).
201.
HEALY, supra note 4, at 1–5.
202.
Id. at 5; see also id. at 7.
The power of his words and the force of his personality gave his opinion an authority
far beyond the normal judicial dissent. Civil libertarians immediately embraced it as
an article of faith, and Holmes’s tribute to the “free trade in ideas,” along with his
concept of “clear and present danger,” became not only cultural catchphrases but, in
time, the law of the land. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that Holmes’s dissent—
the most important minority opinion in American legal history—gave birth to the
modern era of the First Amendment, in which the freedom to express oneself is our
preeminent constitutional value and a defining national trait. Nor can it be disputed
that, nearly a century later, his dissent continues to influence our thinking about free
speech more than any other single document.
Id.
203.
Id. at 7 (“Nor can it be disputed that, nearly a century later, his dissent continues to
influence our thinking about free speech more than any other single document.”).
204.
UROFSKY, supra note 40, at 21.
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Giles Rich who co-authored the Patent Act.205 The Pauline Newman
IP American Inn of Court was founded in honor of “one of the most
distinguished intellectual property judges in the country.”206 Her legal
accomplishments have been recognized by the Chemistry and the Law
Division of the American Chemical Society (ACS), and her alma mater
Vassar college recognized that she used her “insights and knowledge
she garnered as a scientist to do incisive work” to “encourage[e] the
movement of discoveries and innovations into the marketplace.”207
Judge Newman also won the respect of her colleagues at the
Federal Circuit. Judge Lourie noted that “[s]he has made her mark by
articulate exposition of policy.”208 Former Chief Judge Michel noted
that “Judge Newman may hold the record for the most dissents. But
her dissents have great force and often persuade other colleagues over
time.”209 Judge Moore concurred, saying, “What people may not
realize is that many of her dissents have later gone on to become the
law—either the en banc law from our court or spoken on high from the
Supremes.”210 She noted that “Merck v. Integra comes to mind. It’s a
case where she wrote a very strong dissent. The Supreme Court took
it and not only changed the state of the law to reflect what she had
written, but they cited her outright in the opinion.”211

205.
Pauline Newman, IP HALL FAME, http://www.iphalloffame.com/pauline_newman/
[https://perma.cc/BBR5-N77Y] (last visited Aug. 3, 2016) (noting that she is “one of the most
prominent women patent lawyers in the world” and that she was “instrumental in bringing
about a number of patent reforms, including the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit”); see also Nomination Process, IP HALL FAME, http://www.iphalloffame.com/nominationprocess/ [https://perma.cc/WVN9-XS7N] (last visited Aug. 3, 2016).
Inductees are chosen by members of the IP Hall of Fame Academy, which comprises
individuals already inducted into the IP Hall of Fame and other acknowledged IP
leaders. The Academy makes its selection based on the nominations it receives from
the global IP community and chooses those nominees considered to have made an
outstanding contribution to the development of today’s IP system.
Id.
206.
The
Pauline
Newman
IP
Inn
of
Court,
A M.
INNS
CT.,
http://info.newmaninn.org/home/about [https://perma.cc/AUD3-XVDY] (last visited Aug. 3, 2016);
see also Gurrieri, supra note 18 (“Judge Newman is a treasure for the patent community. She is
definitely one of the most principled persons you’ll ever meet.”).
207.
Darin Klemchuk, Judge Pauline Newman Reflects on 30 Years of the Federal Circuit,
KLEMCHUK LLP (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.klemchuk.com/231-judge-pauline-newman-reflectson-30-years-of-the-federal-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/B72Y-DMUZ]; see also Shirley Ann Jackson,
The New Polytechnic: Addressing Global Challenges, Transforming the World, RENSSELAER
POLYTECHNIC INST. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://president.rpi.edu/speeches/2015/new-polytechnicaddressing-global-challenges-transforming-world [https://perma.cc/JSQ6-KSQV].
208.
NYU Sch. of Law, supra note 139.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
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Chief Judge Michel and Judge Moore were referring to the patent
dialogue that takes place within the court. Their comments indicate
that Judge Newman’s dissents carry the weight both within the
Federal Circuit and at the Supreme Court. Judge Newman’s dissents
have also been recognized by the patent community. In a blog post
headlined “Nominating Pauline Newman for PTO Director,” Gene
Quinn wrote:
Pauline Newman has continued to dazzle with her understanding of patent law
and issues, particularly when she is in dissent and willing to stand up to the rest of
her colleagues on the Federal Circuit. She has keenly identified time and time
again the fact that Federal Circuit panels decide cases in ways that directly
contradict both the rules of the Court and established precedent.212

In 2013, NYU School of Law conferred upon Judge Newman
the “Law Women Alumna of the Year” Award.213 That same year,
ChIPs, an organization set up “to recognize the exceptional
accomplishments of individuals who have contributed significantly to
the field of intellectual property and have shown a demonstrated
commitment to the ChIPs mission” gave its inaugural award to Judge
Newman.214 In 2015, she was invited to introduce Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, who—along with her daughter, Columbia Law Professor
Jane Ginsburg—won the award that year. Justice Ginsburg said of
Judge Newman, “[H]er intelligence, her diligence, her devotion to a
very difficult area of the law has really paved the way for the [women]
in this room.”215
It would be unfortunate if these honors were simply dismissed
as faint praise. They are factual datapoints that individually and
collectively point to a judge whose dissents have not diminished her
stature in the patent community, contrary to conventional wisdom on
judicial dissenters discussed in Section II.A. Blake Hartz summed up
that “[i]f there is a ‘dialogue’ about, among, or between the Federal
Circuit and anyone else, Judge Newman is one of the discernible
voices.”216

212.
Gene Quinn, Nominating Pauline Newman for PTO Director, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 13,
2009), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/01/13/nominating-pauline-newman-pto-director/id=1504/
[https://perma.cc/WA2G-SJ4F].
213.
NYU Sch. of Law, supra note 139.
214.
ChIPs, ChIPs 2013 Hall of Fame Inductee—Hon. Pauline Newman, YOUTUBE (Feb.
12, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C0RuqUzi3h8 [https://perma.cc/RZR9-7Y2L].
215.
ChIPs, ChIPs Women in IP Global Summit 2015 | Hall of Fame Presentation:
Justice
Ruth
Bader
Ginsburg,
YOUTUBE
(Feb.
12,
2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dENSaFyJuXg [https://perma.cc/Y96Y-4F8Z].
216.
Hartz, supra note 19, at 49.
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III. AN EMPIRICAL PORTRAIT OF JUDGE NEWMAN’S DISSENTS: ANALYSIS
AND IMPLICATIONS
This empirical study draws on one core dataset and several
satellite datasets. The core dataset is comprised of Judge Newman’s
210 dissents from 1985, when she issued her first dissent, to the end of
2016, a period of thirty-two years. Only opinions authored by Judge
Newman were considered.217 En banc dissents she signed onto were
omitted. The study covered both reported and unreported decisions
published by WestlawNext.218 The opinions were hand-coded for:
1. Case names, citations, and dates;
2. Citations of her dissents in the same case, in a different Federal
Circuit case, and at the Supreme Court;
3. Outcomes of the cases in which the majority voted against her before
the en banc court and at the Supreme Court;
4. Judges who joined her en banc opinions and those who voted in the
majority against her;
5. Legal doctrine: validity, infringement, exceptions and defenses,
remedies, evidence and procedure, design patents, and prosecution;
6. The industries the cases concerned; and
7. The lower tribunals from which the appeals originated.

The data was coded on Excel and the graphs generated either on
Excel or Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). To provide
context for some of the categories of data gleaned from Judge
Newman’s dissents, the study also looked at the dissents by nine other
Federal Circuit judges who served comparable tenures. This required
compiling a full roster of every judge that served on the Federal
Circuit as well as raw data about the number of opinions they
authored, their dissents, and tenure on the court (Figure 2, below).219
The numbers for the top ten judges including Judge Newman were
filtered for dud results, such as cases that did not relate to that
particular judge or to a patent law dissent.
217.
This is in keeping with other empirical studies. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki &
William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation,
65 MD. L. REV. 841, 865–66 (2006) (“[W]e only code those opinions written by the judges
themselves, not all opinions in which they joined.”).
218.
The following search was used to find the cases in which a judge’s patent dissent was
mentioned: adv: newman /7 dissent! & patent & DATE(after 12-31-1983 & before 01-01-2016).
The following exemplary search was used to find cases in which judges dissented in patent cases:
adv: DISSENT(newman) & patent! & DATE (after 12-31-1983 & before 01-01-2017). The name
was changed for each judge studied.
219.
These ten judges were Judges Newman, Lourie, Friedman, Archer, Plager, Rader,
Mayer, Smith, Davis, and Dyk.
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FIGURE 2: TOP 10 JUDGES: LENGTH OF SERVICE & DISSENTS (RAW DATA)220

A. Record of Number of Dissidents
Conventional wisdom points to Judges Newman and Dyk as
being known for their dissents.221 However, no Federal Circuit judge,
past or present, comes close to filing as many dissents as Judge
220.
An “*” and blackened row indicate the judges who were included in this study.
221.
Crouch, supra note 47 (“[I]n 2/3 of those cases either Judge Newman or Judge Dyk
was involved in the dissent.”).
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Newman.222 As Figure 3 shows, a few judges have served terms
similar to Judge Newman’s.223 Yet she holds the largest number of
patent dissents, more than double that of Judges Dyk and Mayer.
Justice Harlan’s 316 dissents over thirty-four years seem to eclipse
Judge Newman’s 210 dissents over thirty years until one considers
that these are only her patent law dissents. Since patent cases make
up about 30 percent of the Federal Circuit’s docket, it is conceivable
that the true number of her dissents may be more than three times
larger.224

FIGURE 3: TOP 10 JUDGES: LENGTH OF SERVICE & DISSENTS (FILTERED)

The difference in the number of dissents written by Judge
Newman and her colleagues becomes even more stark when one looks

222.
Hartz, supra note 19, at 48 (finding more than a third of the dissents between
1998–2009 came from Judge Newman); see also id. (“Judge Newman dissents more than anyone
else on the court.”).
223.
The data was filtered to exclude cases where the judge did not in fact write the
opinion. For instance, “Smith” might have been a party in a case, or the judge was mentioned in
a case where another judge had dissented.
224.
Newman, supra note 68, at 824 (noting that “patent appeals from the district courts
are about twenty-five percent of our caseload, with another five percent the patent and
trademark appeals from the tribunals of the Patent and Trademark Office, and another one
percent from the International Trade Commission.”).
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at their opinions rendered at five-year intervals (Figure 4 below).225 It
is possible that judges need time to get their bearings. Justice
Brennan did not dissent in any of the sixteen opinions rendered in his
first term, but later “dissented forty-two times out of fifty-six cases in
a single term.”226
The year 1995 marks an important inflection point in the
history of Judge Newman’s dissents, as there was a marked increase
in the number of her dissents. An examination of data, discussed in
more detail in Section III.C, reveals that the spike consisted of
dissents concerning patent validity, infringement, and issues
concerning evidence and procedure. By the 2011–2016 period, her
dissents more than doubled compared to the first runner up, Judge
Dyk.
Here, a methodological point may be made. An earlier version
of the study covered Judge Newman’s tenure in intervals of five years:
1980–1985,
1986–1990,
1991–1995,
1996–2000,
2001–2005,
2006–2010, and 2011–2015. These five-year intervals were chosen for
ease of reference. Judge Newman first dissented in 1985, making the
cases in the first interval disproportionality small. Nonetheless, the
thirty-year period shows the trend of her dissents. The same may be
said for the other nine judges studied, as seen in Figure 4 below.
When the dataset was updated to include 2016 data, the 2011–2015
interval was extended to 2011–2016. Judge Newman issued eight
dissents in 2016, and 202 dissents before. Compared to her average of
12.4 dissents per year over the 2011–2015 period, her 2016 dissents
dipped slightly. Of the active judges in 2016, Judge Dyk had four
dissents and Judge Lourie none, putting Judge Newman ahead by a
significant margin.
The numbers also reveal another interesting feature: the rate
of her dissents increased the longer she remained on the bench. This
finding corroborates an earlier article on Judge Newman’s dissents
showing that they are both increasing in absolute numbers, as well as
increasing as an increasing proportion of her opinions.227

225.
The cases were assigned numbers according to their date ranges, coded, and the
graph generated using Excel.
226.
Brennan, Jr., supra note 44, at 427.
227.
Hartz, supra note 19, at 51 (“Judge Newman’s rate of dissent, as measured against
the number of majority opinions she has authored in a given year . . . has generally increased
with her length of service on the court.”).
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FIGURE 4: TOP 10 JUDGES: LENGTH OF SERVICE & DISSENTS (5 YEAR
INTERVALS)

At the same time, Judge Newman noted that her seniority on
the bench may have contributed to the perception of her being a
prolific dissenter and to some of the numerical trends observed.228 By
convention, the most senior judge on the panel assigns the majority or
unanimous opinion. She usually assigns these cases to the other
judges to give them exposure and so that she can focus on the cases
where she dissents, which, by virtue of her seniority, is every judge
except the Chief Judge. Saddled with the task, they may have less
capacity and inclination to dissent in other cases. Conversely, she
would have the capacity to dissent in more cases. She herself notes
that “they’re hard to write, and take time away from writing opinions
of precedential value.”229
In terms of dissents as proportion of total number of opinions
filed (Figure 5),230 Judge Newman does not rank the highest. Only
31.11 percent of her opinions are dissents. Judge Mayer is the highest
at 33.94 percent and Judge Dyk follows at 19.13 percent. The fact
that Judge Mayer has not surfaced in conventional wisdom as a “great
dissenter” suggests that while numbers are helpful, more is needed to
garner that recognition and respect.
228.
Interview with Judge Pauline Newman, supra note 83.
229.
Id.
230.
WestLaw search results were manually filtered to get the cases in which the judge
concerned had written the opinion or the dissent.
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FIGURE 5: DISSENT AS PROPORTION OF ALL OPINIONS (BY JUDGE)

B. Proxies of Influence: A Snapshot
The influence of a dissent is difficult to measure. First, as
discussed in Part II, it may have been suppressed or transformed into
the majority opinion. It can also cause the majority to “refine its
opinion, eliminating the more vulnerable assertions and narrowing
the announced legal rule.”231 As Justice Breyer noted, “[y]ou never see
the best points the dissents make, because they’ve been written out of
the majority [opinion] so that there is no need to make that dissenting
point anymore.”232 This happens at the appellate level as well. Ninth
Circuit Judge Fletcher noted, “Somewhat paradoxically, a judge or
justice may write a dissent in order not to have to write one . . . . [A]ll
appellate judges have the experience of writing a draft dissent that
ends up persuading the majority to his or her point of view.”233
Second, a dissent may live long after its author fades.234 It may
be picked up by a social movement drawn to something it already
possesses in its vision. That movement might influence a political
231.
UROFSKY, supra note 40, at 18.
232.
Robert Barnes, The ‘Intensifying’ Art of the Dissent, WASH. POST (July 21, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-intensifying-art-of-thedissent/2013/07/21/d7eac2b8-ef16-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d_story.html
[https://perma.cc/E397EWRM].
233.
UROFSKY, supra note 40, at 17.
234.
Id. at 32 (“Trying to gauge the impact of Court decisions and of dissenting opinions
on the public is difficult to do in any quantitative manner, but as historians we can see that
certain cases at particular times in our history have had an impact far beyond the litigants
involved.”).
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party whose elected candidates may fill the legislature or judiciary
that eventually decides that the view advanced by the dissent should
prevail.235 For instance, while the dissenting opinion of Justice Curtis
in the Dred Scott decision did not stop the Civil War, it was reprinted
and received wide circulation, and its arguments can be found in the
Lincoln-Douglas debates and in the 1860 presidential campaign.236
Third, judges may respond to the dissent’s arguments without
citing the dissent.237 This tactical omission is done to avoid drawing
attention to the dissent and to avoid interrupting the reading of the
majority opinion “to see what the author is responding to . . . , or to
suspend belief pending the reading of the dissenting opinion.”238
Thus, surmised Judge Posner, “[t]he way to deal with arguments in
the dissenting opinion that are worth replying to is to state them
without attribution and then refute them if you can.”239
These dissents are all potent in their own way, but any
measure would be highly controversial. As we saw in Section II.C.,
Judge Newman dissents unreservedly, making it easier to track the
influence of her dissents. At the same time, because other dissenting
judges have different styles and goals, this Article readily
acknowledges the limited ability to accurately gauge the relative
influence of dissents among judges.
On the flip side, while judges writing the majority opinion
strategically muffle the dissent by paying it no attention, from time to
time, these judges may feel compelled by the force of the dissent to
respond. Indeed, Judge Newman has on occasion made known that
she expects the majority to respond to her dissents.240 She reasoned
235.
TUSHNET, supra note 55, at 222 (noting that “courts rarely hold out for long against a
sustained movement in national politics”).
236.
Dred
Scott
v.
Sandford,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/
Dred_Scott_v._Sandford [https://perma.cc/NM9A-Q2P2] (last visited Aug. 3, 2016).
237.
POSNER, supra note 64, at 269.
In a case in which the panel is split, avoid referring in the majority opinion to the
dissenting opinion, a practice that has become common in Supreme Court opinions.
Such references invite the reader to interrupt his reading of the majority opinion to
see what the author is responding to (often heatedly), or to suspend belief pending the
reading of the dissenting opinion. The way to deal with arguments in the dissenting
opinion that are worth replying to is to state them without attribution and then refute
them if you can.
Id.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id.
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 955 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

The majority does not respond. . . . This court’s leading decision on equivalency,
factually on all fours with the case at bar, is dismissed as having been written by a
judge who suffered from the “everyone-knows-that syndrome,” and as having been
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that this patent dialogue was necessary to ensure “coherent guidance
in patent law” and condemned the “stonewall of silence.”241 Still,
sometimes they ignore her dissents or refuse to address them.242
There are three methods through which one can measure the
influence of Judge Newman’s dissents. Citations by her fellow Federal
Circuit judges in the same or in other cases provide a useful proxy to
measure the traction garnered by her views. Another proxy of Judge
Newman’s influence comes from citations by law review articles.
These references may indicate her views resonated with
commentators and with law school instructors and students. Lastly,
of course, an obvious indication of Judge Newman’s influence would be
the traction her dissents garnered at the Supreme Court. For
instance, the Court may reverse the majority panel decision, citing her
dissent with approval, as it did in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences
I, Ltd., mentioned by Judge Moore in Section II.C.3 of this Article.243
1. Citations in the Same Case
Figure 6 shows the dissents of the ten judges with the longest
tenure on the court and the number of times their dissents were cited
by the majority in that same case.244 The fact that these figures were
obtained from the same court over a similar time period helps
normalize some of the discrepancies.
At seventy-three cites, Judge Newman has the highest count.
At thirty-five cites, Judge Dyk comes in next. Judge Mayer comes
next at nineteen cites. They have average cites per dissent of 0.35,
0.47, and 0.25, respectively. Here, one might point out that it should
hardly be surprising that Judge Newman has a higher citation rate
since she wrote more dissents. However, there are at least three
problems with this assumption.

“misread” ever since. The majority, in banc, remains silent. I must express dismay at
this judicial style.
Id. (disapproved by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993)).
241.
Id. (“The technology-based community cannot be reassured by our avoidance of the
responsibility, so recently assigned to this court, for coherent guidance in the patent law. Critical
changes should not be made within a stonewall of silence.”).
242.
See, e.g., Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (“[I]t is appropriate to say a few words about the dissent, which reiterates a view,
expressed by Judge Newman in various other cases, that PTO reexamination cannot affect
pending infringement suits. The dissent candidly acknowledges that this position has been
consistently rejected.”).
243.
545 U.S. 193, 201 (2005).
244.
A text search was used to see if the majority opinion cited the dissent. The search
included permutations such as “dissent,” “dissenting,” the name of the judge, and “colleague.”
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First, citation per dissent may exaggerate the influence of a
dissent where the number of dissents were very low. For instance,
while Judge Mayer dissented seventy-five times, his average was 0.25
cites per dissent. Conversely, Judges Friedman and Smith who have
dissented only four and five times, respectively, have a remarkably
high average of 0.75 and 0.6 cites per dissent. Consider also Judge
Davis who dissented eleven times and had an average of 0.09 cites per
dissent or Judge Lourie who dissented thirty-six times but had an
average of 0.03 cites per dissent.
Second, frequent dissenters may find themselves marginalized
by the other members of the court.245 Hence, one might expect a
frequent dissenter like Judge Newman to be cited less over time. It is
interesting that while Judge Mayer’s results seem consistent with this
idea, Judges Newman and Dyk appear to buck that trend. Further, as
noted in Section II.C.3, Judge Newman’s colleagues at the Federal
Circuit hold her in esteem.
Finally, it is a fallacy that higher citations per dissent
necessarily translates into greater influence without consideration of
the absolute number of citations. A hunter may shoot his duck with a
sniper rifle or with a shotgun. It matters little to the duck whether it
is brought down by a single, clean shot from the rifle, or a volley of
shotgun pellets. In other words, the influence of a dissenter is no less
potent because she offers a library of wisdom, rather than a single
tome from which a citation may be drawn. The dissenter has either
earned the attention of the majority or not. All this means that Judge
Newman’s dissents are the most numerous and enjoy a high number
of cites compared to many of her other colleagues with a high number
of dissents.

245.

See supra Section II.A.
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FIGURE 6: DISSENT CITED IN MAJORITY OPINION (SAME CASE)

2. Citations in a Different Case
Dissents cited in other cases are also important because the
force of an earlier dissent may not prove decisive until later (Figure 7
below).246 Again, Judge Newman holds the count for the most
citations at twenty-eight (or 0.13 cites per dissent). Judge Plager has
sixteen (or 1.07 cites per dissent) and Judge Rader has ten cites (or
0.23 cites per dissent). As to be expected, the citation count on the
whole is significantly lower than for a majority citing the dissent in
the same case. This is because, as noted in Section III.A., the majority
may deliberately choose not to respond to the dissent explicitly to
avoid raising its prominence.

246.
WestLaw was used to search for cases that had cited the dissenting opinion though a
search of every case that had cited to that opinion.
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FIGURE 7: DISSENT CITED IN MAJORITY OPINION (DIFFERENT CASE)

3. Citations by the En Banc Court and Supreme Court
Looking at citations by the en banc Federal Circuit (Figure 8
below), Judge Newman has not been cited. However, that is not
unusual. Seven out of the ten judges with the longest tenures on the
Federal Circuit have never been cited by the en banc court, and the
other three have only been cited once.

FIGURE 8: IMPACT: CITATIONS (EN BANC)
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Looking at citations at the Supreme Court (Figure 9 below),
Judges Newman and Rader lead the pack with three citations each.
Judge Mayer has two citations while Judges Plager and Dyk each
have one citation. The rest have none.
Legal scholarship informs and points the way for future
research. It also signposts the limitations of those endeavors. A case
in point is the level of traction Judge Newman’s dissents have in the
lower courts. Professor Melvin Urofsky noted that lower courts “may
try to distinguish the facts of a case so that they can follow the dissent
rather than the majority.”247 However, given the number of lower
tribunals and the possibility that many may distinguish the facts to
achieve the same result as the dissent without expressly attributing
the dissent makes the task of drawing any meaningful conclusions an
arduous and dicey one.

FIGURE 9: DISSENT CITED BY SCOTUS

Sheer numbers are not the only data point that should be
considered, however; length of the dissent is also important because
one invests more in what one believes. This can be seen at the
Supreme Court level. For example, in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District, No. 1., the Supreme Court battled in
247.
UROFSKY, supra note 40, at 31 (“For them, the Supreme Court’s constitutional
rulings are supposed to provide guidance, and in most cases they do. When, however, there is a
convincing dissent, these jurists may try to distinguish the facts of a case so that they can follow
the dissent rather than the majority.”).
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a 5-4 opinion over the issue of whether using race as a factor in
assigning students to public schools was a denial of equal protection of
the laws to Whites.248 The majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions cover over two hundred pages. Justice Breyer’s dissent
spanned over seventy pages and marshalled empirical evidence to
match contrary evidence from the concurring opinions.249 At the
appellate level, a lengthy dissent provides the losing side with the
material and impetus it needs to attempt to overturn the majority
opinion at the en banc or Supreme Court level.
For this study, a dissent was considered lengthy if it was at
least five pages long. Since length is relative, it was determined that
measuring it against Judge Newman’s own opinions would give a
more constant and thus meaningful measure of how she felt about the
dissent compared to using the majority opinion as a yardstick. Figure
10 (below) reveals that when Judge Newman’s dissent was “lengthy,”
the Supreme Court granted cert twice as often: 30 percent of the cases,
compared to 14.81 percent when it was not lengthy. However, short
dissents may also carry a punch.250 The data based on Judge
Newman’s dissents suggests a positive correlation between the length
of a dissent and the likelihood of it having more impact.

248.
See generally 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
249.
Id. at 803–76 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
250.
POSNER, supra note 64, at 181 (for example, Justice Holmes’ famous dissent in
Lochner is only a page long, “barren of references to constitutional text, the framers’
understanding of it, or principles of interpretation”).
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FIGURE 10: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LENGTH AND CERT. APPLICATION

4. Citations by Law Reviews
Academics can criticize or praise the opinions of the courts in
many ways. Academic opinions can have the effect of leavening or
dampening the public’s regard for an opinion and may sometimes be
the very channel through which the public hears of that opinion in the
first place.251 Beyond the written word, academics’ opinions also play

251.

See Fontana, supra note 92, at 454.

Academics can draw attention to comments by the Justices by writing about what
they are saying, thereby generating recognition and status for members of the Court.
Consider, for instance, the significant quantity of legal scholarship devoted to
originalism, conferring status on Justice Scalia as an important Justice because of his
interest in originalism.
Id.
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a role in shaping the thoughts of the next generation of lawyers.252
Thus, it was important to consider the frequency with which
academics cited dissenting opinions of the Federal Circuit. Law
reviews, rather than casebooks, were used because the casebooks are
vulnerable to the idiosyncrasies that necessarily come with a small
number of academics picking on a small number of cases, of which
very few, if any, would carry dissents.
Many casebooks also
understandably omit citing references entirely, as any law student
encumbered by the staggering weight of casebooks can well
appreciate. The citations for each dissent of each judge was identified
on WestlawNext, and the law review was perused to determine if the
citation was indeed of the judge’s dissent. If “yes,” the law review is
added to the dataset. If “no,” the result is a dud and discarded.
Once again, Judge Newman has the greatest number of
citations in law reviews at a whopping 1,103 (or 5.25 cites per dissent)
(Figure 11 below). The next highest is Judge Rader at 567 citations
(or 12.89 cites per dissent) and third is Judge Dyk with 262 citations
(or 3.49 cites per dissent).

FIGURE 11: DISSENT CITED IN LAW REVIEW ARTICLES

252.
See, e.g., Kate Hardiman, Law Schools Dominated by Democrat Professors, Research
Finds, C. FIX (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.thecollegefix.com/post/24015/ [https://perma.cc/V6UJ53EE].

926

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. XIX:4:873

5. Outcomes on Appeal
This Article also studied the outcome of dissents on appeal to
the en banc court and Supreme Court. The fact that the point of
contention was subsequently altered by a higher tribunal in the
direction recommended by the dissent is a proxy of its influence.
Sometimes the connection is direct—the higher tribunal cites the
proposition advanced by the dissent and reverses the majority. At
other times, that tribunal does not mention the dissent but moves in
its favor. At yet other times, a later case abrogates the majority
opinion and is picked up by Westlaw and displayed as a “red flag.”
Figure 12 shows that of the trickle of dissents that caught the
Supreme Court’s attention, Judge Newman’s dissents have the
greatest effect in convincing the Court to reverse or vacate the
majority’s opinion, as it did eight out of nine times. Judge Rader also
had the majority opinion reversed twice. The dissents of Judge Mayer
were more successful, with the majority opinion reversed by the Court
in three cases. Notably, Judge Dyk’s dissents, while numerous, had
only one affirmance and one reversal of the majority opinion.

FIGURE 12: OUTCOME OF DISSENTS (SCOTUS)

Figure 13 (below) shows a different picture. The en banc
Federal Circuit was less amenable to Judge Newman’s dissents,
overturning only the majority opinion in her favor twice. Why might
that be, despite Judge Newman’s relatively high number of citations?
One obvious answer is that being noticed is being different than being
validated. Judge Dyk fared much better at the Federal Circuit than at
the Supreme Court, with four out of five cases turning in his favor.
Judge Lourie had the case overturned in his favor both times. Judges
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Rader, Plager, and Archer had a single majority opinion in the case
they dissented reversed each time. Judges Friedman, Davis, and
Smith’s dissents had no ostensible influence at the Federal Circuit.

FIGURE 13: OUTCOME OF DISSENTS (EN BANC)

C. Industries & Lower Courts
The industries Judge Newman’s dissents address broadly fall
into seven different categories253:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Construction & Machinery
Software & Business Methods
Communications & Entertainment
Medical Devices, Measurements, Instrumentation, & Optics
Semiconductor, Electrical, & Computers
Chemical & Biopharma
Articles of Manufacture

Figure 14 (below) shows the industries that her dissents have
touched on over time. It is clear that, while featured in every period,
“Chemical & Biopharma” represents the most significant proportion of
253.
These categories are based on the fourteen areas defined in DARYL LIM, PATENT
MISUSE AND ANTITRUST: DOCTRINAL, EMPIRICAL, AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 346–48 (2013)
(detailing how the OECD Patent Statistics Manual and PTO classification system were adapted
for the study).
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her dissents between 2001–2016 (32.91 percent of cases during that
period). It is difficult as a practical matter to distinguish clearly
between chemical cases and biopharma cases. Inventions covering
colchicine products for prophylactic treatment of gout, methods of
using folates to lower levels of homocysteine in the body, and glycemic
control for diabetes straddle both classifications.254 Suffice it to say
that it raises an interesting question whether Judge Newman felt
more compelled to disagree with the majority when the issue more
closely concerns the chemical arts, an area she knows and has strong
policy views about.
Oblon’s Post-Grant Patent Group Chair Scott McKeown
suggests that the answer is “yes.” In the Law360 interview mentioned
in Part II, he noted that Judge Newman’s “deep technical background
in chemistry,” and her background as a patent lawyer, “brings a very
practical and unique perspective” to the Federal Circuit.255
McKeown’s views are also corroborated by Judge Newman’s expressed
willingness to correct the majority on what she perceived to be a
misguided understanding of science and the undermining of the
conditions
conducive
to
the
research,
development,
and
256
commercialization of innovation.
Software and business methods
have also featured more prominently in the mix since 2006 up to the
end of 2016 (at 15.83 percent of cases during that period). These
frequencies may be related to developments in the industry.

254.
See Takeda Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceutical Corp., 785
F.3d 625, 627 (Fed. Cir. 2015), Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 831 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
and Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd., 719 F.3d 1346, 1363 (2013),
respectively.
255.
Gurrieri, supra note 18.
256.
See supra Section II.C.
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FIGURE 14: INDUSTRIES (OVER TIME)

Figure 15 (below) shows the issues that arise in each industry
category. “Validity” issues—those that cover the requirements for
patentability—make up the largest number of her dissents (25.32
percent), followed by infringement (19.74 percent). A significant
proportion of each issue category concerns the “Chemical &
Biopharma” industries, with “Validity” once again showing the highest
percentage of all (52.25 percent). “Software & Business Methods,”
“Chemical & Biopharma,” and “Articles of Manufacture” feature
evenly in “Exceptions & Defenses,” but “Articles of Manufacture” more
prominently in “Infringement.”
“Chemical & Biopharma” and
“Articles of Manufacture” feature most prominently in “Remedies”
(53.85 percent).
The “Other Issues” category covers many
miscellaneous issues but it is clear that “Medical Devices,” “Chemical
& Biopharma,” and “Articles of Manufacture” (19.79, 19.79, 17.71
percent, respectively) feature most prominently there.
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FIGURE 15: INDUSTRIES AND ISSUES

Figure 16 (below) shows the industries categories as they relate
to the lower courts. Most of her dissents respond to appeals from
district courts in the Ninth Circuit (18.31 percent), followed by the
BPAI/PTAB (17.37 percent), and distantly by the district courts in the
Third Circuit (9.86 percent). Judge Newman respects the fact-finding
role of the district courts and takes seriously the Federal Circuit’s role
in guiding the lower courts with its opinions. In one dissent she
wrote:
I write for I do not share my colleagues’ criticism of the terseness of the district
court’s opinion on the issues of patent validity and am concerned with our lack of
guidance on remand. I also believe that we are remiss in declining to review the
construction of the claims on this appeal.257

The majority had criticized the absence of detail in the district
257.
Bemis Mfg. v. Dornoch Med. Sys., Inc., 21 F. App’x 930, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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demurred, writing that:
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Judge Newman

While the district court’s analysis was brief, it relied on the elaborate record that
had been developed in the Patent and Trademark Office in connection with
Dornoch’s attempted interference involving the inventions in suit, a record that
was fully before the district court. Although my colleagues fault the court for
relying on this record, they offer no guidance as to why that reasoning was
deficient, thus providing an appellate opinion that is even sketchier than the
opinion it criticizes.258

She concluded by noting that “[o]ur authority, as well as obligation, is
to give plenary review of the grant of summary judgment. Thus, if my
colleagues believe that the district court erred in relying on the patent
examiner’s analysis of why the inventions were not the same, we
should explain where the error arose.”259
Judge Newman’s disdain for the court usurping the role of the
jury was evident in a case involving the experimental use of an
inventive feature of a boat engine. She wrote that “[i]n converting the
factual question of experimental purpose into a matter of law, our
court has cut another notch in the removal of patent issues from the
trier of fact.”260 She identified consistency as a reason in favor of such
an outcome,261 but warned that the Federal Circuit was not equipped
to weigh the underlying factual determinations required in conducting
these de novo reviews.262 If the Federal Circuit wanted to change that
rule, “then the court should speak with one voice so that trial courts
and parties will know how to try and appeal the issue.”263 Judge
258.
Id.
259.
Id. at 939.
260.
Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
261.
Id. at 1523.
If the Federal Circuit wants to make de novo determinations of factual matters, isn’t
this a good thing? Won’t it add consistency to patent decisions by removing harried
trial judges and sympathetic juries from another area of patent litigation? Is it not a
force for stability if the Federal Circuit will decide all fact-driven questions de novo?
Id.
262.

Id.

However, the appellate court is not structured to find facts without recourse to the
procedures of trial. On issues that require weighing and balancing several confluent
fact-laden circumstances, how can we presume to reach a more just result than those
who were present for days or weeks of testimony, with demonstrations, exhibits, crossexamination, and argument? The procedures of trial and the deference owed to the
judgment grounded in these procedures are the fabric of our system of justice and the
trial/appellate relationship.
Id.
263.
Id. at 1524 (“[T]he majority of this court believes that the special niche of de novo
review is nonetheless the correct place for the factual question of experimental use, then the
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Newman also sets a higher threshold than the majority in overturning
jury findings.264

FIGURE 16: LOWER COURTS AND INDUSTRIES

The relationship that Judge Newman has with the USPTO is
nuanced. She defers to the agency where the matter is “highly
technical,” as in the case of priority contests, where “scientific
expertise” is needed to understand the inventions.265 She also noted
that “the arcana of corroboration and diligence and reduction to
practice, are the soul and substance of the administrative agency. The

court should speak with one voice so that trial courts and parties will know how to try and
appeal the issue.”).
264.
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1197
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[T]he court provides no
sufficient basis for overturning the findings of the jury and overturning the affirmance by the
district court with respect to the question of anticipation . . . .”).
265.
Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
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correct place to determine priority of invention in the first instance is
the PTO.”266 Similarly, courts should defer to the judgment of the
examiners on issues of the sufficiency of disclosure where “the
expertise of patent examination is normally superior to that of
judges.”267
Judge Newman refrains from intervening in the USPTO’s
administrative functions. One dissent concerned whether the USPTO
could accept an unsigned check.268 Judge Newman dissented because
“[t]he majority inappropriately intrudes into the management of the
PTO, overruling a discretionary act of the Commissioner which had
been upheld by the district court in a mandamus suit.”269 The
applicant had not executed the check correctly, and Judge Newman
wrote that “[a]lthough I share my colleagues’ sympathy for the
applicant, I see only mischief in this benevolence. The PTO receives
hundreds of thousands of fee payments each year.”270 She cautioned
that “[c]ourts should not readily intervene in the day-to-day
operations of an administrative agency when the agency practice is in
straightforward implementation of the statute.”271
However, Judge Newman has taken issue over perceived
attempts to usurp the supervisory function of the federal district
courts and the Federal Circuit. Professor Rai noted that Judge
Newman “is, in general, suspicious of perceived shortcuts that the
PTAB might take,” adding that her dissents “are not inconsistent”
with her long-standing views of the USPTO.272 Similarly, patent
attorney Blake Hartz noted that “Judge Newman has expressed
concerns about different standards of review and the relationship of
the court to Patent & Trademark Office.”273
Since the America Invents Act (AIA) came into effect, post266.
In re Keil, 808 F.2d 830, 831–33 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., dissenting); see also
Prolitec, Inc. v. Scentair Techs., Inc., 807 F.3d 1353, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (“I support bringing PTAB expertise to bear in a post-grant review system.”).
267.
Ergo Licensing, 673 F.3d at 1372.
This destruction of a granted patent based on a presumably flawed disclosure in the
application, at a time when it cannot be remedied, is not only a disservice to inventors
who expect a reliable patent upon examination and grant, but an injury to the public
that is served by patent-supported innovation. I must, respectfully, dissent.
Id.
268.
Dubost v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 777 F.2d 1561, 1566–68 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
269.
Id. at 1566.
270.
Id. at 1567.
271.
Id. at 1568.
272.
Gurrieri, supra note 18.
273.
Hartz, supra note 19, at 56.
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grant proceedings have revolutionized patent law by changing where
and how patent validity is litigated.274 Third parties can knock out a
claim they believe is unduly broad or otherwise unpatentable.275
These proceedings were created as a more efficient and less costly
means to weed out suspect claims. The view in practice is that “[i]n
most cases, post-grant proceedings are now presumed to be the best
mechanism for challenging the validity of an issued patent.”276 Thus,
“[d]istrict courts commonly stay litigation until post-grant proceedings
conclude, so most patent infringement lawsuits do not proceed unless
the asserted patents first survive an IPR or other post-grant
proceeding.”277
Once a determination on validity has been made by the courts,
the USPTO should not be able to override it through subsequent
reexamination.278 The fact that the USPTO employs a different
standard of proof, or different procedures, cannot justify a different
outcome.279 Such judgments are “final and conclusive upon the rights
of the parties,” and “[a] system of override by an administrative
agency interferes with the power and obligation of the courts to
‘render dispositive judgments.’”280 Writing in absolute terms, she
274.
See generally Jeffrey Ware, Ewa M. Davison & David Tellekson, Supreme Court
Leaves Intact PTAB Authority to Institute and Regulate Inter Partes Review Proceedings,
FENWICK & WEST LLP (June 23, 2016), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/supremecourt-leaves-intact-ptab-authority-to-institute-and-regulate-inter-partes-review-proceedings.aspx
[https://perma.cc/5PRE-HYSN].
275.
35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319 (2012).
276.
Supreme Court’s Cuozzo Decision Signals PTO Invalidity Proceedings Here to Stay,
COOLEY LLP (June 22, 2016), https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2016/2016-06-22-cuozzodecision-signals-pto-invalidity-proceedings-here-to-stay [https://perma.cc/4DPV-HM3Z].
277.
Id.
278.
In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 698 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s final decision of patent validity,
upon full trial and appeal, is of no effect on subsequent redetermination of patent validity by the
Patent and Trademark Office,” even if the “issues . . . have been litigated and finally
adjudicated . . . .”); see also id. at 1354–55 (“These departures from the constitutional
requirements of judicial authority require attention, for the holding that reexamination can
override the finality of final adjudication is having enlarged impact.”).
279.
In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
My colleagues justify the PTO’s authority to overrule judicial decisions on the
argument that the standard of proof is different in the PTO than in the courts. That
theory is flawed, for obviousness is a question of law, and the PTO, like the court, is
required to reach the correct conclusion on correct law. Any distinction between
judicial and agency procedures cannot authorize the agency to overrule a final judicial
decision.
Id.
280.
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
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noted that “[n]o authority, no theory, no law or history, permits
administrative nullification of a final judicial decision. No concept of
government authorizes an administrative agency to override or
disregard the final judgment of a court. Judicial rulings are not
advisory; they are obligatory.”281 Judge Newman gave three primary
reasons for curbing this trend of overturning judicial determinations
of validity through post-grant review.
First, administrative efficiency warranted her dissents “with
the unconstrained free-for-all that this court has created, for PTO
records show pervasive duplication of litigation and reexamination of
the same patents.”282 She noted that “[i]nstead of finality after full
litigation, full trial in the district court, and full appeal in the Court of
Appeals, now the question of patent validity remains open, vulnerable
to contrary disposition, unconstrained by any form of estoppel or
restraint flowing from the finality of adjudication.”283
Second, as a matter of patent policy, “[t]he ensuing instability
replaces innovation incentive with litigation cost, along with adverse
effect on the patent based incentive for technological advance. Such
gaming of a system designed to provide investment incentive through
property rights warrants thoughtful remediation, not facilitation.”284
Third, as a matter of separation of powers, “[i]n the
administrative state, vigilance is required to balance authority and
responsibility among the branches of government. The pragmatism of
delegation to administrative agencies of complex procedures, is
balanced against the responsibility of the courts to assure compliance
with law.”285 She chided her colleagues for “appear[ing] unperturbed
by the agency’s nullification of this court’s final decision . . . . Thus the
court violates not only the constitutional plan, but also violates the
rules of litigation repose as well as the rules of estoppel and
preclusion—for the issue of validity, the evidence, and the parties in
interest are the same in this agency reexamination as in the finally
resolved litigation.”286
In one pointed dissent, she called two judges to account
because “both Judge Dyk and Judge O’Malley misstate my position on
the role of reexamination.”287 She reminded them:
281.
In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1366.
282.
Fresenius, 733 F.3d at 1383.
283.
Id. at 1382.
284.
Id. at 1383.
285.
Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Newman,
J., dissenting).
286.
In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1366.
287.
Fresenius, 733 F.3d at 1383.
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I was one of the initiators of the reexamination system, the product of the Carter
Commission on which I served. My concern is its abuse. I have never opined that
there are no circumstances in which the PTO may reexamine a patent that has
been through litigation, and I have intentionally avoided discussion of speculative
situations. Here, this court’s final decision followed full litigation, and no reason is
offered for departure from the law of the case, in favor of subsequent PTO
reexamination on the same issues and evidence, requested by a party litigant.288

Judge Newman’s second contention with the USPTO was with
the level of deference owed to the PTAB in reviewing its decisions.
The standard was not deferential, but rather by a preponderance of
evidence.289 Since “[t]he PTAB is not an examining body, but an
adjudicatory body, an objective arbiter between opposing
parties . . . [o]n questions that are close, as here illustrated, the
standard of review can affect the result.”290
Her third and fourth contentions were the standard the PTAB
should use in construing claims, and whether its decisions were
appealable to the Federal Circuit. Judge Newman argued that the
PTAB could not apply a different standard than the courts—the
“broadest reasonable interpretation” (BRI) rather than the narrower
version—“where validity is determined on the legally correct claim
construction,” because “‘the ‘broadest’ construction is designed to
facilitate examination before grant, not to confound litigation after
grant.’”291 In practical terms, this means more prior art can be used to
invalidate patents after they have been granted. She also argued that
“[t]he stated purpose of the ‘final and nonappealable’ provision is to
control interlocutory delay and harassing filings. However, review is
not barred of material aspects that were decided in connection with
the petition to institute.”292 She was concerned that “[t]his restraint
could bar review of information material to the final PTAB judgment,
and may in turn impede full judicial review of the PTAB’s decision.”293
The Supreme Court recently gave its views to both these
contentions in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee.294 It held that
the PTAB could apply the BRI standard, even though “the use of the

288.
Id.
289.
Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 845 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (“My colleagues err in applying deferential review, instead of assuring that the
PTAB’s factual findings are supported by the preponderance of the evidence, as the statute
requires.”).
290.
Id.
291.
In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J.,
dissenting), aff’d, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
292.
Id. at 1291.
293.
Id. at 1284.
294.
See generally Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. 2131.
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broadest reasonable construction standard in inter partes review,
together with use of an ordinary meaning standard in district court,
may produce inconsistent results and cause added confusion,” such as
a patent claim being upheld in district court and later invalidated by
the PTO, but the Supreme Court concluded that this possibility is
inherent to Congress’s regulatory design.295 It also held that the
PTAB’s decision whether to institute post-grant proceedings bars
review of all institution decisions, even after the Board issues a final
decision.
Bloggers Steve Brachmann and Gene Quinn have defended
Judge Newman’s view, noting that unlike claim amendments during
prosecution, “the administrative board has the power to nix a patent
owner’s ability to amend claims altogether, so to conflate [inter-partes
review (IPR)] with initial examination is further proof of the Supreme
Court’s misunderstanding of the patent landscape created by
PTAB.”296 Professor Lisa Ouellette cautioned that courts and PTAB
will both need to be alert that precedents used to invalidate or uphold
the validity of challenged patents in one forum could result in
unwittingly upholding or invalidating patents because they applied a
precedent using a different interpretative rule.297
Cuozzo has entrenched post-grant proceedings as a means for
challenging patent validity. A legal realist might see this as a shift in
the balance of power through the force of judicial activism. In any
case, it is clear that the PTAB’s rulemaking and statutory
implementation will be largely immune to judicial determination. The
Innovation Act H.R. 9, pending before the House of Representatives,
would make the PTAB’s interpretation standard the same as the
district court’s, as well as narrow the estoppel effect of PTO
proceedings.298

295.
Id. at 2146.
296.
Steve Brachmann & Gene Quinn, Industry Reaction: Supreme Court Upholds
Federal
Circuit
in
Cuozzo,
IP
WATCHDOG
(June
20,
2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/06/20/industry-reaction-supreme-court-cuozzo/id=70246/
[https://perma.cc/44HV-4J2W].
297.
Lisa Ouellette, Cuozzo v. Lee and the Potential for Patent Law Deference Mistakes,
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION BLOG (June 23, 2016), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2016/06/
cuozzo-v-lee-and-potential-for-patent.html [https://perma.cc/9X3Y-TL58] (last visited Mar. 4,
2017) (suggesting steps that law clerks and litigants can take to minimize such errors).
298.
Dimitrios Drivas et al., US Supreme Court Affirms Federal Circuit on IPR Claim
Construction Standard and that IPR Institution Decisions Are Final and Non-Appealable, WHITE
& CASE (June 21, 2016), http://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/us-supreme-court-affirmsfederal-circuit-ipr-claim-construction-standard-and-ipr
[https://perma.cc/K5VR-JBWB]
(last
visited Mar. 4, 2017).
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D. “Allies” & “Adversaries”
Dissents reveal a more human side to the study. Through the
majority and dissenting opinions of the court, this Article provides a
glimpse of its ideological fault lines, and through them, Judge
Newman’s “allies” and “adversaries.”
The use of scare quotes has three purposes. First, they help
make clear that any agreements or disagreements between the judges
are ideological and not personal. Indeed, the personal friendship
between the late Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg is well known
despite their equally well-known ideological differences.299 Similarly,
while Judges Newman and her colleagues may have ideological
disagreements, they enjoy a cordial relationship.300
Second, a recent study shows that ideology and interpretive
philosophy are not significant predictors of agreement.301 Rather
agreement depends on who is judging on the bench together,
suggesting that “judging is more about pragmatic problem solving and
maintaining a collegial work environment.”302
The same study
suggests that judicial collegiality likely plays a substantial role on
courts of appeals, since “judicial opinions on multimember courts are
written in an environment that creates incentives for strategic
interaction.”303 It showed that in all cases decided in a seven-year
period between 1997–2003, no two judges agreed any less than ninety
percent of the time.304 Third, it demonstrated that those ideological
differences are likely to be issue- or case-specific. The discussion of
the quantitative data that follows illustrates this.
It is fairly simple to identify Judge Newman’s “adversaries” on
299.
Ginsburg and Scalia: ‘Best Buddies’, NPR (Feb. 15, 2016, 4:28
http://www.npr.org/2016/02/15/466848775/scalia-ginsburg-opera-commemorates-sparringsupreme-court-friendship [https://perma.cc/U4FU-6M9U].

PM),

During their time together on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, a
staunch conservative, and Justice Ginsburg, a staunch liberal, rarely found
themselves on the same side of controversial issues. But in an era when political
divisions drive many in Washington apart on a personal level, their disagreements
remained intellectual.
Id.
300.
Graham, supra note 32 (noting from an interview with Former Chief Judge Michel
that “she was always cordial in personal interactions”); see also id. (“She was lots of fun to work
with, even when we disagreed about the outcome of a case.”).
301.
Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 217, at 841.
302.
Id.
303.
Id. at 865–66.
304.
Id. at 870 (“Numerous sources speak of the importance of collegiality among
chambers and judges.”); see also Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C.
Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1335, 1338 (1998).
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the court. One need only look at who is most consistently in the 2-1
majority or on the opposite side of an en banc court when Judge
Newman is in the dissent. The shortlist consists of judges who have
been in the majority in at least thirty cases where she was on the
dissent. A repeated pattern over years, sometimes decades, makes for
a compelling case. The evidence of her “allies” is more tenuous.
Unlike the Supreme Court where more than one Justice can join a
dissent and thus indicate his or her allegiance, the 2-1 split on the
Federal Circuit makes this same count impossible. One must turn to
en banc dissents for an approximation of the trends observed in
Supreme Court dissents.305
Figure 17 (below) shows that Judge Lourie has signed on most
frequently to Judge Newman’s en banc dissents between 1991–2016,
suggesting that they are long-standing ideological allies. That Judge
Lourie’s professional and educational background is similar to Judge
Newman’s should come as little surprise.306 Figure 17 shows a spike
in the number of judges who signed on to Judge Newman’s en banc
dissents between 2006–2016. In addition to Judge Lourie, Judges
Rader, Garjarsa, Linn, Mayer, O’Malley, Wallach, and Reyna have
contributed toward breaking a period of more than twenty-five years
where she had no co-signatories to her dissents.307 The fact that
Judges O’Malley, Wallach, and Reyna represent the next generation of
judges gives hope that some of her dissents may one day become
mainstream doctrine, as others already have. They may also have
been more willing to join her if they perceived her expertise in the
field and as a senior patent judge to be persuasive.

305.
This would include both dissents in an en banc decision or a dissent to a denial for
rehearing en banc.
306.
Judge Lourie was appointed in 1990 by President George H.W. Bush, who, like
President Reagan (who appointed Judge Newman), is Republican. See Alan D. Lourie, Circuit
Judge, U.S. CT. APP. FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/alan-d-lourie-circuit-judge
[https://perma.cc/RTQ2-MREY] (last visited Aug. 3, 2016). Judge Lourie was formerly Vice
President, Corporate Patents and Trademarks, and Associate General Counsel of SmithKline
Beecham Corporation, and holds a Ph.D. in chemistry. Id. Judge Lourie had been a member of
the board of directors of the Intellectual Property Owners Association and Vice Chairman of the
Industry Functional Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights for Trade Policy
Matters (IFAC 3) for the Department of Commerce and the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative. Id. Like Judge Newman, he was also a member of the U.S. delegation to the
Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property. Id.
307.
See infra Figure 17. Between 1986–1990, Judge Bennett signed on to one; between
1990–1995, Judges Rich and Lourie signed on to one each; between 1996–2000, Judge Rader
signed on to one; no one signed on to her en banc dissents between 2000–2005. Id.
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FIGURE 17: JUDGES WHO JOINED JUDGE NEWMAN IN HER EN BANC
DISSENTS
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FIGURE 18: JUDGE NEWMAN’S “ALLIES”

What of Judge Newman’s “adversaries”? Conventional wisdom
puts Judges Newman and Dyk at polar ideological opposites.308 In
contrast to Judge Newman, Judge Dyk was appointed by Democratic
President Bill Clinton sixteen years after her appointment.309 He was
never in industry, having been at Jones Day for ten years before his
appointment and Wilmer Cutler & Pickering prior to that.310 Judge
Dyk also served as Law Clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren, who
oversaw some of the most interventionist periods in patent history.311
A survey of precedential patent decisions between January
2010–September 2011 reveals that, of the twenty-five decisions where
the two were on the same panel, “the pair disagreed on the outcome or
application of the law in 19[,] i.e., the two judges disagreed in more

308.
Crouch, supra note 47 (“After considering the merits of a case, Judges Pauline
Newman and Timothy Dyk often arrive at opposite conclusions.”).
309.
Timothy
B.
Dyk,
Circuit
Judge,
U.S.
C T.
APP.
FED.
CIR.,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/timothy-b-dyk-circuit-judge [https://perma.cc/K9GK-V88T]
(last visited Aug. 3, 2016).
310.
Id.
311.
Id.; see also Thomas E. Kauper, The “Warren Court” and the Antitrust Laws: Of
Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325, 327 (1968) (“Apparent conflicts
between the patent and antitrust laws have been resolved in favor of the latter.”).
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than 75% of the cases.”312 According to Judge Newman, this may overrepresent the level of disagreement since summary affirmances, as
well as cases where they are on the majority together are not
included.313 However, she also acknowledged ideological differences
between herself and Judge Dyk, which the data confirms as bearing
out in the cases.
The data in this Article reveals a more nuanced conclusion.
Looking at Figure 19, Judge Dyk does indeed disagree with Judge
Newman significantly, and is ranked top in terms of the number of
case where he voted in opposition to her views (sixty cases).314 Chief
Judge Prost comes in next at fifty-seven cases. Like Judge Newman
before, Chief Judge Prost was appointed by a Republican president—
President George W. Bush, in 2001. Unlike Judges Newman and Dyk,
however, Judge Prost’s career took the government track. She served
as Minority Chief Counsel, Deputy Chief Counsel, and Chief Counsel
of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, and in
various labor-related positions.315 Judges Lourie and Rader, who
joined Judge Newman’s en banc dissent, feature prominently here, at
fifty-five and fifty-two cases, respectively. This is strong evidence that
at least for those judges, both points of disagreement and agreement
are issue based rather than ideological.316

312.
Crouch, supra note 47.
313.
Interview with Judge Pauline Newman, supra note 83.
314.
Only those judges who had appeared in the majority in thirty or more cases where
Judge Newman dissented were included.
315.
Those positions include: Chief Labor Counsel (Minority), Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Res. (1989–1993); Assistant Solicitor, Associate Solicitor, and Acting Solicitor, Nat’l
Labor Relations Bd. (1984–1989); Attorney at the Internal Revenue Service (1983–1984); Field
Attorney at the Federal Labor Relations Authority (1980–1983); Labor Relations
Specialist/Auditor at the United States General Accounting Office (1976–1980); Labor Relations
Specialist at the United States Civil Service Comm’n (1973–1976). Sharon Prost, Chief Judge,
U.S. CT. APP. FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/sharon-prost-chief-judge
[https://perma.cc/RV93-F45E] (last visited Aug. 3, 2016).
316.
A future study could delve into some of the points of contention between the judges.
See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT
DEFINED AMERICA (2007).
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FIGURE 19: JUDGE NEWMAN’S “ADVERSARIES”

Professors Czarnezki and Ford posited that “perhaps judges
who have spent more time together on a court can more effectively
determine how to recognize and write these mutually acceptable
judgments.”317 The theory is that over time, members of the same
court learn how to find points of agreement and navigate the
ideological idiosyncrasies of particular colleagues. When one looks at
trends over time (Figure 21 below), one sees that between 2001–2016,
it is apparent that Chief Judge Prost and Judge Dyk have been in
disagreement from the start of their appointments in 2001 and 2000
and continue to the end of 2015. Time trends also show that Judge
Bryson is another judge consistently in opposition to Judge Newman
since his appointment in 1994. These trends suggest that where there
are fundamental differences in ideology or viewpoint, these differences
continue to be reflected in opinions.

317.

Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 217, at 870.
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FIGURE 20: JUDGE NEWMAN’S “ADVERSARIES” (OVER TIME)

E. Contentions
Beyond the number of dissents, citation counts, and the
outcomes on appeal, a more granular analysis of Judge Newman’s
dissents yields a wealth of other findings. For instance, the coded
data shows she dissented most on patent validity and equally on
novelty and nonobviousness.318 The law on infringement was another
area she was very much concerned about, dissenting on issues related
to the doctrine of equivalents and claim construction far more than
anything else in that subcategory.319 With respect to exceptions and
defenses, she regarded accusations of inequitable conduct as a

318.
319.

See infra Section III.E.1.
See infra Section III.E.2.
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“plague” that attracted most of her dissents. However, she sided with
defendants when they sought the protection of research exemption.
This Section also presents the reasons for her disagreements with the
majority.
Figure 21 shows the profile of issues covered by Judge
Newman’s dissents. A number of trends are worth mentioning. First,
the number of dissents addressing patent validity issues has remained
an enduring concern to her, rising from three cases between 1986–
1990 to twenty cases between 2011–2016. Second, between 2006–
2016, the number of dissents covering miscellaneous issues has risen.
This indicates a shift from doctrinal to procedural issues. Third, the
proportion of infringement-related dissents were the highest in the
initial period between 1986–1990, gradually falling as a proportion of
her dissents over the years. Fourth, between 1996–2005, the number
of dissents related to infringements and claim construction rose in
absolute terms. One may surmise that many of those issues were
either resolved or were idiosyncratic and did not arise again, leading
to a leveling-off of those numbers even as the total number of her
dissents has risen.

FIGURE 21: DISSENTS: ISSUE (OVER TIME)
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1. Validity
The fact that validity features with the highest frequency is not
surprising. Every infringement and prosecution case touches on
patent validity. Invalidity is a defense raised by patent infringers,
while validity is the prerequisite in order to successfully prosecute a
patent at the USPTO. Judge Newman has dissented on every aspect
of patent validity except utility (Figure 22). This may have been
because Judge Bryson’s opinion in Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang,
Inc., decided in 1999, settled the issue for the court.320 It also supports
the view that the ideological differences between judges do not extend
to every area of patent law, but indeed, are likely instead to be limited
to specific doctrines. Judge Newman confirmed that “utility is rarely
an issue.”321

FIGURE 22: DISSENTS: VALIDITY (OVER TIME)

320.
321.

185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Interview with Judge Pauline Newman, supra note 83.
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It may be asked how often Judge Newman’s dissents would
uphold a patent the majority is striking down. Some may see a high
percentage of dissents as a rap against her. If it is true, then it
bolsters the argument about her overall view of how the system should
run.322 Looking at the data of the ten longest serving judges (Figure
23), Judge Newman clearly has the highest number of dissents (31)
upholding patent validity. However, when normalizing those dissents
as a percentage of total dissents (Figure 24 below), her percentage
(14.8 percent) puts her at the median. Former Chief Judge Rader
(43.2 percent) and Judge Dyk (17.3 percent) score higher, while
Judges Lourie (13.9 percent) and Mayer (12.0 percent) are
comparable. All these mean that her dissents on patent validity when
compared with other judges in purely quantitative terms do not mark
her as an outlier. Any conclusions about her views on this issue
require a closer examination.

FIGURE 23: DISSENTS TO UPHOLD PATENT VALIDITY (BY JUDGE)

322.

I am indebted to Rochelle Dreyfuss for this insight.
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Judge

Dissents to Uphold

No. of Dissents

%

Newman

31

210

14.76

Lourie

5

36

13.89

Friedman

0

4

0.00

Archer

1

10

10.00

Plager

1

15

6.67

Rader

19

44

43.18

Davis

2

11

18.18

Dyk

13

75

17.33

Mayer

9

75

12.00

Smith

2

5

40.00

FIGURE 24: DISSENTS TO UPHOLD PATENT VALIDITY (PERCENTAGES)

a. Novelty
The law on novelty disqualifies an invention from patentability
if it has been anticipated through a single reference that antedates
one or more claims in the patent or patent application.323 Judge
Newman’s primary concern here lies in novelty destroying prior art
such as “inherent anticipation.”324 The doctrine relates to whether “a
product whose existence was not previously known and is not in the
prior art” would be “unpatentable on the ground that it existed

323.
See HANSEN, SCAFIDI & LIM, supra note 66.
324.
Occasionally, a dissent would touch on procedural fairness in adjudicating the
novelty issue. See, e.g., Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1406–09 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (“When this right is denied summarily, the law requires that the procedure is fair,
and fairly administered. . . . Since on the evidence of record summary judgment was improperly
granted, I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the Board’s decision.”); see also Brown v.
Barbacid, 276 F.3d 1327, 1338–41 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that in an
interference proceeding, it was the senior party who had to prove “by a preponderance of
evidence, conception and/or reduction to practice before the date that had been proven by the
junior party”).
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undiscovered.”325
An inventor’s actions to isolate a chemical
compound existing in vivo as a degradation product of loratidine,
determine its structure, and find its biological properties were novel.
She explained in another dissent that:
[E]very biological property is a natural and inherent result of the chemical
structure from which it arises, whether or not it has been discovered. To negate
the patentability of a discovery of biological activity because it is ‘the natural
result’ of the chemical compound can have powerful consequences for the
patentability of biological inventions.326

Similarly, according to Judge Newman, a product that existed
in trace amounts, although unknown and undetected and unisolated,
was not inherently anticipated.327 Otherwise, “[t]he patentability of
antibiotics, hormones, antibodies, and myriad other previously
unknown
or
unisolated
products
would
be
called
into
question . . . giving rise to uncertainty as to existing patents, as well
as negation of searches for the beneficial components of existing
materials.”328 Instead, “[o]nly after a compound is identified does it
become subject to patenting; if its existence is not reasonably known to
persons of skill in the field, its later discovery cannot be
retrospectively ‘inherently anticipated.’”329
According to Judge Newman, newly discovered chemical
processes involving known ingredients that achieved a different
result were similarly novel.
The majority disqualified the
invention—“because the ingredients were known, it is irrelevant that
a significant change in conditions produces a result that is different
from that achieved under the conditions of the prior art.”330 Judge
Newman condemned “[s]uch a view of ‘inherency’” as “contrary to legal
as well as scientific principles.”331 She reasoned that the prior art
could not anticipate what it could not produce.332 Neither could prior
325.
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 348 F.3d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
326.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., Nos. 99-1262, -1263, -1264, -1303, 2001 WL
766766, at *5 (Fed. Cir. May 30, 2001) (Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc).
327.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1328, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
328.
Id.
329.
Id.
330.
In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 483 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
331.
Id.
332.
Id. at 1380 (“A non-enabling reference cannot serve as an invalidating anticipation,
either expressly or inherently. My colleagues on this panel, holding otherwise, do not explain
how they plug this scientific and legal gap. Such an unexplained finding of inherent anticipation
does not add clarity to this jurisprudence.”).

950

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. XIX:4:873

art that had been practiced in secret.333 Her aversion to including
“secret” prior art may also be seen in her dissent against laboratory
use of inventions creating novelty-destroying prior art. She contended
that this “creat[ed] a new and mischievous category of ‘secret’ prior
art” contrary to law on novelty.334 As a policy matter, she “discern[ed]
no benefit to society, or to the interest of justice, in this new
unreliability of the patent grant.”335
Judge Newman brought the majority to task when it barred
product-by-process claims. She declared that “the exceptions in
connection with ‘anticipation’ of claim content are rare, and represent
a pragmatic adjustment to the needs of science, not law.”336 Such an
exception arose when the claims were directed to “a novel product
that, although patentable as a product, cannot be adequately
described other than by the way it was made; the process may or may
not itself be novel, but that aspect is deemed irrelevant to the claim to
the new product.”337
Reliability is a repeated theme in her dissents. Judge Newman
rejected the majority’s view that individual variations in industry
practice controlled whether there was an offer for sale.338 These
“industry-specific, local, and subjective criteria are a regression
toward the imprecision of the discredited ‘totality of the
circumstances,’ a standard purposefully rejected by the Supreme
Court,” and that “[i]n developing uniform national law it is as
important that the law be consistent across industry boundaries as it
is across state boundaries.”339 Because federal-state tensions would
undermine consistency in the application of the law on novelty,340 she

333.
Id. (“Whatever may or may not have been done in secret in Korea does not convert a
secret and still unknown process into prior art.”).
334.
Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Newman,
J., dissenting); see also Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 742 F.3d 998, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of “creat[ing] a new class of secret prior art,
holding that a privately performed experiment, without publication or public knowledge or use or
sale or inclusion in a United States patent application, is invalidating prior art”).
335.
Baxter Int’l, 88 F.3d at 1063.
336.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
337.
Id.
338.
Lacks Indus., Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., 322 F.3d 1335, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“My colleagues on this
panel depart from this simple standard and its important policy purpose, and instead hold that
individual variations in industry practice control whether there has been an offer of sale under
§ 102(b), whether or not the contract law-based requirement of Group One is met.”).
339.
Id.
340.
Id.
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concluded that “[s]uch pitfalls are not required by the Patent Act, and
should not be created by this court.”341
b. Nonobviousness
The law on nonobviousness disqualifies an invention from
patenting, even if it were otherwise novel, “if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which said subject matter pertains.”342 Judge Newman noted
that nonobviousness is a factually complex area and her dissents focus
on technical rather than policy differences.343 She noted that the court
“must ultimately place [itself] in the mind of a person of ordinary skill
in such fields as electronics or biotechnology or metallurgy, and decide
whether that which is new would have been obvious to such a
person.”344 This is unlike the “reasonable person” in other fields of
law, where “judges are quite at home.” 345
Perhaps for this reason, many of her dissents reflect her
experience with the scientific enterprise. She once wrote that “[t]he
court’s approach reflects misperception of the scientific process as well
as the patent purpose.”346 As she explained, “[s]cientific methodology
usually starts with a hypothesis based on what is already
known; . . . [h]owever, none achieved this long-sought goal, and the

While principles of federalism counsel against imposing a possibly alien legal
standard upon transactions that are primarily matters of state law, such as the law of
sales, the panel majority is not here invoking the guidance of state law, but of
practices ostensibly peculiar to a segment of the automotive industry—practices
unencumbered by state law, indeed unknown, uncodified, and variable.
Id.
341.
Id. at 1354; see also Newman, supra note 102, at 525 (“[A]pplication of the criteria of
‘obviousness,’ 35 U.S.C. § 103, remains one of the most difficult aspects of patent law.”).
342.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
343.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Our cases are rarely factually simple . . . .”).
344.
Newman, supra note 102, at 525.
345.
Id.
346.
PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“It is often far easier to recognize the problem than to find and
demonstrate the solution. . . . My colleagues go too far in limiting the patent system to the
serendipitous and the unexpected.”); see also Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 719
F.3d 1346, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“All
scientific experiments are conducted with a purpose of inquiry, and all experimenters have a
theory of possible outcomes. Such experiments may partake of varying degrees of vision, hope, or
expectation on the part of the experimenter, but these are not criteria of patentability.”).
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record shows the extreme skepticism concerning even the possibility of
this achievement.”347
A key priority for her is to “place the invention in the proper
context for adjudication” by considering “[t]he contemporaneous views
of the engineers who use and understand the technology . . . along
with the prior art.”348 That “proper context” may involve looking
beyond the structural similarity of chemical compounds and
compositions to their properties,349 appreciating the complexity of a
biochemical process,350 or looking beyond commercial motivation for
profit or achieving an economic advantage as a motivation to combine
prior art references to “knowledge in the prior art.”351 Testimony of
scientists is helpful and should be given considerable weight.352

347.
PharmaStem Therapeutics, 491 F.3d at 1378.
348.
Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 91 F.3d 169, 1996 WL 297601, at *8 (Fed. Cir.
June 5, 1996) (unpublished table decision) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
349.
In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 699 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(“[D]etermination of prima facie obviousness of new chemical compounds and compositions and
their uses cannot be based on chemical structure alone, but must also include consideration of all
their properties, including those discovered by the applicant.”).
350.
In re Sibia Neurosciences, Inc., 156 F. App’x 314, 316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
The complexity of this mechanism was oversimplified by the Board, leading the Board
to combine, in perfect hindsight, a reference showing that GPCR can cause changes in
cAMP, and a reference showing that cAMP can cause changes in reporter gene levels.
From these references, the Board adduced the claimed invention . . . [i]n this complex
case of biological advance, the Board’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence, and should be reversed. From the panel majority’s contrary holding, I must
respectfully dissent.
Id.
351.
Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 78 F.3d 540, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s view that “the prior existence of raw and fully
cooked waffle-cut potatoes provided the motivation to combine previously uncombined references
to make the new parfried frozen product under the selected conditions described and claimed in
the ‘084 patent,” and stating: “That inventors hope to profit from their invention is irrelevant to
the determination of obviousness. The motivation to which precedent is directed is that which
would make obvious the technologic advance, not the motivation to achieve a competitive
advantage”).
352.
Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Barr Labs., Inc., 575 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
I do not share their view that it would have been obvious to do that which was
indisputably unobvious to the experienced formulation scientists whose assignment
was to formulate the known product drospirenone. . . . Yet my colleagues, employing
their own expertise, hold that since the scientists working in this field turned out to
be mistaken, it would have been obvious that it was not necessary to take steps to
prevent acid degradation. The [majority] discount[ed] the testimony of the scientists
themselves, ignore[d] the knowledge . . . ignore[d] the textbook teachings . . . . That is
not the law of obviousness.
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An invention’s ingenuity may be seen by the fact that it had
not been accomplished anywhere in the world.353 Probative evidence
of nonobviousness included inventions that were “long-sought” and
“achieved amid general scientific skepticism, despite the extensive
research that was being conducted by many scientists in this field,”
and those “met with universal acclaim and widespread utilization,
including the founding of many commercial enterprises, all of which
are reported to have licensed the patents except for these
defendants.”354 Indeed, despite this meritorious litany, she noted with
some disdain:
Unimpressed by these considerations, my colleagues on this panel now reconstruct
these inventions by selection and inference, with perfect hindsight of the
discoveries . . . simply reweigh[ing] selectively extracted evidence, ignor[ing] the
actual peer response and acclaim at the time these inventions were made, and
decid[ing] that this long-sought advance would have been obvious to this court.355

Simple elegance could sway Judge Newman. In one dissent, she wrote
that the patented product had “an ingenious safety design, whereby
the device is simple to operate by adults but not by children, unlike
prior art utility lighters, and locks automatically after use, unlike
prior art utility lighters.”356 The known need for an improved safety
mechanism did not serve to provide a reason to modify the prior art,
thereby pointing toward the obviousness of the invention where that
need had not been met.357 She warned that despite its relative
simplicity, it was unreasonable “to trivialize” the improvement—“[t]o
Id.; see also PharmaStem Therapeutics, 491 F.3d at 1378. Judge Newman then buttresses her
accusation by noting:
Even if this court were not required to recognize the substantial evidence in support of
the jury verdict, even if APA deference were not required to the three PTO
reexaminations, one must pause at the powerful evidence of the acclaim that was
accorded to this achievement, by these defendants as well as by scientific peers.
Id.
353.
In re Suong-Hyu Hyon, 679 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
This approach has never been attempted, not only in Japan, but also in other
countries. The idea to endow the polyethylene molded article for artificial joints with
molecular orientation or crystal orientation is the very creative, and it is sure that
this invention, if actually carried out, will be applied to artificial joints all over the
world.
Id.
354.
PharmaStem Therapeutics, 491 F.3d at 1367.
355.
Id.
356.
Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman,
J., dissenting).
357.
Id. at 1380 (“To the contrary, the continuing need weighs against the obviousness of
this successful device.”).
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the contrary, the fact that this improvement eluded discovery, and
that its advantages were immediately apparent to the marketplace
and to the competition, weigh in favor of nonobviousness.”358
Another reason why so many of her dissents touch on
nonobviousness is that, according to Judge Newman, the majority
should have followed precedents set by the early Federal Circuit
panels and its predecessor court. Reflecting on the Federal Circuit’s
history, she wrote that “[m]any of the early Federal Circuit decisions
brought the patent law into the legal mainstream. In my view, this
adoption of mainstream law to replace the special treatment often
given to patent issues is an important contribution of the Federal
Circuit to the stability and correctness of patent jurisprudence.”359
Judge Newman’s discomfort with the majority’s comparatively
relaxed approach toward finding nonobviousness may be seen in two
recent cases. In In re Efthymiopoulos, she castigates the majority for
ruling that it was obvious to administer an influenza drug via oral
inhalation.360 She notes that there was no dispute it was believed that
the influenza virus infected primarily the nasal passages, and that
there was no reasonable expectation oral inhalation to the lower
respiratory tract would be effective.361 The only disclosure was by the
inventor, and this was used against the inventor.362 In another case,
her dissent noted that “[o]nly perfect judicial hindsight renders it
obvious to do so—although not even judicial hindsight can find a
teaching or suggestion that these procedures should be combined to
highly beneficial effect.”363
c. Disclosure
The patent specification describes the invention, including the
claims. The description needs to enable a person having ordinary skill
in the art to make and use the invention, to convince such a person
that the inventor truly possesses the invention, and the claims must
be stated with sufficient precision so as to map out the metes and

358.
Id.
359.
Newman, supra note 102, at 525.
360.
In re Efthymiopoulos, 839 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, J., dissenting).
361.
Id.
362.
Id.
363.
Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 640 F. App’x 951, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
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bounds of the invention.364 It must also describe the best mode known
to the inventor.365
Here too, Judge Newman emphasized the need for the law to
remain attuned to the realities of science. She noted that with the
maturing of biotechnology “the need for special accommodation, such
as the deposit of cell lines or microorganisms, may diminish.”366 At
the same time, there needs to be “sufficient disclosure, including
experimental data when appropriate, that reasonably support[s] the
scope of the requested claims.”367 She objected to requiring “inventors
to identify and include in their claims the chemical interaction
products formed in such a complex mixture . . . in order distinctly to
state what the inventor regards as his invention,”368 as this was “a
serious disruption of chemical patent-dependent activity flowing from
this decision and the massive taint upon existing property rights.”369
Judge Newman has been on the right side of history in
instances where it counted, such as whether there was a written
description requirement that was separate from enablement. She
disagreed that “there is not now and never has been a ‘written
description’ requirement in the patent law. It has always been
necessary to disclose and describe what is patented. It has never been
the law that one can claim what is not made known and set forth in
the patent.”370 The en banc court in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli
Lilly & Co. upheld her views six years later.371

364.
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
365.
Id.
366.
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Newman, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
367.
Id.
368.
Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 77 F.3d 450, 453 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
369.
Id.
370.
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
371.
598 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Reading the statute to give effect to its language that the specification ‘shall contain a
written description of the invention’ and hold that § 112, first paragraph, contains two
separate description requirements: a ‘written description [i] of the invention, and [ii]
of the manner and process of making and using [the invention’]. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.
Id.
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d. Statutory Subject Matter
The law on patentable subject matter requires that the claimed
invention be directed to one of four statutory categories.372 Judge
Newman defended business method patents as statutory subject
matter when the majority held that “process” in the patent statute,
excluded “all processes that do not transform physical matter or that
are not performed by machines,”373 thus effectively wiping out
business method patents.374
She argued that a “process for
determining risk in commodity transactions does not become an
abstraction because it is broadly claimed in [the patentee’s] first claim.
It may be claimed so broadly that it reads on the prior art, but it is
neither a fundamental truth nor an abstraction.” 375
The Supreme Court wrote that “[t]he Court of Appeals
incorrectly concluded that this Court has endorsed the machine-ortransformation test as the exclusive test,”376 instead clarifying that
“[t]his Court’s precedents establish that the machine-ortransformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative
tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes
under § 101. The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test
for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”377 The
Court upheld the majority on its conclusion but eviscerated its
reasoning.

372.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (specifying four independent categories of inventions or
discoveries that are eligible for protection: “processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions
of matter”); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (“The Court’s precedents provide three
specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent-eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas.’”).
373.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting), aff’d but
criticized, Bilski, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
374.
Are Software and Business Methods Still Patentable After the Bilski Decisions?,
BITLAW,
http://www.bitlaw.com/software-patent/bilski-and-software-patents.html
[https://perma.cc/M3DF-PEEY] (last visited Aug. 3, 2016) (“[T]he October 30, 2008 In re Bilski
decision of the Federal Circuit caused many commentators to suggest that the age of software
patents is over. The Supreme Court partially reversed this opinion in its Bilski v. Kappos opinion
in June 2010.”).
375.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 997; see also In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) (observing that “judge-made law has retreated from specifying
how a mathematical algorithm must interact in the claimed invention in order to constitute
statutory subject matter, and advanced toward the test of whether the overall process is for a
technologically useful art,” then arguing, accordingly, that “[a]ll mathematical algorithms
transform data, and thus serve as a process to convert initial conditions or inputs into solutions
or outputs, through transformation of information . . . in a technological process to produce a
useful result”).
376.
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604.
377.
Id.
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In Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., she dissented
from denial of the petition for rehearing en banc.378 While agreeing
with the court on the outcome, she argued “discoveries of natural
phenomena or their application in new ways or for new uses” may be
eligible for patenting if it “is novel and unforeseen, and is of profound
public benefit.”379 Allowing the method at issue to be patented does
not “preempt further study of this science, nor the development of
additional applications. Patenting does, however, facilitate the public
benefit of provision of this method through medical diagnostic
commerce, rather than remaining a laboratory curiosity.”380
2. Infringement
The law on infringement prohibits the sale, use, creation,
import, or offer for sale of a patented invention.381 The scope of the
invention is defined by the patented claims, either literally or in
relation to internal and extrinsic interpretive sources—the doctrine of
equivalents.382 Judge Newman’s infringement-related dissents touch
on both of these themes: claim construction and the doctrine of
equivalents. Her dissents occasionally touch on a range of other
issues, such as extraterritoriality, inducement, divided infringement,
literal infringement, exclusion orders at the International Trade
Commission (ITC), and joint infringement (Figure 23).

378.
809 F.3d 1282, 1293–94 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
379.
Id. at 1294.
380.
Id. at 1293–94; see also Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042,
1048 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding a claim patent eligible on the basis that “[t]his type of constructive
process, carried out by an artisan to achieve ‘a new and useful end,’ is precisely the type of claim
that is eligible for patenting”).
381.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
382.
See HANSEN, SCAFIDI & LIM, supra note 66.
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FIGURE 25: DISSENTS: INFRINGEMENT (OVER TIME)

a. Claim Construction
Judge Newman has three prime concerns in claim construction,
two of which surfaced in the lengthiest of her dissents, Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., which ran for over twenty-seven pages.383
First, claim construction should be a question of fact, not law, with

383.
52 F.3d 967, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., dissenting), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370
(1996). Judge Newman’s concern about the fact-law distinction extends beyond claim
construction. She dissented in Lough v. Brunswick Corp., pointing out that experimental use is a
question of fact. 103 F.3d 1517, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Newman, J., dissenting). In another case,
Judge Newman dissented because the panel mischaracterized “critical findings of fact as rulings
of law.” See Mabus v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 633 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
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lower courts given proper deference.384 Even if the effect of a claim
was ultimately a legal issue, it remains premised on underlying facts
that should not be reclassified.385 Treating claim construction as a
matter of law “distorts the trial/appellate relationship” and “manifests
a heady misperception of our assignment as a national appellate
court.”386
This was an “egregious lapse,”387 since it “not only raises a
constitutional issue of grave consequence, but [it also] creates a
litigation system that is unique to patent cases, unworkable, and
ultimately unjust.”388 It would also create a schism between patent
and non-patent cases. This was unacceptable since “[t]he Federal
Circuit is responsible for establishing consistent national law . . . We
acted to assure that the same procedures would apply in the trial of
patent cases as in other civil actions.”389 She voiced her concern about
the inability of the Federal Circuit to be up to the task.390
Second, claims should be given the meaning supported by the
specification and prosecution history.391 Claims “are readily and
384.
See Hartz, supra note 19, at 55–56 (“Judge Newman has repeatedly criticized the
rest of the court for turning questions that appear to be factual into legal issues that can be
decided by the court.”).
385.
Markman, 52 F.3d at 1000 (“[T]he meaning and scope of disputed technologic and
other terms of art in particular usage are classical questions of fact. Their nature as fact does not
change because their finding, like most findings in litigation, has a legal consequence.”); see also
id.
These facts are found on evidence that includes the patent specification, relevant prior
art, the prosecution history, the testimony of experts in the field, and other relevant
evidence such as tests and demonstrations, all as I shall discuss post. These findings
do not become rules of law because they relate to a document whose legal effect
follows from the found facts.
Id.
386.
Id. at 1008.
387.
Id. at 1010 (“The most egregious lapse in the majority’s ruling is its discard of the
jury right in patent cases.”).
388.
Id. at 999.
389.
Id. at 1025.
390.
Id. at 1025–26.
I doubt the practical feasibility of the majority’s holding that this court will ‘construe’
the meaning of technical terms and words of art without benefit of the trial
experience. It is of course appropriate for this court to be alert to methodologies of
resolution of disputes that involve science and technology. . . . [I]t is an illusion to
think that patent litigation difficulties can be resolved by turning factual issues into
matters of law and assigning them to the Federal Circuit. . . . The deference that
appellate courts must give to the trial process is fundamental to the efficiency, and
the effectiveness, of the judicial system.
Id.
391.
See, e.g., Markem-Imaje Corp. v. Zipher Ltd., 657 F.3d 1293, 1301–03 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The panel majority’s contrary result ignores the paramount
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unambiguously understood when the rest of the specification is read,”
and while “the claims could have been more perfectly drawn, [] when
read in the context of the specification there is no doubt as to what is
described and claimed.”392 A decision that departs from this rule
“perpetuates a distortion of the construction of patent documents,
contrary to precedent and defeasible of the critical need for stability
and predictability in the system of patents.”393 A claim is not limited
by its plain meaning; “a claim is ‘inimical’ to any broader construction
than the invention set forth in the specification, and reliance on
dictionaries, even technical dictionaries, without due consideration of
the context of the invention may lead to ‘absurd results.’”394
She noted, however, that dictionaries and treatises should be
used
to educate the non-technical judge in understanding what the inventor and the
examiner understood, not to impose a new evidentiary presumption and not to
enlarge the patented invention beyond that set forth by the inventor. The words of
patent claims have the meaning and scope with which they are used in the
specification and the prosecution history.395

At the same time, “[i]t is also incorrect to hold that words in
claims are broader in meaning than their usage in the specification,
simply because a dictionary definition may not contain the limitations
of the specification.”396 It was also wrong to construe a claim “so as to
delete limitations stated in the claim—including the ‘preamble’
clause—and then to hold the claim ‘anticipated’ by subject matter that
is excluded by the limitations stated in the preamble clause.”397
importance of the specification in claim construction.”); Dorel Juvenile Grp., Inc. v. Graco
Children’s Prods., Inc., 429 F.3d 1043, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The
majority’s approach to claim construction strains this court’s attempts to restore consistency of
analysis to patent claims by placing the claims in the context of the specification.”); see also
Sinorgchem Co., Shandong v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 511 F.3d 1132, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“The panel majority adds inconsistency and unpredictability by
arbitrarily limiting the scope of the claimed invention in a way that conflicts with the teachings
of the specifications and the knowledge in the field of the inventions. I respectfully dissent.”).
392.
Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 275 F. App’x 969, 980 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (Newman, J., dissenting).
393.
Housey Pharm., Inc. v. Astrazeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(Newman, J., dissenting); see also Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039,
1041 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]his
court’s claim construction diverges from the specification and the prosecution history, and
presents a claim construction that impinges on the prior art and thereby fosters invalidity.”).
394.
Housey Pharm., 366 F.3d at 1356.
395.
Id. at 1358.
396.
Id.
397.
Marrin v. Griffin, 599 F.3d 1290, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting).
My colleagues on this panel delete material limitations in the claim because they
appear in the preamble of the claim, and then find the claim anticipated, although the
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b. The Doctrine of Equivalents
Judge Newman has defended the right of patentees to use the
doctrine of equivalents as an “equitable tool of infringement analysis”
to reach beyond the literal wording of the claims.398 After observing
that “the doctrine is as old as the patent system,” she wrote that “[t]he
high cost of much modern innovation, and the increasing ease of
finding technological alternatives, provide new arguments on both
sides of the policy issue.”399 Thus, “[t]he extent to which a wise
balance is reached will depend on how well we understand the
contributing factors and the balance of interests that the law
serves.”400 Elaborating, she wrote:
Disputed issues of equivalency generally arise only after an innovative advance
has been successfully commercialized, and others appropriate the benefit thereof
while skirting the claims. Thus the doctrine of equivalents is a tool of a
technology-based economy; it is an indicator of the policy balance between
creativity and imitation. . . . A national economic policy that weighs on the side of
fostering development and investment in new technology will have a different
approach to the law of equivalency than an economic policy aimed at facilitating
competition by minor change in existing products. Any tightening or loosening of
access to the doctrine of equivalents shifts the balance between inventor and
copier.401

As with claim construction, Judge Newman viewed issues of
equivalence as issues of fact, and she expressed her “distress” where
the majority fails to accord deference.402 In her view, the doctrine of

claim is not anticipated when the deleted limitations are considered. These deleted
limitations distinguish the invention that is described and claimed in the patent in
suit. It is incorrect to construe the claims contrary to the deleted limitations so as to
broaden the claims into invalidity.
Id.
398.
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1536 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“Unless the doctrine of equivalents is to be eliminated as an
equitable tool of infringement analysis, these simple electrical equivalents are squarely within it.
It is not useful to scientists and engineers for courts to magnify scientific differences beyond
their reasonable meaning.”); see id. at 1542 (“The doctrine of equivalents does not authorize
judicial revision of the basic invention; the interested public must know with reasonable
precision the boundaries of the patent grant.”).
399.
Newman, supra note 102, at 527.
400.
Id.
401.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
402.
Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“I am distressed at this new disregard of the deference due to jury
verdicts . . . .”), disapproved of on other grounds by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508
U.S. 83 (1993); see also Blumenthal v. Barber-Colman Holdings Corp., Nos. 93-1005, 93-1006,
1995 WL 453120, at *8 (Fed. Cir. July 31, 1995) (Newman, J., dissenting).
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equivalents should adhere to “the substance of the patented invention,
avoid[ing] the rigors of formulae and dogma, and [should be]
applied . . . as the facts and circumstances, and justice, merited.”403
She opposed it where the accused device did not have all the functions
described in the specification,404 and she rejected a rule that required
the equivalents both to be known and disclosed in the patent.405 These
were akin to “manipulat[ing] the issues of equivalency and estoppel to
achieve a policy-driven result.”406

Whether the cylindrical and frusto-conical shapes are equivalent is a question of fact.
This question was not subject to summary resolution against the non-movant, for
Blumenthal provided sufficient evidence whereby a reasonable jury could find
equivalency between the form of the claimed and the accused electrodes . . . . The facts
of equivalency require trial. Thus I must dissent from the majority’s resolution of this
case.
Id.
A reasonable jury, correctly instructed, viewing all the evidence presented at trial of
the case here under review, could have found infringement by equivalency. Our role is
appellate review, not trial de novo. The panel majority, holding that there was
insufficient evidence of equivalency to present the issue to a jury, appears to
concentrate its attack on Malta’s evidence of the ‘way’ aspect of the
function/way/result test of Graver Tank. The panel majority finds an inadequate
showing of why the elements work in the same way.
Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Newman, J.,
dissenting); Senmed, Inc., 888 F.2d at 821.
[T]his appeal is from a jury verdict of infringement, yet it is difficult to find in the
majority opinion any deference to the jury, or application of the standard by which
jury verdicts are reviewed on appeal. Thus I respectfully dissent from the review
process followed by the panel majority.
Id.
403.
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 954 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
disapproved by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
404.
Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 141 F.3d 1084, 1093 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“By imposing a new rule of law that overrides the facts of
equivalency, the panel majority bars liability for infringement by an equivalent device if the
equivalent does not possess the unclaimed advantages or functions described in the
specification.”).
405.
Brunswick Corp. v. United States, Nos. 97-5017, 97-5021, 1998 WL 163700, at *10
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 1998) (Newman, J., dissenting).
The rule here announced and applied by the panel majority severely departs from the
precedent of the Supreme Court and of this court. It is directly contrary to the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,
wherein the Court “reject[ed] the more severe proposition that equivalents must not
only be known, but must also be actually disclosed in the patent in order for such
equivalents to infringe upon the patent.”
Id.
406.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 630 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
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She cautioned against venturing into “industrial policy” that
lies beyond the court’s competence.407 She looks to Congress for gap
filling, writing that “[i]t is for Congress, not the courts, to change the
law for policy reasons.” She frowned upon “judicial legislation” which
inadequately takes into account “the consequences for research and
innovation or the public interest . . . . Congress would be expected to
consider the public and private economic and policy aspects of these
complex industries. I cannot imagine how, on the record before us, a
panel of this court can decide how Congress will decide the issue.”408
Judge Newman urged a holistic view of the alleged infringing
device and a willingness to gloss over instances “where one or a
number of elements of an alleged infringing device are not equivalent
to elements in the claim or claims of a patented device, and a
conclusion of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents can still
be made.”409 Hence:
[B]ecause if the elements of the alleged infringing device that are not equivalent to
elements in the patent are not crucial to how the device performs, or the result
that it obtains, then the device as a whole could still perform substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result as the
patented device.410

There are limits to the doctrine of equivalents, one being
prosecution history estoppel. Where patent applicants narrow their
claims during prosecution, they may be precluded from invoking the
doctrine of equivalents to broaden the scope of their claims to cover

[T]he majority ignores the bases of the GVR which returned this case to us, and
instead manipulates the issues of equivalency and estoppel to achieve a policy-driven
result. . . . Although the Supreme Court rejected judicial entry into this policy arena,
the majority has entered headlong, criticizing 150 years of Supreme Court precedent
and 18 years of Federal Circuit precedent as “unworkable.”
Id.
407.

Id.

This spontaneous judicial action represents a venture into industrial policy whose
consequences have been inadequately considered. The majority’s announced purpose
of facilitating competition by restricting patentees’ access to the doctrine of
equivalents has not been evaluated for its effect on the nation’s technology-based
industry, for its effect on the system of patents as an innovation incentive, or indeed
for its effect on competition. The interdependent policy aspects of technologic
innovation, industrial growth, and competition were not briefed, and do not inhere in
this court’s “special expertise” in adjudication of patent disputes.
Id.
408.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 879 F.2d 849, 850–51 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Newman,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
409.
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
disapproved by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
410.
Id.
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subject matter ceded by the amendments. However, it should be
regarded narrowly.
She wrote that “[b]y adopting a generous
interpretation of the scope of surrender, and stinginess toward its
rebuttal, the ensuing framework is one that few patentees can
survive.”411 Instead, she emphasized the need to look carefully at the
reasons for why the equivalents might have been surrendered.412 The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that “the patentee still might rebut
the presumption that estoppel bars a claim of equivalence. The
patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in
the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that
would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.”413 In doing
so, the Supreme Court vindicated other related dissents of hers.414
To the limitation of prosecution history estoppel, there are
three exceptions. The first was when the claim was foreseeable.
Judge Newman once dissented against a ruling that a narrower
unamended claim is barred from access to any degree of equivalency
where a broader claim was amended during prosecution.415 To her,
this amounted to an “absolute bar” that “would give the coup de grace
to this vestige of the doctrine of equivalents.”416 In another dissent,
she wrote that “an existing structure need not be recognized, or even
recognizable, as an equivalent at the time of the patent application or
amendment, in order to be ‘foreseeable’ if it is later used as an
equivalent.”417
The majority had ruled that “the aluminum alloy shield was
retrospectively foreseeable at the time of the amendment because it
later was used as an equivalent, although it was not known to be
equivalent and would not have been deemed equivalent at the time of

411.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1385 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
412.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 631 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
[E]quivalents are now held forfeited whether or not the claimed element itself was
amended, or even discussed, during prosecution. In contrast, the Court has
consistently held that the law of estoppel requires determination of what was
surrendered and why, measured by the representations made by the applicant in
order to obtain the patent.
Id.
413.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002).
414.
See, e.g., Intermatic Inc. v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 273 F.3d 1355, 1369–70 (Fed.
Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1016 (2002), vacated, 60 F. App’x 805 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
415.
Id.
416.
Id. at 1370.
417.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368, 1383 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting).
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the amendment.”
She accused the majority of inconsistency,418
rhetorically asking, “How can a particular equivalent be foreseeable, if
it was not known that the technology was equivalent in the context of
the invention?”419
Neither does a search report filed in compliance with a duty of
disclosure create prosecution history estoppel “as to the complete and
detailed content of all of the references listed in that report.”420 This is
because “[t]he role of the prosecution history in generating an estoppel
is different from its role in construing the claims,” and the majority’s
rule would have the “mischievous consequence” of “convert[ing] into
estoppel the information provided in accordance with the duty of
disclosure.”421
Judge Newman insisted that the second and third limitations
to prosecution history estoppel—“tangentialness” of the amendment
and “some other reason”—were both questions of fact.422 In another
case, she protested against requiring “that the inventor was actually
prevented from describing an unknown equivalent, in order to rebut
the presumption of surrender—and that the reason was contained in
the prosecution history—a virtual impossibility,” which in any case
required “full and fair exploration of the issues with benefit of the
procedures of trial.”423
418.

Id. at 1386.

[F]or my colleagues hold that it suffices to estop access to the doctrine of equivalents if
the then-believed to be nonequivalent structure was a known structure in the field of
the invention. My colleagues rule that it is irrelevant that the structure was believed
not to be equivalent, as long as an original claim before amendment could have
generally included a device having that structure.
Id.
419.
Id. at 1385–86.
420.
Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“References not cited by and not relied on by the
examiner, but filed and explained by the applicant in accordance with Rule 56 and its
implementing rules, do not generate prosecution history estoppel.”), abrogated by Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
421.
Id. at 1466, 1469.
422.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“I do not agree with the
treatment of the factual criteria of ‘tangentialness’ and ‘other reasons’ as questions of law, or
with the adjudication of these new issues without permitting evidence and argument in
accordance with the procedures of trial.”).
423.
Id. at 1385.
All three classes of rebuttal raise questions of fact and all raise questions of first
impression, requiring full and fair exploration of the issues with benefit of the
procedures of trial. The court’s limitation of the presentation of evidence that may
serve to rebut the presumption of surrender constricts judicial ability to render a just
decision.
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Another limit to the doctrine of equivalents comes from
equivalents that had been disclosed but not claimed. Characterizing
this as “a new absolute bar to equivalency, a bar that applies when
there is no prosecution history estoppel, no prior art, no disclaimer, no
abandonment,” she criticized the decision because it “jettisons even
the possibility of relief when relief is warranted, and further distorts
the long-established balance of policies that undergird patentsupported industrial innovation.”424
The majority defended its
position, denying that it was “announcing a new rule,” or that the
holding was inconsistent with precedent.425
The “all elements” rule also limits the scope of the doctrine of
equivalents. Judge Newman resisted the majority’s rule “that all
elements of the restated claim are subject to the presumption of
surrender of all equivalents, whenever the antecedent independent
claim is cancelled.”426
The majority sought to prevent “astute
practitioners, through clever claim drafting, from electing to treat
most, if not all, amendments by merely adding new claim limitations
rather than narrowing preexisting ones.”427
Her dissent regarded that view as “seriously flawed.”428 The
logical conclusion would be “that no subordinate claim can avoid
presumptive surrender and estoppel whenever a broader claim is
cancelled. Yet the writing of broader claims and their cancellation
during prosecution is, or was, the common practice.
Astute
practitioners are indeed needed, for little is left of access to
equivalency.”429 She warned that “future applicants may attempt to
obtain access to the doctrine of equivalents through avoiding
Id.; see also Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 352 F.3d 1369, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[T]he approach required by precedent is to recognize the
Festo presumption of estoppel, and remand to the district court to determine whether the
presumption has been or can be rebutted on any of the grounds established in the Festo cases.
Consistent guidance is required for stable law.”).
424.
Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1064 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (Newman, J., dissenting).
425.
Id. at 1055 (Clevenger, J., concurring).
Judge Newman has a different view of this case than I do. It is incorrect to
characterize our decision today as announcing a new rule. It is equally incorrect to
characterize our decision today as a mutinous act in the light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605,
70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950).
Id.
426.
Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1146 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (Newman, J., dissenting in part).
427.
Id. at 1152.
428.
Id. at 1153.
429.
Id.
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dependent claims.”430 This would lead to a litany of consequences,
such as higher costs, more frequent mistakes, and longer examination
times.431
c. Extraterritoriality and Other Facets of Infringement
Patentees can sue for activity conducted outside of the United
States that would infringe if conducted domestically.432 In Cardiac
Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., the majority excluded all
process inventions.433 Judge Newman accused her colleagues of “overreact[ing] and overreaching.”434 She argued that the statutory term
patented invention had “the same meaning in this subsection as in
every other part of [the Patent Act]: it is the general term embracing
all of the statutory classes of patentable invention.”435 Further there
was a risk that the defendant may escape liability when “some steps
are performed in the United States and other steps are performed
offshore.”436 This would cause “all process inventions [to be] seriously
devalued” and would be an “absurd result.”437
Judge Newman’s dissents also touched upon foreign decisions.

430.
431.

Id.
Id.

Patent applications will cost more, since independent claims carry a heavier fee than
dependent ones. There will be more opportunities for mistakes, and insignificant
changes in the wording of limitations that would have been incorporated by reference
will be fodder for litigation. Examination will probably take longer, because the use of
dependent form adds organization to the claims and makes them easier to
understand. The losers are those patentees who had no reason to foresee today’s new
rule, and future patentees who will have to cope with it.
Id.
432.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012) (providing a cause of action for patent infringement when a
defendant “supplies” for assembly outside of the U.S. the “components” of a patented invention).
433.
576 F.3d 1348, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
434.
Id.
[M]y colleagues have over-reacted as well as overreached, for it is not necessary (nor is
it our prerogative) to destroy the statute for all process industries, in order to avert
potential abuses in unknown circumstances. I agree that for ever more complex
technologic facts, vigilance is required to preserve the statutory purpose. . . . The
court’s ruling reopens, for process inventions, the loophole that was plugged by §
271(f) for all patented inventions. The extensive legislative record shows consideration
of equity, economics, innovation incentive, and international concerns, in the
evolution of the text of § 271(f).
Id.
435.
436.
437.

Id. at 1366.
Id. at 1373.
Id.
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One case concerned whether the court has discretion to resolve aspects
that concern foreign patents.438 The majority “raise[d] the specter that
foreign courts might adjudicate United States patent rights, proposing
that if our courts are permitted to decide questions under foreign
patent law, other countries will feel free to decide questions of United
States patent law.”439 She noted that “it is not new for courts in other
countries to apply the law of other nations when warranted. Courts in
other countries have not refrained from applying foreign patent law,
including United States law.”440 She pointed out that there was
nothing to warrant a different treatment of patents, observed “the
similarity of the policies that underlie patent law of all industrialized
nations, and stress[ed] that for most technologies the same scope of
practical protection is available to industrial development in all
nations.”441 She also noted that “[i]t would be anomalous indeed for
the United States now to rule that the courts cannot understand
patent principles as applied in other nations.”442
On the issue of divided infringement, the majority in Akamai
Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. determined that there
was no infringement when one entity performed some steps of the
claim and the other performs other steps, unless one entity “controls
or directs” the activity of the other.443 The defendants in the case
“formed a strategic partnership, enabled their two programs to work
together, and collaborated to sell the two programs as a unit,”444 but
did not infringe, even when they collaborated to practice every
limitation of the claims. The en banc court concluded that the induced
infringement could be found without direct infringement.445 Judge
Newman disagreed, because direct infringement, rather than
inducement, was the correct framework upon which to approach the
issue.446 The Supreme Court reversed the majority, holding that “our
438.
Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 916 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting).
439.
Id.
440.
Id. at 917.
441.
Id. (“All nations have recognized their obligation to provide a judicial forum to
address disputes involving their citizens; no warrant has been shown to remove foreign patents
from this purview.”).
442.
Id.
443.
692 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
444.
Id. at 1349.
445.
Id. at 1319.
446.
Id. at 1326.
Thus the majority discards decades of precedent, refuses our en banc responsibility,
and states that ‘we have no occasion at this time to revisit any of those principles
regarding the law of divided infringement as it applies to liability for direct
infringement.’ The apparent justification is the new inducement-only rule of liability.
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case law leaves no doubt that inducement liability may arise if, but
only if, [there is] . . . direct infringement.”447 Disagreeing with both
the en banc court and Judge Newman as to the outcome, the Court
concluded that “performance of all the claimed steps cannot be
attributed to a single person, so direct infringement never
occurred.”448
In Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Federal
Circuit considered whether a good-faith belief in the invalidity of an
asserted patent was a defense to induced infringement.449 Judge
Newman argued that it was not.450 The majority criticized Judge
Newman’s dissent, noting that it “does little more than construct a
straw man and set him ablaze”451 and that the defendant’s good faith
belief in patent invalidity was required to find induced
infringement.452 The case went up before the en banc court, and
Judge Newman gathered to her cause Chief Judge Rader as well as
Judges Reyna and Wallach, who joined her dissent.453 The Supreme
Court agreed with Judge Newman, noting that “the allocation of the
burden to persuade on these questions, and the timing for the
presentations of the relevant arguments, are concerns of central
relevance to the orderly administration of the patent system.”454
Accordingly, “because infringement and validity are separate issues
under the Act, belief regarding validity cannot negate the scienter
required under § 271(b).”455
As for ITC cases, Judge Newman sided with the defendants in
a case where the patentee, InterDigital, sought to bring an exclusion
Id.; see also Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1381–83 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“A reasonable jury could have found that this collaborative
activity infringed the various claims” based on a theory of direct infringement.”), overruled by
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
447.
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014) (“The
Federal Circuit’s analysis fundamentally misunderstands what it means to infringe a method
patent. A method patent claims a number of steps; under this Court’s case law, the patent is not
infringed unless all the steps are carried out.”).
448.
Id. at 2118.
449.
720 F.3d 1361, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part), vacated in part by 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015).
450.
Id. at 1374.
451.
Id. at 1369 n.1.
452.
Id. (“We certainly do not hold ‘that if the inducer of infringement believes in good
faith that the patent is invalid, there can be no liability for induced infringement. . . . Nor do we
‘include a belief in patent validity as a criterion of infringement.’”).
453.
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 699, 703–04 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
454.
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1929 (2015).
455.
Id. at 1928.
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action against Nokia. She first noted that “InterDigital does not
manufacture the patented invention in the United States, and no
domestic industry produces the items for which exclusion is sought.”456
Second, “[t]he license that InterDigital seeks to impose on Nokia, on
threat of exclusion of importation, is not a license to manufacture any
patented product in the United States; it is a license to import
products made in foreign countries.”457 Accordingly, no exclusion
remedy was warranted.458 Recently, a case arose whose outcome
would leave patentees with remedy at the ITC when importations
were conducted by electronic transmission. The majority held that
only tangible imports are subject to exclusion. Basing her views
principally on “the language, structure, and purpose of [§] 337, and
decades of precedent concerned with digital data, electronic
transmission, and infringing importation,” she dissented.459
3. Defenses & Exceptions
Inequitable conduct is far and away the most common reason
for Judge Newman’s dissents in the subcategory of exceptions and
defenses (Figure 24 below). While most of her dissents are decidedly
pro-patentee, Judge Newman’s views on the common law research
exemption favor defendants. According to her, the patent system’s
goal of providing financial incentives “to create new knowledge and
bring it to public benefit through new products” is counterbalanced
against its goal to “add to the body of published scientific/technologic
knowledge . . . . The right to conduct research to achieve such
knowledge need not, and should not, await expiration of the patent.”460
She acknowledged the challenges of finding the correct balance but
noted that “[s]etting the boundaries of a common law exemption
requires careful understanding of the mechanisms of the creation,
development, and use of technical knowledge, and of today’s
complexity of interactions among invention and the innovating fruits

456.
InterDigital Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 707 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing).
457.
Id.
458.
Id. (“The panel majority errs in holding that Congress intended to authorize access
to the ITC exclusion remedy in such circumstances. That is not the purpose of the ‘licensing’
amendment to Section 337 of the Tariff Act.”).
459.
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Newman, J., dissenting).
460.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), vacated, 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005).
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of invention,” but cautioned that barring research “would be a practice
impossible to administer.”461

FIGURE 26: DISSENTS: EXCEPTIONS & DEFENSES (OVER TIME)

a. Experimental Use & Repair/Reconstruction
Judge Newman defended the rights of researchers to
experiment on patented inventions. In Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v.
Merck KGaA, the majority had denied the exemption “because the
[defendant’s] research had the goal of curing cancer and
commercializing the cure.”462 She responded that “an ultimate goal or
hope of profit from successful research should not eliminate the
exemption.”463 Instead, “[t]he better rule is to recognize the exemption

461.
462.
463.

Id.
Id. at 876
Id.
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for research conducted in order to understand or improve upon or
modify the patented subject matter, whatever the ultimate goal.”464
That rule would recognize that “research itself is not prohibited, nor is
comparison of the patented subject matter with improved technology
or with designs whose purpose is to avoid the patent.”465
As a matter of law, she urged a distinction between permissible
“research” and impermissible “development.”466 Factors such as
“scale, creativity, resource allocation, and often the level of
scientific/engineering skill needed for the project . . . may serve as a
useful divider, applicable in most situations.”467 An exhaustive
definition of what qualifies is impossible because “[l]ike ‘fair use’ in
copyright law, the great variety of possible facts may occasionally
raise dispute as to particular cases. However, also like fair use, in
most cases it will be clear whether the exemption applies.”468
The Integra majority was also concerned that the exemption
would eliminate patents on research tools.469 Judge Newman called
this a “misperception” because “[t]here is a fundamental distinction
between research into the science and technology disclosed in patents,
and the use in research of patented products or methods, the so-called
‘research tools.’”470 An assay kit is “subject to the patent right as is
any other device or method, whether it is used to conduct research or
for any other purpose.”471 In contrast, where the invention was a new
composition with certain biological properties, the defendant’s
“syntheses and evaluations” did not use the products as a research
tool.472 As mentioned in Section II.C.3., the Supreme Court agreed
with Judge Newman, holding that the “exemption from infringement
extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related
to the development and submission of any information” required
under the relevant statutory provision.473
One other area of note in Judge Newman’s dissent is that
“there is no automatic right to replace unworn, unbroken parts of a
patented structure simply because the unworn part is sold or used in

464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 877–78.
Id. at 878.
Id.
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005).
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attachment to a worn part.”474 The facts concerned a patented plug
that was “a material and complex part of the total claimed invention,”
and the fact that it requires a particular cartridge configuration to
mate it to the head was “a controlling fact.”475 In order to preserve
“the integrity of the patent grant,” since “[i]f the asserted repair also
requires reconstruction, it cannot be deemed to constitute an
exception,” and that “[t]he right to exclude others from practice of the
patented invention is eviscerated if others are authorized to
reconstruct a material portion thereof simply because the worn part of
the patented structure is not readily repaired or replaced.”476
b. Inequitable Conduct
Inequitable conduct is a defense to patent infringement. It has
the effect of an “atomic bomb” and can “endanger a substantial portion
of a company’s patent portfolio.”477 A court finding inequitable
conduct may refuse to enforce the patent and its entire family.478 To
prove inequitable conduct, the defendant must show that the patent
applicant: (1) withheld or misrepresented so-called “material”
information and (2) did so with intent to deceive the USPTO.479
On the issue of materiality, an undated brochure at a trade
show a few weeks after the application was filed, and found not to be
invalidating prior art was not material to patentability. There was no
evidence that the brochure was published before the application’s
filing date. She reiterated the “high stakes” that came with a charge
of inequitable conduct for “both the attorney, whose career it can
threaten, and the applicant, who can lose a perfectly valid patent.”480
On the issue of intent, she resisted the idea that courts should
be able to infer deception. Basing inequitable conduct on a “should
have known” standard that the information might be material to
patentability “further revives the “plague” of the past.” That is wrong,
according to Judge Newman, because the inequitable conduct
“requires scienter and deliberateness.”481
474.
Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc., 875 F.2d 300, 304–06 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
475.
Id. at 307.
476.
Id.
477.
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288–89 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
478.
Id.
479.
See id. at 1287.
480.
Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
481.
Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
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In one case, the applicant failed to send a manual and
photographs to the USPTO.482
The USPTO established on
reexamination that the information was immaterial to patentability.
The majority “infer[red]” evidence of deceit when the applicant failed
to send his attorney the manual and photographs because “a savvy
inventor and businessman such as Mr. Obradovich would have known
the information was material to patentability and would therefore
withhold it in order to deceive the PTO.”483 Judge Newman disagreed
because “a more likely inference is that a savvy inventor and
businessman would know that a patent obtained through concealment
of a material reference is not a reliable commercial asset.”484
Nor should mistakes be exaggerated into deception.485 She
reiterated that “[t]o avoid the inequity resulting from litigation-driven
distortion of the complex procedures of patent prosecution, precedent
firmly requires that the intent element of inequitable conduct must be
established by clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent—not
of mistake, if there were such, but of culpable intent.”486
Judge Newman campaigned against majority opinions she felt
were too lax in finding inequitable conduct, and repeatedly warned
her colleagues not to contribute to the “absolute plague” of inequitable
conduct allegations.487 She wrote that “every experiment done and not
done, every scientific inference, every judgment or belief, is fair game
for opportunistic attack.”488
Doubtless, her work at American

482.
Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 768 F.3d 1185, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
483.
Id. at 1193–94.
484.
Id. at 1194.
485.
McKesson Info. Sols., Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
It is not clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent that the applicant did not
inform the examiner of the examiner’s grant of a related case of common parentage a
few months earlier, a case that was examined by the same examiner and whose
existence has previously been explicitly pointed out by the same applicant or is it clear
and convincing evidence of deceptive intent that the applicant did not cite a reference
that the applicant had cited in the same related case, and that had been explicitly
discussed with the same examiner in the related case.
Id.
486.
Id.
487.
Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1155 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“At the time this fee concession was
adopted the courts were experiencing the ‘absolute plague’ of charges of inequitable conduct in
‘almost every major patent case,’ perhaps cautioning the regulators about additional fodder for
that plague.”).
488.
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
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Cyanamid and FMC Corp. led her to express concern at how this
“litigation-driven issue” evolved to “demand a perfection that few
could attain in the complexities of patent practice.”489 According to
her, “straightforward scientific and patent activity were distorted
until judicial suspicions were raised, despite the absence of any
significant error or misstatement,” and “[s]uch attacks feed upon the
complexities of science and technology, and it is rare indeed that some
flaw cannot be found.”490
Judge Newman described an apocalyptic scene where “[t]he
consequences were disproportionally pernicious, for they went far
beyond punishing improper practice.
The defense was grossly
misused, and with inequitable conduct charged in almost every case in
litigation, judges came to believe that every inventor and every patent
attorney wallowed in sharp practice.”491 To the skeptical readers, it
seems almost as if she turns, looks straight at them and says, “This is
not hyperbole.”492
Inequitable conduct presented a danger to the viability of the
patent system itself. She wrote that “[l]itigation-induced assaults on
the conduct of science and scientists, by aggressive advocates intent on
destruction of reputation and property for private gain, produced the
past ‘plague’ of charges of ‘inequitable conduct.’”493 Where the
realities of science met the requirements of the law, the latter must
give way lest the progress of the former be derailed by “opportunistic
challenge.”494
Scientific research and patent prosecution were
489.
Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
490.
Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1381.
491.
Ferring B.V., 437 F.3d at 1195.
492.
Id.
493.
Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1372.
A successful attack on the inventor or his lawyer will destroy the patent, no matter
how valid the patent and how sound the invention. The uncertainties of the processes
of scientific research, the vagaries of the inductive method, the complexities of patent
procedures, and the twists of hindsight, all provided grist for this pernicious mill.
Indeed, the prevalence of accusations of inequitable conduct in patent cases led judges
to suspect that all scientists are knaves and all patent attorneys jackals. Today this
court revives that misbegotten era.
Id.
494.

Id. at 1373.

This case illustrates the ease of opportunistic challenge to the conduct of experimental
science in patent context. My colleagues have distorted the patent process, and the
science it supports, into a game of high stakes hindsight that few patents can survive.
This additional risk to those who create valuable advances of science and technology
has no countervailing public benefit, for the only beneficiary is the infringer who
destroys the patent. I must, respectfully, dissent.
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complex, and scientists and attorneys should not be penalized as
“knaves” and “jackals,” nor should “valid” and “sound” inventions be
subject to the “pernicious mill” from a “misbegotten era.”495
She appealed to historicity and commercial common sense,
writing that “[p]ractitioners from an earlier era well recall the adverse
impact on industrial innovation when patents were not a reliable
support for commercial investment, based in part on the judicial belief
that patents and their practice were seriously flawed.”496 It was easy
for defendants to “challenge the niceties of patent prosecution” if it
was “irrelevant whether the examiner was in fact deceived, or whether
the purported flaw in prosecution affected patentability, or whether
the action was an intentional misrepresentation or at worst
negligence, or whether the invention met the statutory requirements
of patentability.”497
Judge Newman was concerned about subjectivity in
adjudication. She wrote that the standard allows courts to infer
material misrepresentation, malevolent intent, and to “wipe out a
valuable property right, all on summary judgment.”498 In another
dissent, Judge Newman was affronted by the majority’s perceived
distrust of the scientific community, noting that “[t]here is no
evidence, or even an allegation, that any of these scientists had
anything to gain or lose as a result of the issuance of the ‘398 patent.”
499 She took the panel to task for mischaracterizing that the affiants
had “intimate ties” such “that their scientific opinions may be biased
and were submitted with deceptive intent,” calling it “a travesty.”500
She explained that scientists commonly interact with others in the
field, and “[s]uch relationships do not warrant an inference of bias and
deception. There must be evidence and analysis, not innuendo.
Scientific integrity should not be impeached by per se rules without
foundation.”501
Sometimes her dissents related to more controversial routes of
finding inequitable conduct. In one instance, the majority found
inequitable conduct for underpayment of a fee because it was paid at a
rate for “small entities” rather than the normal rate. To her, this was

Id.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.

Id. at 1372.
Ferring B.V., 437 F.3d at 1195.
Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1196–97.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id. at 1200.
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an error correctable without further inquiry.502 In another instance,
she argued that inventorship issues gave rise to inequitable conduct
only where it was deceptively withheld during the examination
process.503 Nor were patent applicants required to disclose all similar
technologies, but only “all information material to patentability of the
claimed invention.”504
Judge Newman’s sympathy for inventors accused of inequitable
conduct was evident when she resisted imposing personal liability on
an inventor who was a non-party after the case had been tried and
judgment rendered.505 The majority allowed a fee award claim to be
brought against the inventor, and found “no basis . . . to believe” that
he could have avoided personal liability had he been joined as a
defendant before judgment was rendered.506 She wrote that “the
imposition of personal liability on the inventor, after all proceedings
have ended, undoubtedly will breed a new ‘plague’ of inequitable
conduct litigation, and further move patent cases from the
mainstream of not only substantive law but also procedural law.”507
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the majority
502.
Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1155 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“At the time this fee concession was
adopted the courts were experiencing the ‘absolute plague’ of charges of inequitable conduct in
‘almost every major patent case,’ perhaps cautioning the regulators about additional fodder for
that plague.”).
503.
Slade Gorton & Co. v. Millis, 62 F.3d 1433, 1995 WL 471106, at *7 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(unpublished table decision) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Incorrect inventorship, if incorrect because of deceptive intent, will invalidate the
patent. But the issue at trial was not whether the inventorship was correct; it was
whether the applicant intentionally withheld from the patent office information that
was required to be disclosed. With no evidence of deceptive intent in withholding
information that was required to be disclosed, there can not have been a verdict of
inequitable conduct.
Id.
504.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Advanced Envtl. Recycling Techs., Inc., 92 F.3d 1203, 1996 WL
325081, at * 5 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (Newman, J., dissenting).
505.
Ohio Cellular Products Corp. v. Adams USA, Inc., 175 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (Newman, J., dissenting), rev’d by Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000).
His personal liability was never litigated, and ‘piercing the corporate veil’ has been
explicitly disclaimed as a ground for charging Mr. Nelson with personal liability. Mr.
Nelson had no opportunity to contest the issue of his personal liability for inequitable
conduct as an inventor. Thus I must, respectfully, dissent from my colleagues’
ratification of this breach of due and fair process.
Id.
506.
Id. at 1353–54 (“The issue of inequitable conduct, although decided adversely to Ohio
Cellular, was not based on undisputed facts or admissions. The majority’s findings of personal
liability do not derive from litigation in which Mr. Nelson had the opportunity to defend his
personal liability.”).
507.
Id. at 1355.
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opinion. It noted Judge Newman’s “vigorous dissent,”508 and agreed
with her that the defendant was never given the opportunity to
respond but instead “adjudged liable the very first moment his
personal liability was legally at issue.”509 She caustically noted that
“[p]rocedure of this style has been questioned even in systems, real
and imaginary, less concerned than ours with the right to due
process.”510
As with the doctrine of equivalents and claim construction,
inequitable conduct was a question for the jury.511 To her, the fact
that deceptive intent rested on credibility findings was sufficient for it
to be a jury question.512 She emphasized the need for a full trial before
inequitable conduct can be found, chastising the majority for
concluding that inequitable conduct had occurred “not upon
considering and weighing the particular facts, but by adverse
inference and presumption, on summary judgment.”513
In an unusual case, Judge Newman came to the defense of an
attorney where she was convinced that there was no intent to deceive
the PTO. She wrote:
Mr. Lipman refrained from the precipitous (and irresponsible) action that the PTO
states was his obligation immediately on receiving the April 27 letter. This was
proper, not improper, representation. He actively and diligently investigated the
matter and duly and timely prepared the appropriate documents for filing in the
PTO. The circumstances do not establish a violation of 37 C.F.R. § 10.23
(Misconduct). I must, respectfully but with urgent concern for this miscarried
disciplinary action, dissent.514

In a later dissent, she stated more broadly that “[a]ttorney fee
sanctions are rarely assessed in routine civil actions, lest the chilling

508.
Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 464–65 (2000).
509.
Id. at 468; see also id. at 471 (“As Judge Newman wrote in dissent: ‘The law, at its
most fundamental, does not render judgment simply because a person might have been found
liable had he been charged.’”).
510.
Id.
511.
Agfa Corp. v. Creo Prods. Inc., 451 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (“This is a departure from the established jury right, for materiality and intent are
quintessential questions of fact, and have been tried to a jury throughout the nation’s history.”).
512.
Id. at 1383 (“As the panel majority correctly points out, findings of deceptive intent
often require findings of credibility. Credibility is unequivocally the province of the jury. . . . The
question of whether the patent applicant intended to deceive the patent examiner is a fact, for
which a jury may be demanded.”).
513.
Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (“That is not the law of inequitable conduct, and it is not a reasonable application of
any of the rules and protocols of evidence.”).
514.
Lipman v. Dickinson, 174 F.3d 1363, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Newman, J., dissenting).
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effect of threatened punishment of the lawyer inhibit an aggrieved
party’s access to assistance.”515
4. Remedies
The victorious patentee is entitled to damages, injunctive
relief, and attorney fees, or any combination as the circumstances
warrant.516 Figure 27 (below) shows Judge Newman’s dissents on
remedies. Her dissents have focused on injunctions and damages.
Her other dissents touch on attorney fees, costs, sanctions, and unjust
enforcement.

FIGURE 27: DISSENTS: REMEDIES (OVER TIME)

515.
Phonometrics, Inc. v. Westin Hotel Co., 350 F.3d 1242, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
516.
See HANSEN, SCAFIDI & LIM, supra note 66.
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a. Damages
Judge Newman generally had little reason to dissent on the
issue of damages. In one case, the majority sided with a district court
that rejected the master’s methodology “in the absence of clear error in
the premises adopted by the master or in his application of law.”517
She has also differed from the majority in valuing infringed patents by
looking at “licenses involving the technology of those patents bundled
with additional technologies, such as software code.”518 The majority
held “that only the royalty in the settlement agreement can be
considered in the hypothetical license negotiation.”519 Judge Newman
thought that those licenses involved the same subject matter and
“allocating their proportional value, with the assistance of undisputed
expert testimony” should have been permissible.520
b. Injunctions
Any consideration of preliminary injunctive relief necessarily
implicates the judge’s view of likelihood of success on the merits and
therefore the elements of validity. The burdens of proof can be
determinative, and Judge Newman parted from her colleagues in the
presumption of validity. As she put it, “[t]he appropriate question,
however, is whether the movant is likely to prevail on the merits, not
whether the accused infringer can raise a defense.”521
Judge Newman explained the reason for this staunch defense
of the presumption of validity in another dissent. She wrote:

517.
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The district court pointed to no error
in judgment or law or factual premise in these rulings, and erred in rejecting the master’s
decision and substituting its own.”).
518.
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
519.
Id. at 882.
520.
Id. at 876.
521.
Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 660 F.3d 1293,
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
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The presumption arises from the Patent Office’s final decision to grant the patent:
the examination that not only finds the prior art, but weighs and evaluates the
technological and objective evidence, based on scientific experience and legal
expertise. . . . The presumption is based not only on the identification of prior art
and the differences from the claimed invention, but on the administrative decision
of unobviousness. It is curious indeed to hold that only the former administrative
actions are entitled to its benefit, accepting the expertise of the examiner as
searcher but not as evaluator.522

As to the balance of hardships, that factor should be decided in favor
of the defendant where the current state of affairs is not easily
recoverable if the interim infringement is authorized. Every factor
should be considered.523 For Judge Newman, “[w]hen the equities are
considered, and on an objective view of the facts of patent validity, the
fair and just action is to preserve the status quo during the
litigation.”524
c. Attorney Fees
Patent law permits fee-shifting in egregious situations.
Generally speaking, Judge Newman requires a higher threshold for
attorney fees than her colleagues. Amidst the rising tide of patent
trolling, she made the point that even a “weak case is entitled to a day
in court without fear of judicial ire.”525 The American Rule militated
against fee-shifting so that one is not penalized for merely defending
or prosecuting a lawsuit. She noted that “[t]he nation’s policy is to
retain the American Rule; and should that rule favor what some call
‘patent predators’ or ‘patent trolls,’ the possible potential remedy is
complex and its implications manifold.”526
In another case, what the majority found “an ‘exceptional case’
of such severity as to warrant the award of attorney fees” was one
with “unexceptional trial procedures and non-culpable prosecution
errors.”527 The case touched on a pet peeve of hers—inequitable
conduct. She wrote that:

522.
Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
523.
Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman,
J., dissenting) (“Instead, the majority opinion announces that this aspect will not be considered
at all.”).
524.
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 496 F. App’x 46, 56 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
525.
Colida v. Sanyo N. Am. Corp., No. 04-1287, 2004 WL 2853034, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Dec.
2, 2004) (Newman, J., dissenting).
526.
Id.
527.
Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 528 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
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My colleagues now hold that when “inequitable conduct” is relied on for a fee
award, there is “no distinction, in either our case law or any statutory authority,
between inequitable conduct that is somehow benign, and inequitable conduct that
is otherwise.” To the contrary, that distinction is critical, as reflected in precedent
and in the premises of the statute, and must be considered.528

On the facts, the majority had found inequitable conduct based on the
inventor paying “small-entity fees” instead of “large entity fees” as
well as his “failure to tell the examiner of ongoing litigation with
Motorola involving related patents, an error that was shown to be
unintentional, of no interest to the examiner, and of no consequence to
the allowance of any claims.”529 She again reiterated her concern
voiced in inequitable conduct cases that “[a]ny patent prosecution, and
indeed any litigation, is vulnerable in its detail. It is appropriate and
necessary to consider the nature of the conduct, in reviewing an
attorney fee award, and to limit such award to major infractions, as
statute and precedent require.”530
5. Other Issues
Beyond the traditional doctrinal categories, Judge Newman
also dissented on a host of other miscellaneous issues (Figure 28
below). Most are case specific and provide little direction for future
application.531 A few areas, however, are significant and warrant
some discussion. The areas that warrant discussion are her dissents
on: design patents, evidence and procedure, and prosecution.

528.
Id. at 1362.
529.
Id.
530.
Id. at 1365.
531.
A common theme might be that Judge Newman argues the court should exercise
jurisdiction and give the parties an answer, rather than duck the issue. I am indebted to Andrew
Michaels for this insight.
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FIGURE 28: DISSENTS: OTHER ISSUES (BY YEAR)

a. Design Patents
Judge Newman’s dissents involving design patents primarily
stress the distinct role that they play from utility patents. In one
dissent, she wrote that “[a] design patent is not a substitute for a
utility patent. When the only distinctiveness of the claimed design is
in its functional features, and ornamentation is not asserted or shown,
the design does not meet the statutory requirements.”532 At the same
time, she has also resisted attempts to create new rules specific to
design patents.533 In context of whether a design patent could benefit
532.
In re Sung Nam Cho, 813 F.2d 378, 383–84 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
533.
Cont’l Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc., 141 F.3d 1073,
1081–84 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I must, however, dissent from the court’s creation of a new rule specific to design
patents, the panel majority holding that experimental use is “virtually inapplicable in
the design patent context.” . . . I can think of no public policy that is served by
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from the experimental use exception in utility patent law, she wrote
that
[t]here is no reason, in law or policy, for the panel majority’s new and special rule
whereby the statutory bar accrues for design patents as soon as the basic design of
the article is made, even when later modifications of the design are essential to the
utility of the article for its intended use.534

In one dissenting opinion, Judge Newman made an important
observation that would become the law several years later. On the
issue of novelty, the majority held that “a design patent is not valid if
it is a combination of known design elements, even if the combination
is novel and the design viewed as a whole meets the criteria of
unobviousness.”535 In response, she wrote that “[c]ontrary to the
panel’s view, the overall appearance of a design can indeed be novel,
and can indeed constitute the patentable novelty.”536 She explained
that “many, if not most, design patents are novel combinations of
known design elements, and that recognition of a design’s overall
appearance can constitute a point of novelty, in the usage that has
evolved in design patent law.”537 As a matter of policy, she wrote, “I
am concerned lest the design patent law be placed in unpredictable
limbo, for many if not most design patents are novel combinations of
known design elements, and design patents are examined and granted
on this rationale.”538
The Federal Circuit articulated the modern test for
infringement in Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, Inc.—whether the
accused product looks substantially similar to the design patent when
seen as a whole by an ordinary observer.539 The court in that case
overturned the more stringent “point of novelty” test which required a
judge to find “novel elements” in the patent which did not exist in the
prior art.540 The modified ordinary observer test reduces the burden of
patent holders to prove design patent infringement, simplifying the
path for effective enforcement of design patents.

removing design patents from the body of precedent that guides application of
§ 102(b).
Id.; see also Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int’l, LLC, 449 F.3d 1192, 1193–95 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Newman, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (“The patentability of a
design is determined on statutory criteria, as for all patents.”).
534.
Cont’l Plastic Containers, 141 F.3d at 1081.
535.
Lawman Armor, 449 F.3d at 1194.
536.
Id.
537.
Id.
538.
Id.
539.
543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
540.
Id.
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b. Evidence & Procedure
Judge Newman’s dissents on evidence and procedure look like
a scattershot (Figure 29 below). The vast majority are idiosyncratic
instances of one or two cases over thirty years. In a matter concerning
a mandamus petition, Judge Newman was in favor of a more
expansive jurisdiction.541 Judge Newman was concerned about the
cost of the Federal Circuit’s decision on parties. Where the matter
could only be resolved in one fashion, summary judgment was the
way. 542

541.
Joy Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Mine Serv. Co., 810 F.2d 1127, 1130–33 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also In re Roberts, 846 F.2d 1360, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (Newman, J., dissenting). In In re Roberts, the majority was concerned that
granting leave would result in a conflict with Seventh Circuit patent law. Id. at 1361–63. Judge
Newman brushed it aside:
Seventh Circuit patent law is extinct; it has no role in ongoing litigation, unless it has
law of the case viability. Our responsibility as successor appellate authority is to
determine the law of the case viability . . . By rejecting both authority and opportunity
to respond to Roberts’ petition, we do not fulfill our obligation to achieve consistency
in patent law and practice.
Id. at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting).
542.
Euclid Chem. Co. v. Vector Corrosion Techs., Inc., 561 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“Since as a matter of law only one
conclusion is reasonable, there is no need for prolongation of this litigation with its costs, delays,
and burdens on parties and courts.”).
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FIGURE 29: DISSENTS: EVIDENCE & PROCEDURE (OVER TIME)

c. Prosecution
Judge Newman’s principal contention in prosecution-related
issues lies in the relationship between, on the one hand, the USPTO
reexamination process and, on the other, the district court and the
Federal Circuit (Figure 30 below). Sometimes it was a question of
whether the PTAB should follow the same standard of interpreting
claims as the district court. At another, it was whether the Federal
Circuit or the PTAB should have the last word on patent validity.
These issues were discussed in Section II.C. in setting out the
sometimes deferential and sometimes stormy relationship between
Judge Newman and the PTAB.
An issue that has risen more recently involves the scope of the
PTAB’s discretionary powers.
One facet of Judge Newman’s
contention involves whether the PTAB can decide whether to institute
post-grant proceedings. According to Judge Newman, the American
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Invents Act empowers the USPTO Director, not the PTAB, to do so.
The role of the PTAB lies in rendering the final opinion.543 She
explains that the Director to be satisfied that there is a reasonable
likelihood of invalidating at least one claim, to prevent “cumulative
and harassing attacks, whereby the vitality of the patent could be
consumed by multiple and time-consuming proceedings.”544 Casting
this requirement against a historical backdrop, she explains that this
threshold was designed to avoid the mandatory review of cumulative
or overlapping issues during ex parte or inter partes review.545
In SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, Judge Newman
fleshes this out.546 On the facts, the challenger had “presented
complete evidence as to all of the claims that it challenged in the
petition, and ComplementSoft provided a full response. Nonetheless,
the PTO refused to consider all of the claims that had been placed at
issue, leaving seven claims undecided.”547 She charges the majority
with a violation of legislative intent, cautioning that “[t]he AIA
provisions are designed to act in harmony, like a well-oiled engine.
Incorrect implementation by the agency distorts the framework,
providing the now-observed result of protracted litigation grinding
against administrative obstinacy.
The victim is the Nation’s
innovation economy.”548
A second facet of Judge Newman’s contention involves whether
the PTAB can select which of the challenged patent claims and issues
to adjudicate, leaving the rest undecided. In Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
Graphics Corp., she noted that “[t]his absence of finality negates the
AIA’s purpose of providing an alternative and efficient forum for
resolving patent validity issues.”549 This uncertainty is exacerbated by
the fact that PTAB proceedings rely on a different standard of proof
than the district courts, “produc[ing] prolonged uncertainty and
multiplied proceedings, at increased rather than reduced cost.”550
Another issue worth discussing is that of double patenting.
The issue arises when two patents issue with claims over the same
invention. Like the doctrine of equivalents, it is judge made. Patent
policy prohibits patentees from extending the duration of protection of
543.
Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
544.
Id.
545.
Id. at 1036–37.
546.
825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
547.
Id. at 1355.
548.
Id. at 1354.
549.
814 F.3d 1309, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, J., dissenting).
550.
Id.
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their patents through double patenting.551 The law does not treat the
earlier patent as prior art, but “simply requires elimination of the
extension of exclusivity by truncating the term of the second patent to
issue, to coincide with the term of the first patent to issue.”552
On the basis that the first patent was not regarded as prior art,
Judge Newman objected to the majority using it as a reference against
the second patent in judging nonobviousness.553 When obviousnesstype double patenting is found, patentees may disclaim the term of
any patent granted on the application at issue that would extend
beyond the term of cited application or patent using a terminal
disclaimer, rather than have the entire application denied.554 In one
dissent, the majority had found “neither common inventorship nor
common ownership, but having so found withholds the standard
remedy of the terminal disclaimer, and simply denies the application.”
She wrote:
If there indeed is obviousness-type double patenting, then a terminal disclaimer is
necessarily available. However, the court rules that a terminal disclaimer is not
available because there is not common ownership. Yet if there is not common
ownership or common inventorship, there cannot be double patenting,” and
criticized the majority’s reasoning as being “circular.”555

551.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
552.
Id. at 974–75.
553.
In re Lonardo, 119 F.3d 960, 968–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Newman, J., concurring in the
judgment as to Serial No. 08/218,756, dissenting as to Reexamination Nos. 98/003,494 and
90/003,343) (“Double patenting is not a ground of rejection that is permitted to be raised under
the reexamination statute.”); Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 975 (Newman, J., dissenting).
When the second patent to issue is (as here) the first patent that was filed, an
anomaly may arise when there is a valid charge of obviousness-type double patenting.
I repeat, that charge is not here available because the first patent that was filed was
in fact a reference against the second patent.
Id.
554.
Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, A Look at the U.S. Doctrine of Obviousness-Type Double
Patenting, KLUWER PATENT BLOG (June 13, 2012), http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2012/06/13/alook-at-the-u-s-doctrine-of-obviousness-type-double-patenting/
[https://perma.cc/Y27W-9UVD]
(last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
555.
In re Hubbell, 709 F.3d 1140, 1150–54 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(“On this circularity, the court denies the CalTech application on the ground of double
patenting.”).
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FIGURE 30: DISSENTS: PROSECUTION (OVER TIME)

IV. CONCLUSION
This Article provides both a quantitative and qualitative
portrait of a remarkable woman who helped shape the law for over
thirty years in a court she helped to create. She regards the court as a
success, but has never forgotten its purpose and mission and has not
hesitated to remind her colleagues when they go awry. For Judge
Newman, “[t]he most important value of the rule of law is in the
provision of a stable and reliable framework for behavior, and the
avoidance of litigation.”556 It is a duty and one from which she would
not shrink or waver.

556.

Newman, supra note 104, at 687.
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Judge Newman’s dissents have enriched the patent dialogue at
the Federal Circuit. A few have succeeded in gaining traction with the
Supreme Court, with her colleagues, and with academics. Others are
pitched to a key for a future court and a true measure of their
influence lies in the hands of history. All have become part of its
institutional memory, and they provide an unvarnished roadmap of
the issues where she saw room for course correction. As is fitting, the
final words on her dissents are hers:
It is time, again, to think creatively, to assure that the law and the policy it
implements are optimum for today’s and tomorrow’s science and its technologic
applications.557
Our differences of opinion are, I believe, healthy, and necessary. They weigh
against the risks of complacency and disaffection envisioned by opponents of the
formation of the Federal Circuit . . . . I do not profess objectivity in my assessment
of the Federal Circuit. I believe that the fears of the opponents have not been
realized; and my hopes as a proponent are being met. This alone cautions against
complacency. Justice Holmes said that the inevitable comes to pass only through
effort. We are committed to that effort.558

557.
558.

Pauline Newman, After Twenty-Five Years, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 123, 123 (2007).
Newman, supra note 102, at 527–28.
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